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SUMMARY	  	  	  In	   the	  heady	  days	  of	   postwar	   imperial	   retreat,	   as	   various	   factions	  wrestled	  for	   claims	   to	   the	   nation,	   challenges	   to	   the	   legitimacy	   of	   the	   colonial	   state	  often	   appeared	   as	   moral	   attacks.	   In	   Singapore,	   culture	   became	   the	   shared	  language	   of	   political	   activism	   in	   the	   transition	   from	   the	   colonial	   to	   the	  postcolonial,	  as	  different	  parties	  contended	  for	  moral	  leadership	  through	  the	  mobilizing	  language	  of	  being	  ‘anti-­‐yellow’.	  This	  thesis	  traces	  the	  story	  of	  the	  Anti-­‐Yellow	   Culture	   Movement,	   or	   反黄文化运动 	   (fanhuang	   wenhua	  yundong),	  and	  argues	  that	  it	  was	  a	  discursive	  space	  that	  emerged	  at	  a	  point	  in	   Singapore’s	   history	   when	   a	   plethora	   of	   postcolonial	   imaginings	   was	   in	  competition,	  and	  the	  most	  direct	  strategy	  to	  capture	  the	  ground	  was	  through	  arguments	  of	  cultural	  morality.	  	  	  The	  thesis	  follows	  the	  development	  of	  this	  movement	  through	  its	  three	  main	  protagonists.	   The	   Anti-­‐Yellow	   Culture	   Movement	   was	   initiated	   among	   the	  Chinese	   middle	   school	   students	   to	   oppose	   the	   prevalence	   of	   pornography	  and	  sexually	  suggestive	  films	  and	  cabaret	  shows,	  and	  it	  quickly	  escalated	  into	  an	  attack	  on	  colonialism	  and	  a	  call	  for	  the	  revitalization	  of	  a	  national	  culture.	  However,	  the	  looseness	  with	  which	  the	  label	  of	  ‘yellow	  culture’	  was	  applied,	  and	   the	   force	  with	  which	   it	  was	  deployed	   reveals	   its	  nature	   as	   a	   rhetorical	  tool	   to	   police	   ideological	   or	   aesthetical	   adherence	   among	   the	   literary	  community,	   even	   as	   these	   standards	   remained	   uneven	   and	   contested.	  Meanwhile,	   the	   British	   colonial	   government	   was	   closely	   monitoring	   this	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movement	  and	  subsequently	  suppressed	  it	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  it	  was	  a	  front	  for	   an	   insidious	   Communist	   plot.	   Burdened	   by	   the	   need	   to	   prolong	  decolonization	   and	   the	   lack	   of	   a	   committed	   public	   relations	   strategy,	   the	  British	   framed	   the	   issue	   of	   ‘yellow	   culture’	   in	   security,	   rather	   than	   moral	  terms.	  In	  1959,	  the	  newly	  elected	  People’s	  Action	  Party	  government	  revived	  the	  movement	   and	   institutionalised	   its	  moral	   arguments	   as	  national	  policy.	  The	   ways	   that	   the	   party	   enforced	   the	   cleansing	   of	   ‘unsavoury’	   cultural	  elements	   reflects	   a	   governing	   rationality	   based	   on	   social	   and	   sexual	  discipline,	  which	  laid	  the	  foundations	  for	  subsequent	  cultural	  policies	  in	  the	  name	  of	  nation-­‐building.	  	  	  By	   locating	   and	   contextualizing	   the	   debates	   of	   the	   Anti-­‐Yellow	   Culture	  Movement,	   this	   thesis	   traces	   the	  discourses	  of	  morality	  at	   the	   interstices	  of	  decolonisation,	   onset	   of	   the	   global	   Cold	   War	   and	   early	   stages	   of	   nation-­‐building.	   ‘Yellow	  culture’	  meant	  different	   things	   to	  different	  parties,	  yet	   the	  term	   carried	  with	   it	   the	  weight	   of	   universal	   righteousness.	   As	   a	   result,	   the	  Anti-­‐Yellow	   Culture	   Movement	   became	   a	   forceful	   and	   didactic	   form	   of	  activism	   that	   at	   times	   distracted	   its	   adherents	   from	   their	   internal	  contestations	   and	   contradictions.	   These	   debates	   reveal	   the	   plural,	  fragmented	  and	  ironic	  nature	  of	  cultural	  politics	  in	  post-­‐war	  Singapore.	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INTRODUCTION	  
	  
The	  Spark	  	  On	  the	  morning	  of	  12	  October	  1953,	  a	  16-­‐year-­‐old	  student	  Chong	  Geok	  Tin	  was	  violently	   raped	   and	   strangled	   to	   death.	   She	   was	   on	   her	   way	   home,	   through	   a	  shortcut	  at	  Pearl’s	  Hill,	  when	  she	  met	  her	  assaulter.	  Her	  gold	  earrings,	  necklace	  and	   ring	   were	   robbed,	   and	   she	   had	   suffocated	   from	   having	   her	   own	   white	  knickers	   stuffed	   into	   her	  mouth.1	  Despite	   months	   of	   police	   investigation	   and	   a	  sizeable	   bounty,	   the	   murderer	   was	   never	   apprehended.	   The	   case	   immediately	  provoked	  widespread	  outrage	  and	  attention.	  Local	  Chinese	  newspaper	  Nanyang	  
Siang	  Pau	  dramatically	  emphasized	  that	  the	  incident	  took	  place	  within	  only	  500	  metres	  of	   the	  Police	  Headquarters.	  The	   case	  was	   reported	   in	  voyeuristic	  detail:	  “the	   deceased	   body	  was	   clean	   like	   jade	   and	  pure	   like	  water.	  Her	   physique	  was	  robust	   and	   beautiful.	   Her	   private	   parts	   revealed	   signs	   of	   assault	   and	   injuries.”2	  Such	  sensational	  reporting	  soon	  gave	  way	  to	  more	  serious	  concerns	  about	  public	  safety.	   Chong’s	   rape	   and	  murder	   reminded	   the	   public	   of	   two	   other	   unresolved	  rape-­‐murders	  that	  had	  happened	  earlier	  that	  year,	  and	  the	  efficiency	  of	  the	  police	  was	  brought	  into	  question.	  Sin	  Pao,	  a	  paper	  known	  for	  its	  leftist	  slant,	  published	  a	  scathing	   commentary	   criticising	   the	   police	   for	   acting	   like	   “wolves	   and	   tigers”	  when	  handling	  the	  illegal	  hawkers,	  but	  behaving	  like	  “rats	  and	  cats”	  when	  dealing	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  ST,	  13	  October	  1953;	  NYSP,	  13	  October	  1953.	  See	  Appendix,	  Figure	  1.	  	  2	  NYSP,	  13	  October	  1953.	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with	   serious	   robbers	   and	   thieves.3	  The	   injustice	   was	   made	   more	   glaring	   by	  Chong’s	   image	   as	   a	   “meek,	   respectful	   girl	   with	   a	   pleasant	   personality”4	  who	  clearly	   did	   not	   deserve	   the	   fate	   that	   befell	   her.	   The	   Mother	   Superior	   of	   St.	  Anthony’s	   Girls’	   School	   had	   praised	   her	   as	   “a	   good	   pupil	   and	   her	   conduct	   in	  school	  was	  quiet	  and	  reserved.”5	  	  	  Chong’s	   rape-­‐murder	   elicited	   a	   multitude	   of	   reactions,	   though	   none	   was	   as	  powerful	   or	   as	   lasting	   as	   the	   response	   from	   the	   Chinese	   middle	   school	  community.	   The	   rape	   and	  murder	   occurred	   at	   a	   ripe	   time	   of	   repressed	   dissent	  and	  discontent	  among	  the	  highly	  politicized	  Chinese	  youths,	  and	  the	  case	  opened	  up	  a	  valve	  for	  the	  surge	  of	  student	  activism	  conducted	  on	  school	  campuses	  and	  in	  print.	   These	   students	   argued	   that	   the	   real	   reason	   for	   Chong’s	   demise	   was	   the	  prevalence	   of	   ‘yellow	   culture’	   (黄色文化	   huangse	   wenhua)	   in	   society.	   They	  blamed	   the	   increasingly	   popular	   strip-­‐tease	   shows,	   sexually	   suggestive	  Hollywood	   films	   and	   the	   import	   of	   nudist	   picture	   books	   as	   key	   culprits	   for	   the	  state	   of	   moral	   degeneracy	   in	   society.	  What	   started	   as	   a	   campaign	   to	   eradicate	  pornography	  from	  classrooms	  soon	  expanded	  into	  a	  vocal	  youth	  movement	  that	  fashioned	  itself	  after	  the	  New	  Culture	  Movement	  in	  early	  twentieth-­‐century	  China.	  As	   a	   vehicle	   for	   channelling	   their	   views	   as	   well	   as	   to	   mobilise	   support,	   they	  projected	   a	   voice	   of	   vanguardism	   through	   self-­‐published	   youth	   periodicals.	  Through	  their	  writings,	  these	  students	  critiqued	  social	  inequalities	  brought	  about	  by	   the	  evils	  of	   colonialism	  and	  capitalism,	  and	   they	  articulated	   their	  alternative	  visions	   of	   a	   robust	   Malayan	   culture.	   The	   student	   community	   encouraged	   each	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  SP,	  16	  Oct	  1953.	  4	  Ibid.	  5	  ST	  13	  October	  1953;	  NYSP,	  13	  October	  1953.	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other	   to	   create	   poetry,	   songs,	   novels	   and	   plays	   as	   part	   of	   this	   national	   cultural	  revitalization	   project,	   and	   the	   Anti-­‐Yellow	   Culture	  Movement	   became	   a	   special	  moment	  of	  literary	  flourishing	  in	  the	  Chinese-­‐speaking	  segment	  of	  Singapore.	  	  The	  students’	  cause	  soon	  gained	  traction	  beyond	  their	  own	  circles,	  culminating	  in	  the	   organizing	   of	   the	   Anti-­‐Yellow	   Cultural	   Council	   in	   1956.	   This	   council	   was	  attended	   by	   over	   400	   organisations	   from	   the	   Chinese,	   Malay	   and	   Indian	  communities	   in	   Singapore,	   and	  was	   supported	  by	  prominent	  personalities	   such	  as	  Lee	  Kuan	  Yew	  himself.	  However,	  the	  influence	  of	  this	  movement	  also	  began	  to	  alarm	   the	   British	   colonial	   authorities,	   who	   had	   long	   been	   monitoring	   these	  activities	   and	   now	   began	   casting	   them	   within	   the	   frame	   of	   a	   Communist	  insurgency.	   The	   Council	   itself	   was	   short-­‐lived	   as	   several	   key	   members	   were	  arrested	   shortly	   after	   its	   formation,	   abruptly	   halting	   the	   momentum	   of	   the	  movement.	   In	  1959,	   the	  newly	  elected	  People’s	  Action	  Party	   (PAP)	  government	  breathed	  new	  life	  into	  the	  Anti-­‐Yellow	  Culture	  Movement.	  Among	  the	  many	  other	  priorities	   that	   must	   have	   been	   on	   its	   agenda	   after	   achieving	   self-­‐government,	  cultural	  policy	  was	  to	  take	  precedence.	  Merely	  eight	  days	  after	  PAP	  gained	  power,	  Home	   Affairs	   Minister	   Ong	   Pang	   Boon	   revoked	   the	   licences	   of	   several	   ‘yellow’	  publications,	  set	  up	  a	  Films	  Censorship	  Board	  and	  banned	  pinball	  machines	  and	  jukeboxes.	   The	   momentum	   of	   this	   moral	   policing	   lasted	   until	   1961,	   when	   the	  state	  shifted	  its	  focus	  on	  merger	  and	  independence.	  	  	  This	  thesis	  traces	  the	  unfolding	  story	  of	  the	  Anti-­‐Yellow	  Culture	  Movement,	  or	  反
黄文化运动	   (fanhuang	   wenhua	   yundong)	   from	   its	   inception	   as	   a	   student-­‐led	  movement,	   its	   suppression	   by	   the	   British	   colonial	   authorities,	   to	   its	   later	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reinvigoration	   and	   institutionalisation	   under	   the	   PAP.	   Despite	   this	   seemingly	  linear	   timeline,	   it	   was	   not	   a	   single	   campaign	   or	   narrative	   with	   defined	   goals,	  objectives	  or	  even	  enemies.	   It	  was	  the	  coalescing	  of	  a	  multitude	  of	  perspectives	  and	  agendas	  under	  a	  shared	  banner,	  each	  group	  adopting	  a	  common	  vocabulary	  of	   morality	   and	   culture.	   This	   thesis	   argues	   that	   the	   Anti-­‐Yellow	   Culture	  Movement	  was	  a	  discursive	  space	  that	  emerged	  at	  a	  point	  in	  Singapore’s	  history	  when	   a	   plethora	   of	   postcolonial	   imaginings	   was	   in	   competition,	   and	   the	   most	  direct	  strategy	  to	  capture	  the	  ground	  was	  through	  arguments	  of	  social	  morality.	  ‘Yellow	  culture’	  meant	  different	   things	   to	  different	  parties,	   yet	   the	   term	  carried	  with	  it	  the	  weight	  of	  universal	  righteousness.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  Anti-­‐Yellow	  Culture	  Movement	   became	   a	   forceful	   and	   didactic	   form	   of	   activism	   that	   at	   times	  distracted	  its	  adherents	  from	  their	  internal	  contestations	  and	  contradictions.	  This	  thesis	   is	   thus	   interested	   in	  how	   the	  discursive	   space	  of	   the	  Anti-­‐Yellow	  Culture	  Movement	   was	   constructed	   from	   the	   perspective	   of	   its	   three	   main	   groups	   of	  protagonists,	  and	  uncovering	  its	  inherent	  ironies	  and	  contradictions.	  	  
	  
Morality	  and	  the	  Making	  of	  a	  Discursive	  Space	  	  In	   this	   thesis,	   ‘yellow	   culture’	   is	   treated	   as	   a	   constructed	   discursive	   space.	   In	  Foucauldian	   discourse	   analysis,	   space	   refers	   to	   a	   series	   of	   material	   and	   non-­‐material	   systems	   where	   power	   is	   inscribed,	   and	   the	   linguistic	   phenomenon	   of	  ‘discourse’	   is	   but	   one	   of	   the	   ways	   to	   generate	   power.6	  He	   further	   explains	   the	  relationship	  between	  space	  and	  discourse:	  “the	  unity	  of	  a	  discourse	  is	  based	  not	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Michel	   Foucault,	   “The	   Order	   of	   Discourse”,	   in	   Untying	   the	   Text:	   A	   Post-­‐Structuralist	  
Reader,	  ed.	  Robert	  Young,	  (Boston:	  Routledge,	  1981),	  pp.	  48	  –	  78.	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so	  much	  on	  the	  permanence	  and	  uniqueness	  of	  an	  object,	  as	  on	  the	  space	  in	  which	  various	   objects	   emerge	   and	   are	   continuously	   transformed.”7	  Put	   to	   application,	  the	  discourse	  around	  ‘yellow	  culture’	  is	  not	  so	  much	  determined	  by	  what	  it	  is,	  but	  by	  the	  “interplay	  of	  the	  rules	  that	  make	  possible	  the	  appearances	  of	  objects	  at	  any	  given	   time.”8	  Thus,	   this	   study	   adopts	   the	   broad	   approach	   of	   examining	   the	   key	  actors	   that	  produced	   the	  discourses	   around	   ‘yellow	   culture’,	   and	   the	   context	   in	  which	  this	  unstable	  term	  has	  been	  put	  to	  use	  to	  varying	  effects.	  	  	  The	  Anti-­‐Yellow	  Culture	  Movement	   could	  partly	  be	  explained	  by	   the	  concept	  of	  ‘moral	  panic’,	  which	  refers	  to	  an	  episode	  where	  an	  object	  or	  a	  group	  of	  people	  is	  defined	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  societal	  values	  and	  interests,	  causing	  widespread	  alarm	  that	  is	  disproportionate	  to	  the	  reality	  of	  their	  dangers.9	  In	  Stanley	  Cohen’s	  pioneering	  study	  of	   ‘moral	  panic’,	  he	   is	   less	  concerned	  about	   the	  origins	   than	  the	  reactions	  surrounding	  the	  incident	  and	  their	  effects	  on	  society.	  An	  important	  component	  in	  generating	   these	   reactions	   is	   the	   persistence	   of	   “suasive	   images”,	   which	   are	  immediately	  recognizable	  symbols	  of	  threat	  that	  can	  stir	  up	  emotions	  and	  direct	  mass	   action	   towards	   their	   elimination.	   In	   the	   construction	   of	   these	   symbols,	  “images	  are	  made	  sharper	  than	  reality.”10	  Erich	  Goode	  and	  Nachman	  Ben-­‐Yehuda	  further	   refined	   Cohen’s	   ideas	   to	   add	   that	   the	   people	   who	   perpetuate	   these	  “suasive	   images”	  were	  usually	   small	  groups	  of	   righteous	  and	   fervent	  elites	  who	  held	   society	   to	   an	   absolute	   ethical	   standard,	   in	   turn	   dictating	   the	   norms	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Michel	   Foucault,	   The	   Archaeology	   of	   Knowledge,	   Translated	   by	   A.	   M.	   Sheridan	   Smith,	  (London:	  Routledge,	  2002),	  p.	  36.	  8	  Ibid.	  9	  Stanley	  Cohen,	  Folk	  Devils	  and	  Moral	  Panics:	  The	  Creation	  of	  the	  Mods	  and	  Rockers,	  (Oxford:	  Blackwell	  Publishers,	  1972;	  1987),	  p.	  9.	  10	  Ibid.,	  p.	  43.	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deviants	   in	   society. 11 	  Similarly,	   the	   advocates	   of	   the	   Anti-­‐Yellow	   Culture	  Movement	  at	  different	  stages	  were	  minority	  groups	  of	  intellectual	  or	  ruling	  elite,	  whose	  power	  over	  the	  masses	  also	  resided	  in	  their	  ability	  to	  convince	  society	  to	  accept	  their	  moral	  positions.	  	  	  The	   ‘anti-­‐yellow’	   crusade	   was	   constructed	   as	   a	   moral	   dialogue	   –	   its	   messages	  were	   crafted	   not	   only	  with	   the	   advocate’s	   interests	   in	  mind	   but	   also	   how	   their	  perceived	   audience	   would	   receive	   them.	   Building	   on	   Cohen’s	   idea	   of	   “suasive	  images”,	  my	  use	  of	  ‘discourse’	  takes	  on	  a	  second	  and	  more	  literal	  meaning	  –	  as	  a	  set	  of	  speech	  acts	  that	  have	  communicative	  and	  mobilizing	  functions	  in	  service	  of	  ‘moral’	   causes.	   As	   Paulo	   Freire	   wrote,	   “a	   true	   revolution	   must	   initiate	   a	  courageous	  dialogue	  with	  the	  people.	  Its	  very	  legitimacy	  lies	  in	  that	  dialogue.”12	  Ji	  Fengyuan,	  who	   examines	   the	   use	   of	   linguistic	   engineering	   in	   the	   early	   years	   of	  Communist	   China,	   argues	   that	   by	   equating	   ideology	   with	   morality,	   the	  Communist	  Party	  was	  able	  to	  codify	  the	   language	  of	  Marxism	  into	  simple	   ‘right’	  and	   ‘wrong’,	   thereby	   reaching	   out	   to	   a	   wider,	   assumedly	   less-­‐educated	  audience.13	  	  	  Although	  the	  ‘anti-­‐yellow’	  protagonists	  utilized	  the	  moral	  argument,	  this	  thesis	  is	  less	  concerned	  with	  reconstructing	   their	  moral	  worldviews.	   Instead,	  morality	   is	  used	   in	   its	   adjectival	   sense	   -­‐	   as	   an	   ordering	   mechanism	   that	   structures	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Erich	  Goode	  and	  Nachman	  Ben-­‐Yehuda,	  Moral	  Panics:	  The	  Social	  Construction	  of	  
Deviance,	  (Oxford:	  Blackwells,	  1994),	  p.	  27;	  Kenneth	  Thompson,	  Moral	  Panics,	  (London:	  Routledge,	  1998),	  pp.	  12	  –	  13.	  12	  Paulo	   Freire,	   Pedagogy	   of	   the	   Oppressed,	   translated	   by	   Myra	   Bergman	   Ramos,	   (New	  York:	  Continuum,	  2005),	  p.	  128.	  13	  Ji	   Fengyuan,	   Linguistic	  Engineering:	   Language	  and	  Politics	   in	  Mao’s	   China,	   (Honolulu:	  University	  of	  Hawaii	  Press,	  2004),	  pp.	  62-­‐70.	  	  
	   7	  
creates	   hierarchies	   of	   values.	  14	  As	   anthropologist	   Thomas	   Csordas	   noted,	   “if	   it	  wasn’t	   for	   evil,	   morality	   would	   be	   moot.”15	  The	   existence	   of	   a	   moral	   order	  necessitates	  the	  binary	  of	  ‘good’	  and	  ‘evil’,	  or	  in	  this	  case,	   ‘decent’	  and	  ‘obscene’.	  The	  competition	  between	  the	  various	  parties	  resides	   in	  their	  ability	  to	  convince	  their	  intended	  audience	  of	  their	  reference	  standards	  of	  ‘yellow’	  and	  ‘healthy’.	  It	  is	  the	   discourse	   of	   morality,	   and	   not	   morality	   itself	   that	   would	   illuminate	   the	  various	   interests	   and	   strategies	   of	   these	   protagonists.	   Yet,	   ‘decency’	   and	  ‘obscenity’	  are	  relative	  concepts	  that	  need	  to	  be	  defined	  in	  terms	  of	  one	  another,	  “producing	   a	   closed	   system	   that	   thwarts	   even	   the	  most	   assiduous	   inquiry	   into	  what	   any	   part	   of	   it	   might	   mean.”16	  ‘Obscenity’	   can	   be	   understood	   as	   a	   socially	  determined	  concept	  that	  is	  defined	  “wholly	  in	  relation	  to	  what	  it	  threatens.”17	  As	  a	  delimiter	  of	  morally	   acceptable	   standards,	   ‘obscenity’	   becomes	   a	  boundary	  of	  intense	   contestation,	   because	   an	   object	   becomes	   obscene,	   in	   part,	   “by	   virtue	   of	  the	   response	   of	   the	   viewing	   object.”18	  Thus,	   in	   this	   thesis,	   ‘yellow	   culture’	   is	  understood	   as	   a	   broad	   derogatory	   term	   that	   its	   detractors	   applied	   to	   refer	   to	  anything	  that	  they	  disagreed	  with.	  	  While	   this	   thesis	  will	   not	   indulge	   in	   a	   full	   exploration	  of	   the	   symbolisms	  of	   the	  colour	   yellow	   or	   to	   trace	   the	   genealogy	   of	   the	   term,	   ‘yellow	   culture’,	   a	   brief	  background	   is	   due.	   Historically	   in	   Europe,	   yellow	   had	   been	   associated	   with	  promiscuity	  as	  prostitutes	  in	  the	  middle	  ages	  were	  required	  to	  wear	  yellow	  signs	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Thomas	  J.	  Csordas,	  “Morality	  as	  a	  Cultural	  System”,	  Current	  Anthropology,	  Vol	  54,	  No.	  5	  (October	  2013),	  pp.	  523	  –	  546.	  15	  Ibid.,	  p.	  525.	  16	  Deana	  Heath,	  Purifying	  Empire:	  Obscenity	  and	  the	  Politics	  of	  Moral	  Regulation	  in	  Britain,	  
India	  and	  Australia,	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2010),	  p.	  39.	  	  17	  Leigh	  Gilmore,	   “Obscenity,	  Modernity,	   Identity:	   Legalizing	  The	  Well	  of	  Loneliness	   and	  
Nightwood”,	  Journal	  of	  the	  History	  of	  Sexuality,	  Vol.	  4,	  No.	  4,	  (1994),	  p.	  606.	  18	  Heath,	  Purifying	  Empire,	  p.	  41.	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and	  ‘yellowbacks’	  was	  a	  term	  to	  describe	  risqué	  novels	  of	  French	  modernity.19	  Fin	  de	  siècle	  Britain	  was	  popularly	  known	  as	  the	   ‘Yellow	  Nineties’,	  characterized	  by	  “aesthetic	  idealism,	  taunting	  self-­‐display,	  uncommon	  sexuality	  and	  degeneracy.”20	  Victorian	  moral	  puritanism	  reacted	  against	   the	  competing	  current	  of	   the	  avant-­‐garde,	  epitomized	  by	  writers	  and	  artists	  of	  the	  day	  such	  as	  Oscar	  Wilde,	  Aubrey	  Beardsley	   and	   Charles	   Baudelaire.	   In	   particular,	   the	   publication	   of	   the	  unconventional	  (but	  to	  some,	  scandalous)	  magazine	  The	  Yellow	  Book	  defined	  the	  colour	  of	  the	  era.	  As	  one	  British	  journalist	  remarked	  of	  this	  publication:	  “…yellow	  became	   the	   colour	   of	   the	   hour,	   the	   symbol	   of	   the	   time-­‐spirit.	   It	  was	   associated	  with	  all	  that	  was	  bizarre	  and	  queer	  in	  art	  and	  life,	  with	  all	  that	  was	  outrageously	  modern.”	  21	  	  	  Similar	   use	   of	   the	   term	   ‘yellow	   culture’	   was	   found	   in	   China	   since	   the	   early	  twentieth	  century.	  Despite	  yellow	  being	  the	  emperor’s	  colour,	  the	  breakdown	  of	  the	   imperial	   order	   gave	   rise	   to	   a	   new	   search	   for	   modern	  meanings,	   especially	  among	   the	   intellectuals	   who	   borrowed	   ideas,	   concepts	   and	   vocabulary	   heavily	  from	  the	  West.	   In	   the	  1930s,	  KMT	  officials	  accused	  Li	   Jinhui,	  a	  music	  composer,	  for	  peddling	  ‘yellow	  music’	  and	  perpetuating	  ‘yellow	  culture’.	  Li	  was	  arguably	  the	  first	   modern	   music	   composer	   in	   China	   who	   “pioneered	   a	   new	   and	   hugely	  influential	   brand	   of	   Sinified	   jazz	   music…	   and	   single-­‐handedly	   responsible	   for	  launching	   the	   careers	   of	   almost	   every	   notable	   singer,	   popular	   musician,	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Sabine	  Doran,	  The	  Culture	  of	  Yellow:	  Or,	  the	  Visual	  Politics	  of	  Late	  Modernity,	  (New	  York:	  Bloomsbury,	  2013),	  p.	  53.	  20	  Dennis	   Denisoff,	   “Decadence	   and	   aestheticism”,	   Cambridge	   Companion	   to	   the	   Fin	   De	  
Siecle,	  ed.,	  Gail	  Marshall,	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2007),	  p.	  31.	  21	  Holbrook	   Jackson,	  The	  Eighteen	  Nineties:	  A	  Review	  of	  Art	  and	   Ideas	  at	   the	  Close	  of	   the	  
Nineteenth	   Century	  (1913),	   quoted	   in	   “The	   Yellow	   Nineties	   Online”,	   edited	   by	   Dennis	  Denisoff	  and	  Lorraine	  Janzen	  Kooistra	  [http://www.1890s.ca/]	  (accessed	  15	  July	  2016).	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movie	   star	   of	   the	   era.”22	  However,	   in	   the	   period	   of	   national	   crisis	   and	   soul-­‐searching,	   Li’s	   soft	   and	   feminine	   style	   of	   music	   was	   considered	   irrelevant	   and	  even	   detrimental	   to	   the	   nationalist	   goals	   of	   projecting	  masculine	   strength.23	  As	  the	   above	   has	   shown,	   the	   term	   ‘yellow	   culture’	   and	   its	  meanings	   travel	   across	  time	   and	   space,	   and	   are	   shaped	   by	   their	   contexts.	   Likewise,	   this	   thesis	   is	  interested	   in	   examining	   how	   ‘yellow	   culture’	   was	   used	   by	   specific	   groups	   of	  people	  in	  Singapore	  from	  1953	  to	  1961,	  how	  it	  gained	  currency	  and	  acquired	  its	  various	  shifting	  meanings,	  and	  how	  the	  discourse	  around	  it	  reflect	  the	  priorities	  and	  anxieties	  of	  its	  progenitors.	  	  
	  
Historiographical	  Survey	  and	  Structural	  Outline	  	  This	   thesis	   is	   produced	   at	   a	   time	   of	   energetic	   contestation	   over	   the	  interpretations	  of	  the	  political	  developments	  of	  the	  1950s	  and	  1960s.	  The	  state,	  local	  academics,	   former	  student	  activists	  and	  even	   film-­‐makers	  have	  been	  more	  active	   in	   the	   last	   few	   years	   than	   in	   the	   previous	   decades	   in	   asserting	   or	  reasserting	  their	  sides	  of	  the	  story.	  A	  particularly	  persistent	  and	  intense	  strand	  of	  debate	   is	   the	   extent	   of	   Communist	   involvement	   in	   the	   politics	   of	   the	   day.	   The	  dominant	  narrative	  perpetuated	  by	  Lee	  Kuan	  Yew	  has	  long	  cast	  the	  Chinese	  left	  as	   “teeming	   with	   raw	   energy	   and	   idealism”	   but	   susceptible	   to	   Communist	  manipulation.24	  This	  image	  was	  rehashed	  in	  2014,	  with	  the	  republication	  of	  Lee’s	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  Andrew	  Jones,	  Yellow	  Music:	  Media	  Culture	  and	  Colonial	  Modernity	  in	  China’s	  Jazz	  Age,	  (Durham:	  Duke	  University	  Press,	  2001).	  p.	  73.	  23	  Ibid.,	  pp.	  116-­‐117.	  	  24	  Lee	  Kuan	  Yew,	  From	  Third	  World	  to	  First:	  The	  Singapore	  Story,	   (Singapore:	  Singapore	  Press	  Holdings,	  2000),	  pp.	  165	  –	  166.	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Battle	  for	  Merger,	  a	  series	  of	  radio	  talks	  aimed	  at	  persuading	  the	  public	  in	  1961	  of	  the	   Communist	   threat	   within	   the	   Chinese	   left.25	  Earlier	   scholarship	   has	   also	  framed	   Chinese	   students’	   activism	   as	   part	   of	   the	   Malayan	   Communist	   Party	  (MCP)’s	   Open	   United	   Front	   strategy.	  26	  Yet,	   these	   caricatures	   are	   problematic	  because	  they	  simplify	  and	  flatten	  the	  internal	  dynamics	  of	  the	  student	  population,	  disregard	  the	  moral	  potency	  of	  these	  cultural	  movements	  and	  failed	  to	  take	  into	  account	  reasons	  for	  their	  popularity.	  	  	  At	   the	   other	   end	   of	   the	   spectrum	   are	   works	   that	   sought	   to	   recover	   the	  experiences	   of	   the	   ‘Chinese	   left’	   from	   the	  margins	   of	   dominant	   historiography.	  Many	  former	  political	  detainees	  and	  student	  activists	  are	  beginning	  to	  speak	  out	  about	  their	  personal	  experiences	  so	  that	  readers	  can	  “appreciate	  the	   ‘otherness’	  of	   that	  past”.27	  As	  a	  generation	   that	  believe	   they	  have	  been	  unjustly	  suppressed	  and	  disregarded	  by	  the	  state,	  they	  have	  painted	  a	  picture	  of	  the	  1950s	  with	  tones	  of	   nostalgia,	   bitterness,	   romanticization	   and	   victimization.	   This	   leads	   one	   to	  question	   how	   different	   these	   histories	   were	   if	   they	   were	   as	   polemical	   and	   as	  politically	   adversarial	   as	   the	   dominant	   official	   narrative.	   	   While	   their	   personal	  experiences	   ought	   to	   be	   respected,	   the	   overarching	   tone	   of	   tragedy	   and	   state	  suppression	   hinders	   critical	   understandings	   of	   these	   students’	   agency	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  Lee	   Kuan	   Yew,	   Battle	   for	   Merger,	   (Singapore:	   National	   Archives	   of	   Singapore	   and	  Straits	  Times	  Press,	  2014).	  26	  Lee	  Ting-­‐Hui,	  The	  Open	  United	  Front:	  The	  Communist	  Struggle	  in	  Singapore	  1954	  –	  1966,	  (Singapore:	   South	   Seas	   Society,	   1996);	   John,	   Drysdale,	   Singapore,	   Struggle	   for	   Success,	  (Singapore:	   Times	   Books	   International,	   1984);	   Dennis	   Bloodworth,	   The	   Tiger	   and	   the	  
Trojan	  Horse,	   (Singapore:	   Times	   Books	   International,	   1986);	   Richard	   Clutterbuck,	  Riot	  
and	  Revolution	  in	  Singapore	  and	  Malaya,	  1945-­‐1963,	  (London:	  Faber	  and	  Faber,	  1973).	  27	  Tan	   Jing	   Quee	   et	   al.,	   eds.,	  The	  May	  13	  Generation:	   the	  Chinese	  middle	   schools	   student	  
movement	  and	  Singapore	  politics	   in	  the	  1950s,	   (Petaling	   Jaya:	   Strategic	   Information	   and	  Research	  Development	  Centre,	  2011),	  p.	  ix.	  	  
	   11	  
creativity	  in	  mobilizing	  for	  their	  causes.28	  	  	  There	   have	   been	   attempts	   in	   the	   last	   decade	   to	   open	   up	   the	   space	   for	   more	  critical	  scholarship.29	  In	  Timothy	  Harper’s	  hallmark	  essay,	  he	  persuasively	  argues	  that	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  counter-­‐insurgency	  deeply	  permeates	  the	  colonial	  documents	  on	  which	   the	   dominant	   narrative	   is	   based,	   and	   “the	   very	   idea	   of	   a	   ‘Communist	  United	   Front’	   is	   perhaps	   a	   misnomer:	   most	   of	   the	   groups	   caught	   up	   in	   leftist	  popular	  radicalism…	  were	  neither	  communist,	  united,	  nor	  a	  front	  for	  anybody	  but	  themselves.”30	  Rather	  than	  to	  denounce	  or	  to	  vindicate	  the	  Chinese	  left	   for	  their	  ideological	  positioning,	  this	  thesis	  is	  interested	  in	  the	  ways	  that	  the	  protagonists	  of	   this	   movement	   have	   constructed	   their	   arguments	   and	   perpetuated	   their	  activism.	   While	   the	   political	   climate	   of	   the	   vocal	   nationalists	   in	   post-­‐war	  Singapore	   was	   already	   left-­‐leaning	   and	   receptive	   to	   communism,	   the	  pervasiveness	   of	   socialist	   ideology	   was	   dependent	   on	   its	   ability	   to	   offer	   an	  attractive	   alternative	   to	   British	   rule,	   and	   its	   appeal	   was	   real	   to	   many	   of	   its	  adherents.	  To	   focus	  primarily	  on	   the	  question	  of	  Communist	  party	  membership	  would	   be	   to	   overstate	   the	   extent	   of	   top-­‐down	   orchestration	   and	  manipulation,	  and	  greatly	  underestimate	  the	  agency,	  initiative,	  and	  passions	  of	  the	  movement’s	  perpetuators.	  In	  Hui	  Yew-­‐Foong’s	  study	  of	  post-­‐war	  Sarawak,	  he	  argued	  that	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  Meredith	   Weiss	   in	   her	   study	   of	   student	   movements	   in	   Asia	   summarised,	   “student	  movements	   are	   among	   few	   genres	   of	   movement	   defined…	   (by	   their)	   inherently	  temporary	   status,	   (which)	  encourages	  a	  degree	  of	   efficiency	  and	  creativity	   in	   students’	  mobilization.”	   See	  Meredith	  Weiss	   et	   al.,	   Student	  Activism	   in	  Asia:	  Between	  Protest	   and	  
Powerlessness,	  (Minneapolis:	  University	  of	  Minnesota	  Press,	  2012),	  pp.	  5	  -­‐	  6.	  29	  Such	  as	  Hong	  Lysa	  and	  Huang	  Jianli,	  eds.,	  The	  Scripting	  of	  a	  National	  History:	  Singapore	  
and	  its	  Pasts,	  (Hong	  Kong:	  Hong	  Kong	  University	  Press,	  2008);	  Michael	  D.	  Barr	  and	  Carl	  Trocki,	   Paths	   Not	   Taken:	   Political	   Pluralism	   in	   Postwar	   Singapore”,	   eds.,	   (Singapore:	  National	  University	  of	  Singapore	  Press,	  2008).	  30	  T.N.	  Harper,	  “Lim	  Chin	  Siong	  and	  the	   ‘Singapore	  Story’”,	   in	  Comet	  in	  our	  Sky:	  Lim	  Chin	  
Siong	  in	  History,	  Tan	  Jing	  Quee,	  Jomo	  K.S	  eds.,	  Poh	  Soo	  Kai,	  new	  edition	  ed.	  (Petaling	  Jaya:	  Strategic	  Information	  and	  Research	  Development	  Centre,	  2015),	  pp.	  6,	  13.	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left-­‐wing	  intellectuals	  saw	  themselves	  as	  part	  of	  a	  tide	  of	  historical	  change,	  where	  progress	  was	  an	  inevitable	  outcome.31	  Similarly,	  Hajimu	  Masuda	  argued	  that	  the	  rise	  of	  communism	  in	  Asia	  was	  not	  necessarily	  a	  result	  of	  the	  expansion	  of	  Soviet	  ideology.	   Rather,	   Marxism	   provided	   a	   new	   vocabulary	   for	   understanding	   and	  describing	  the	  new	  social	  and	  political	  realities	  of	  the	  postwar	  period.	  Communist	  ideology	  was	   translated	   and	   adopted	   for	   the	   purposes	   of	   articulating	   localized	  concerns	   and	   historically	   contingent	   contexts,	   and	   reflected	   not	   so	   much	   of	   a	  global	   ideological	  battle.32	  This	  applies	   to	   the	  context	  of	  Singapore	  as	  well.	   I	  am	  driven	  by	  questions	  of	  why	  and	  how	  this	  particular	  cultural	  movement	  came	  to	  form	  a	  discursive	  space,	  and	  how	  the	  language	  of	  progressiveness	  was	  allowed	  to	  flourish.	  I	  am	  also	  interested	  in	  how	  terms	  like	  ‘yellow	  culture’	  and	  ‘progressive	  culture’	  were	   interpreted	   by	   their	   proponents	   and	  what	   these	  meanings	   reveal	  about	  their	  interests	  and	  intentions.	  	  	  This	  thesis	  also	  attempts	  to	  enrich	  the	  conversations	  about	  state-­‐society	  relations	  at	  a	  time	  of	  political	  flux.	  The	  Anti-­‐Yellow	  Culture	  Movement	  is	  a	  fascinating	  case	  study	  of	  how	  a	  cultural	  movement	  initiated	  from	  the	  ground	  was	  first	  suppressed	  by	   the	   (colonial)	   state,	   and	   later	   recalibrated	   by	   a	   different	   regime	   for	   the	  purposes	  of	  state-­‐formation.	  Existing	  studies	  of	  the	  political	  activism	  and	  cultural	  politics	  of	  the	  1950s	  tend	  to	  give	  weight	  to	  either	  the	  ‘statist’	  perspective,	  which	  focuses	  on	  the	  institutional	  processes,	  the	  political	  parties	  and	  politicians;	  or	  the	  ‘grassroots’	   perspective,	   which	   emphasizes	   the	   civil	   groups,	   activists	   and	   their	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31 	  Hui	   Yew-­‐Foong,	   Strangers	   at	   Home:	   History	   and	   Subjectivity	   among	   the	   Chinese	  
Communities	  of	  West	  Kalimantan,	  Indonesia,	  (Leiden:	  Brill,	  2011),	  pp.	  73	  -­‐	  76.	  32 	  Masuda	   Hajimu,	   Cold	   War	   Crucible	   :	   the	   Korean	   Conflict	   and	   the	   postwar	   world	  	  (Cambridge:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  2015),	  p.	  27.	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causes;	   but	   seldom	   both.	   In	   the	   ‘statist’	   accounts,	   mass	   movements	   are	   the	  backdrops	  on	  which	   the	   casts	  of	  political	  parties	  wrestle	   for	   the	   leading	   role.	  33	  	  The	   efflorescence	   of	   cultural	   and	   literary	   productions	   is	   seen	   as	   a	   prop	   for	   the	  political	   concert,	   in	   service	   of	   constitutional	   politics	   and	   the	   wider	   ideological	  struggle.	  This	   approach	   is	  useful	   to	  gain	  a	  broad	   sweep	  of	  developments	   in	   the	  postwar	  years	  but	  has	  not	  been	  able	  to	  peer	  into	  the	  inner	  sphere	  of	  the	  student	  community	  and	  extricate	   the	  dynamics	  of	   their	  activism.	  Where	   the	   ‘grassroots’	  perspectives	  are	  concerned,	  scholars	  have	  tended	  to	  focus	  on	  specific	  moments	  of	  confrontation	  and	  conflict,	  such	  as	  the	  Anti-­‐National	  Service	  protests	  on	  13	  May	  1954,	  the	  “Fajar	  Trial”	  concerning	  University	  Socialist	  Club	  members	  in	  1954,	  or	  the	   crackdowns	   in	   Nanyang	   University	   in	   the	   late	   1950s.34 	  However,	   these	  ruptures	  represent	   the	  peaks	  of	  a	  momentum	  of	  youth	  politicization	  that	  began	  much	   earlier,	   and	   were	   the	   results	   of	   a	   wider	   intellectual	   and	   cultural	  fermentation	  that	  was	  already	  taking	  place.	  As	  Hong	  Lysa	  noted,	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  Anti-­‐Yellow	  Culture	  Movement	  lay	  in	  its	  ‘rehearsal’	  value,	  as	  it	  prepared	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33 	  Albert	   Lau,	   The	   Politics	   of	   Becoming	   “Malaysian”	   and	   “Singaporean”,	   (Singapore:	  Institute	  of	  Southeast	  Asian	  Studies,	  2008);	  Edwin	  Lee,	  Singapore:	  The	  Unexpected	  Nation,	  (Singapore:	   Institute	   of	   Southeast	   Asian	   Studies,	   2008);	   Yeo	   Kim	   Wah,	   Political	  
Development	  in	  Singapore	  1945	  –	  55,	  (Singapore:	  Singapore	  University	  Press,	  1973);	  Yeo	  Kim	  Wah,	   “Student	   Politics	   in	  University	   of	  Malaya”,	   Journal	  of	  Southeast	  Asian	  Studies,	  Vol.	   23,	   no.	   2,	   (September	   1992),	   pp.	   346-­‐380;	   Lee	   Ting-­‐Hui,	   The	   Open	   United	   Front;	  Richard	  Clutterbuck,	  Riot	  and	  Revolution	  in	  Singapore	  and	  Malaya.	  34	  Chan	  Wai	  Han,	  ed.,	  Youth	  on	  Trial,	  (Singapore:	  Function	  8	  Limited,	  2014);	  Poh	  Soo	  Kai	  et	  al.,	  eds.,	  The	  Fajar	  Generation	  :	  the	  University	  Socialist	  Club	  and	  the	  politics	  of	  postwar	  
Malaya	  and	  Singapore,	   (Petaling	   Jaya:	  Strategic	   Information	  and	  Research	  Development	  Centre,	   2010);	   Teng	   Siao	   See	   et	   al.,	   eds.	   Education	   at	   large:	   student	   life	   &	   activities	   in	  
Singapore,	   1945-­‐1965,	   (Singapore:	   The	   Tangent,	   World	   Scientific	   Pub.	   Co.,	   2013);	   Loh	  Kah	  Seng	  et	  al.,	  The	  University	  Socialist	  Club	  and	  the	  contest	  for	  Malaya:	  tangled	  strands	  of	  
modernity	  (Amsterdam:	  Amsterdam	  University	  Press,	  2012);	  Yao	  Souchou,	  “All	  Quiet	  on	  Jurong	   road:	  Nanyang	  University	   and	  Radical	  Vision	   in	   Singapore”,	   in	  Paths	  Not	  Taken:	  
Political	   Pluralism	   in	   Postwar	   Singapore”,	   Michael	   D.	   Barr	   and	   Carl	   Trocki,	   eds.,	  (Singapore:	  National	  University	  of	  Singapore	  Press,	  2008),	  pp.	  170	  –	  187;	  Huang	   Jianli,	  “Language	   Fault	   Lines:	   The	   Wang	   Gungwu	   Report	   on	   Nanyang	   University,	   in	   The	  
Scripting	  of	  a	  National	  History:	  Singapore	  and	  its	  Pasts,	  eds.	  Hong	  Lysa	  and	  Huang	  Jianli,	  (Hong	  Kong:	  Hong	  Kong	  University	  Press,	  2008),	  pp.	  109	  –	  136.	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ground	   for	   later,	  more	   forceful	   forms	  of	   activism.35	  As	   a	   cultural	   and	  discursive	  movement,	  it	  ignited	  the	  first	  inklings	  of	  students	  finding	  a	  voice,	  and	  defined	  the	  terms	  in	  which	  they	  would	  then	  articulate	  their	  idealisms.	  This	  thesis	  attempts	  to	  bridge	  the	  gap	  by	  bringing	  both	  the	   ‘grassroots’	  and	   ‘statist’	  perspectives	  under	  the	  same	  analytical	   frame.	   It	  argues	  that	  the	   ‘anti-­‐yellow	  culture’	  rhetoric	  was	  a	  common	  discursive	  space	  from	  which	  discourses	  of	  morality	  were	  mobilised.	  The	  students	   were	   responsible	   for	   first	   constructing	   this	   space	   through	   print	  publications.	  Meanwhile,	  the	  colonial	  authorities	  were	  also	  constructing	  a	  parallel	  discourse	   based	   on	   counter-­‐insurgency	   and	   projecting	   the	   empire	   as	   a	   moral	  exemplar.	   Subsequently,	   the	   PAP	   would	   inherit	   the	   students’	   ‘anti-­‐yellow’	  vocabulary	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  cultivating	  a	  national	  ethos	  and	  amassing	  political	  capital,	   representing	   one	   of	   the	   first	   instances	   of	   a	   dominant	   regime	   co-­‐opting	  civil	  society	  causes	  to	  fortify	  its	  hegemony	  in	  Singapore.	  	  	  	  The	  Chinese	  youth	  periodicals	  published	  in	  the	  1950s	  constitute	  the	  main	  source	  materials	   for	  the	   first	   two	  chapters	  of	   this	   thesis.	  To	  my	  surprise,	   these	  sources	  have	   received	   scant	   scholarly	   attention	   despite	   their	   rich	   content	   and	   their	  relative	   accessibility. 36 	  A	   small	   number	   of	   Chinese	   literary	   scholars	   have	  examined	  selected	  poetry	  and	  short	  stories	  published	  in	  these	  texts,	  but	  there	  has	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  Hong,	  May	  13th	  Generation,	  p.	  91;	  Fang	  Xiu,	  方修 Fang	  Xiu,	  Mahua	  Wenxue	  Daxi马华文
学大系	  (A	  Collection	  of	  Malayan	  Chinese	  Literature),	  (Singapore:	  Shijie	  Shuju,	  1972).	  36	  Both	  the	  Singapore	  National	  Library	  and	  the	  National	  University	  of	  Singapore	  Chinese	  Library	  have	  extensive	  collections	  of	  these	  youth	  periodicals.	  The	  titles	  are	  compiled	  in	  the	  bibliographic	  volume:	  Wang	  Lianmei,	  He	  Bingbiao,	  Huang	  Huili	  王连美、何炳彪、黄
慧丽	   ,	   Xinjiapo	   Huanwen	   Qikan	   50	   Nian新加坡华文期刊 50年	   (50	   Years	   of	   Singapore	  Chinese	  Periodicals),	  (Singapore:	  National	  Library	  Board,	  2008).	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been	  no	  further	  academic	  study	  on	  the	  youth	  periodical	  genre	  in	  Singapore.37	  One	  possible	   explanation	   for	   their	   underutilization	   is	   that	   these	   periodicals	   were	  often	   dismissed	   as	   articles	   of	   Communist	   propaganda	   –	   first	   by	   the	   colonial	  government	   and	   subsequently	   by	   scholars	   adhering	   to	   the	   dominant	   narrative.	  Nonetheless,	  upon	  closer	  reading,	  these	  periodicals	  give	  a	  precious	  glimpse	  into	  the	   intellectual	   worlds	   of	   the	   Chinese	   student	   community,	   where	   in-­‐depth	  discussions	   and	   intense	   debates	   were	   conducted	   on	   philosophy,	   literature,	  contemporary	   affairs,	   music	   and	   art.	   They	   contained	   translated	   works	   from	  Dostoyevsky,	  Tolstoy,	  Lu	  Xun,	  Ba	  Jin,	  Hugo	  and	  Goethe,	  whetting	  appetites	  of	  the	  most	   voracious	   readers.	   These	   periodicals	   were	   a	   common	   platform	   for	   the	  exchange	  of	  ideas	  and	  encouraged	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  dialogic	  community.	  Yet,	  the	  intense	   disagreements	   and	   ‘war-­‐of-­‐pens’	   that	   occurred	   among	   writers	   and	  between	  publications	  revealed	  a	  deeply	  diverse	  and	  divided	  group.	  By	  studying	  the	   writings	   of	   these	   youths,	   we	   can	   come	   to	   a	   fuller	   understanding	   of	   their	  intellectual	   universe	   beyond	   the	   counter-­‐insurgency	   perspective.	   Unless	  otherwise	  stated,	  all	  English	  translations	  from	  Chinese	  texts	  are	  my	  own.	  	  
	  Finally,	  this	  thesis	  approaches	  this	  movement	  from	  the	  perspectives	  of	  three	  of	  its	  interlocutors	  -­‐	  the	  youths,	  the	  British	  colonial	  officials,	  and	  the	  PAP	  government.	  Each	  chapter	  focuses	  on	  one	  of	  these	  protagonists	  while	  also	  following	  a	  general	  chronology.	  Chapter	  One	  introduces	  the	  Chinese-­‐educated	  youth	  community	  that	  initiated	  and	  sustained	  this	  movement	  from	  about	  1953	  -­‐	  1956,	  and	  examines	  the	  broad	   discursive	   strategies	   undertaken	   by	   these	   youths	   as	   they	  wrangled	   for	   a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  Fang,	  Mahua	  Wenxue	  Daxi;	  詹道玉 Zhao	  Daoyu,	  Zhanhou	  Chuqi	  Xinjiapo	  Huawen	  Xiju战
后初期新加坡华文戏剧	  1945	  –	  1959	   (Chinese	  Theatre	   in	   the	  Early	   Post-­‐War	   Singapore	  1945-­‐1959),	  (Singapore:	  Global	  Publishing	  Co.	  Inc.,	  2001).	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voice	   in	   the	  public	   sphere	   through	   the	  genre	  of	  youth	  periodicals.	  Chapter	  Two	  takes	   a	   closer	   look	   at	   the	   anti-­‐yellow	   culture	   arguments	   from	  within	   the	   youth	  community	   and	  dissects	   the	   inherent	   contestations	   and	   contradictions.	   Chapter	  Three	  examines	  the	  British	  colonial	  attitudes	  towards	  these	  student	  movements	  and	   interrogates	   the	   counter-­‐insurgency	   framework	   from	   which	   the	   colonial	  authorities	   operated	   in	   suppressing	   the	   movement.	   Chapter	   Four	   is	   a	  continuation	   of	   the	   story	   from	   1959-­‐1961,	   when	   the	   newly	   elected	   PAP	  government	   set	   forth	   to	   launch	   their	   version	   of	   the	   Anti-­‐Yellow	   Culture	  Movement.	   Overall,	   each	   of	   these	   chapters	   examines	   how	   different	   groups	   or	  individuals	   raised	   the	   Anti-­‐Yellow	   Culture	   banner	   to	   achieve	   their	   aims.	   Let	   us	  now	   begin	   with	   the	   student	   community,	   where	   the	   spark	   of	   Chong	   Geok	   Tin’s	  rape	  and	  murder	  ignited	  the	  first	  flames	  of	  the	  Anti-­‐Yellow	  Culture	  Movement.	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CHAPTER	  1	  
“Vitality	  in	  Abundance!”:	  
The	  Discourse	  of	  Youth	  Vanguardism	  at	  a	  Political	  Turning	  Point	  	  
	  
	  
Igniting	  the	  Flame	  	  	  On	  24	  October	  1953,	  several	  students	  of	  Chung	  Cheng	  Branch	  Middle	  School	  organized	   an	   Anti-­‐Yellow	   Culture	   forum	  within	   their	   class.	   These	   students	  pinpointed	   ‘yellow	   culture’	   as	   Chong	   Geok	   Tin’s	   ultimate	   murderer.	   They	  reasoned	   that	   Chong’s	   death	   was	   not	   an	   isolated	   incident,	   but	   a	   result	   of	  systemic	  problems	  in	  society,	  such	  as	  the	  poor	  economy	  and	  the	  presence	  of	  ‘yellow	  culture’.	  1	  The	  death	  of	  an	  ‘innocent’	  fellow	  student	  was	  testament	  to	  the	   level	   of	   moral	   corruption	   in	   society,	   and	   ‘yellow	   culture’	   was	   both	   its	  cause	   and	   its	   symptom.	   During	   the	   seminar,	   these	   middle	   school	   students	  protested	  against	  what	  they	  perceived	  as	  increasingly	  salacious	  and	  tasteless	  themes	  in	  various	  forms	  of	  popular	  entertainment	  of	  the	  day.	  The	  targets	  of	  their	  attack	  included	  scantily	  clad	  actresses	  on	  screen	  and	  in	  cabaret	  shows,	  martial	   arts	   films,	   amorous	   songs	   and	   dances,	   and	   celebrity	   gossip	   and	  tabloid	  papers	  (colloquially	  also	  known	  as	   ‘mosquito	  presses’).	  These	  forms	  of	   popular	   entertainment	   were	   considered	   meaningless	   since	   they	   only	  sought	  to	  stimulate	  the	  senses	  but	  not	  engage	  the	  viewer	  in	  serious	  thought.2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Chen	  Fan陈凡,	  “Fanlun	  Fandui	  Huangse	  Wenhua	  Yundong泛论反对黄色文化运动	  [On	  the	  Anti-­‐Yellow	  Culture	  Movement]”，Menleiji闷雷集	  [Collection	  of	   the	  Muted	  Thunder]，(Singapore:	  Qingnian	  Shuju,	  1959).	  	  2	  Huangdi,	  Issue	  7,	  1	  December	  1953.	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Even	  though	  the	  objects	  of	  critique	  were	  external,	  the	  students	  decided	  that	  an	   immediate	   solution	   lay	   in	   internal	  purification	  –	  a	   series	  of	  measures	   to	  cleanse	   their	   own	   student	   community	   of	   the	   negative	   influences	   of	   ‘yellow	  culture’.	   During	   that	   first	   forum,	   the	   class	   of	   students	   committed	   to	   the	  following	   measures:	   to	   cleanse	   the	   school	   library	   and	   class	   libraries	   of	  ‘yellow’	  publications;	  to	  persuade	  classmates	  not	  to	  bring	  ‘mosquito	  presses’	  to	  school;	  and	  to	  actively	  prevent	  students	  from	  watching	  ‘yellow’	  films	  and	  discussing	  risqué	  topics.	  	  News	   of	   the	   forum	   organized	   by	   the	   year	   2	   class	   in	   Chung	   Cheng	   Branch	  Middle	   School	   spread	   quickly	   and	   a	   school-­‐wide	   forum	   was	   organized	   to	  discussed	  the	  same	  issues.	  Soon,	  Chung	  Cheng	  Main	  Middle	  School	  (different	  from	   Chung	   Cheng	   Branch	   Middle	   School),	   Hwa	   Chong	   Middle	   School,	  Nanchiao	  Middle	  School,	  Chung	  Hwa	  Middle	  School	  and	  other	  Chinese	  middle	  schools	  responded	  to	  the	  call	  to	  combat	  ‘yellow	  culture’	  by	  organizing	  similar	  committees	   and	   forums.3	  These	   committees	   were	   highly	   structured	   and	  mobilized	  the	  teachers	  and	  school	  management	  leaders.	  For	  instance,	  Chung	  Cheng	  Main	  middle	   school	   recruited	   their	   school	   principal	   as	   the	   honorary	  Chairman,	  with	  three	  students	  acting	  as	  Executive	  Chairmen,	  and	  the	  school-­‐wide	  committee	  of	  60	  students	  were	  delegated	  various	  roles	   such	  as	  music	  research,	   printed	   publications	   research,	   theatre	   research,	   writing	   and	  publicity,	  audit	  and	  finance.	  The	  school-­‐wide	  committees	  then	  supervised	  the	  sub-­‐committees	   in	   each	   class.	  4	  The	   students	   were	   at	   the	   forefront	   of	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Ibid.	  4	  Huangdi,	  Issue	  6,	  15	  November	  1953.	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movement,	   as	   teachers	   and	   principals	   assumed	   a	   secondary	   role	   in	   giving	  speeches	  at	  selected	  seminars.	  Each	  of	  these	  forums	  kept	  to	  the	  initial	  format	  initiated	  by	  Chung	  Cheng	  Branch	  School,	  while	  including	  different	  additional	  activities.	   For	   instance,	   Nanchiao	   Girls	   School	   organized	   an	   International	  Women’s	  Day	  cum	  School	  Anniversary	  on	  8	  March	  1954,	  where	   they	  had	  a	  mass	  book	  burning	  session	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  school	  field,	  followed	  by	  mass	  singing	  and	  speeches	  given	  by	  student	   leaders	  and	   teachers.5	  Various	  songs	  were	   composed	   for	   these	   forums,	   and	   students	  would	   sing	   in	   unison	   after	  pledging	   their	   commitment	   to	   eradicate	   ‘yellow	   culture’	   from	   their	   own	  minds	   and	   from	   their	   schools.	   What	   gave	   these	   movements	   this	   sense	   of	  potency	   and	   unity	   across	   the	   many	   different	   schools,	   and	   what	   made	   the	  ‘anti-­‐yellow’	  rhetoric	  a	  particularly	  resonant	  one?	  This	  chapter	  is	  concerned	  with	   how	   the	   youths	   perceived	   and	   represented	   themselves	   through	   the	  print	   medium	   and	   how	   they	   gave	   voice	   to	   themselves	   through	   the	   moral	  issue	  of	  ‘yellow	  culture’.	  	  
	  
Postwar	  Politicization	  of	  Chinese	  Middle	  School	  Students	  	  Although	  the	  Anti-­‐Yellow	  Culture	  Movement	  was	  instigated	  and	  sustained	  by	  students	   in	   1953-­‐1956,	   the	   category	   of	   ‘student’	   in	   postwar	   Singapore	  requires	  further	  explanation.	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  students	  were	  so	  readily	  able	  to	  organize	  themselves	  was	  no	  accident.	  The	  general	  student	  body	  following	  the	   war	   was	   in	   their	   late	   teens	   or	   early	   twenties	   due	   to	   the	   years	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  SP,	  11	  March	  1954.	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disruption	  to	  their	  education	  during	  the	  Japanese	  Occupation.	  Due	  to	  a	  lack	  of	  manpower	   and	   resources	   in	   the	   immediate	   postwar	   years,	   the	   school	  management	   often	   allowed	   students	   to	   form	   self-­‐governing	   committees	  taking	   care	   of	   student	   administrative	   matters,	   meals	   and	   fundraising	   for	  poorer	  students.	  Chinese	  High	  School	  had	  a	  student	  representative	  body	  that	  ran	  the	  extra-­‐curricular	  activities,	  organized	  excursions,	  sports	  competitions	  and	   social	   bonding	   activities,	   and	   they	   maintained	   an	   active	   public	   notice	  board	   for	   students	   to	   post	   their	   writings.6	  Despite	   their	   ability	   to	   organize	  many	  activities	  on	  their	  own,	  the	  student	  leaders	  still	  respected	  teachers	  and	  made	  an	  effort	  to	  achieve	  good	  grades	  as	  a	  way	  to	  gain	  the	  school’s	  trust	   in	  them.7	  These	   student	   leaders’	   organizational	   ability	   and	   good	   grades	   also	  made	  them	  role	  models	  for	  many	  younger	  students.	  	  	  The	  students’	   reverence	   for	   teachers	  and	  student	   leaders	  was	  not	  extended	  to	   other	   forms	   of	   authority,	   especially	   for	   the	   British	   colonial	   government.	  Education	  had	  always	  been	  viewed	  as	  a	  highly	  prized	  and	  staunchly	  defended	  domain	   of	   the	   Chinese	   community.	   They	   saw	   education	   as	   the	   means	   of	  cultural	  preservation	  and	  protection	  in	  a	  pluralistic	  Southeast	  Asia,	  and	  any	  attempts	   by	   the	   British	   authorities	   to	   intervene	   were	   always	   viewed	   with	  suspicion	  or,	   in	  some	  cases,	  with	  antagonism.	  This	  was	  especially	  so	  for	  the	  Chinese	  middle	  school	  students,	  who	  had	  neither	  the	  resources	  nor	  stature	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Hong	   Lysa,	   “Politics	   of	   the	   Immigrant	   Chinese	   Communities	   in	   Singapore	   in	   the	  1950s.”	   in	  The	  May	  13	  Generation:	  the	  Chinese	  middle	  schools	  student	  movement	  and	  
Singapore	  politics	   in	   the	  1950s,	   Tan	   Jing	   Quee,	   Tan	   Kok	   Chiang	  &	  Hong	   Lysa,	   eds.,	  (Petaling	  Jaya:	  Strategic	  Information	  and	  Research	  Development	  Centre,	  2011),	  p.	  45.	  	  7	  Goh	  Sin	  Hwee	  (Trascriber)	  and	  Chiang	  Wai	  Fong	  (Translator),	  “Riding	  the	  Tide	  of	  Idealism:	  An	  Interview	  with	  Han	  Tan	  Juan”	  in	  Tangent,	  No.	  6,	  (April	  2003),	  p.	  222.	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negotiate	   directly	   with	   the	   British	   authorities	   unlike	   the	   Chinese	   business	  leaders.	  	  	  The	   students’	   anti-­‐colonial	   stance	  was	   exacerbated	  by	   a	   series	  of	  measures	  undertaken	   by	   the	   British	   government	   during	   the	   Malayan	   Emergency.	   In	  1950,	  the	  British	  authorities	  raided	  Chinese	  High	  School	  and	  Nan	  Chiao	  Girls	  School	  for	  alleged	  communist	  infiltration,	  to	  the	  consternation	  of	  the	  Chinese	  student	   community.	   The	   editor	   of	   Nanchiao	   Daily	   published	   a	   series	   of	  commentaries	   to	   lend	   support	   to	   the	   school,	   and	   accused	   the	   British	  government	  of	  attempting	  to	  “destroy	  Chinese	  culture”.8	  In	  1951,	  more	  than	  200	   Chinese	   middle	   school	   students	   boycotted	   the	   junior	   middle	   three	  examinations	   to	   protest	   the	   British	   decision	   to	   implement	   a	   nation-­‐wide	  examination.9	  As	  a	   result	  of	   these	   tensions,	   the	  students	  viewed	   themselves	  as	  victims	  of	  colonial	  oppression	  –	  a	  position	  that	  would	  reinforce	  their	  moral	  legitimacy	  in	  anti-­‐colonial	  activism.	  	  	  
Intellectual	  Influences	  	  	  Their	  political	  activism	  was	  in	  part	  inspired	  by	  the	  events	  happening	  around	  the	  world	  and	   their	  desire	   to	  be	  part	  of	   the	  global	  decolonizing	  movement.	  The	   1950s	   was	   an	   exhilarating	   time	   for	   the	   proto-­‐nationalist,	   as	   imperial	  powers	  retreated	  and	  waves	  of	  independence	  movements	  swept	  across	  Asia	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Cheah	   See	   Kian谢诗坚,	   Zhongguo	   Geming	  Wenxue	   YIngxiangxia	   de	   Mahua	   Zuoyi	  
Wenxue	   (1926-­‐1976)	  中国革命文学影响下的马华左翼文学	   (1926-­‐1976)	   (Malayan	  Chinese	   Left	   Wing	   Literature:	   Its	   Influence	   by	   China’s	   Revoluntionary	   Literature	  1926-­‐1976),	  (Penang:	  Han	  Chiang	  College,	  2009),	  p.	  125.	  9	  ST,	  19	  November	  1951.	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and	  Africa.	  As	  several	  scholars	  have	  noted,	  the	   language	  of	   internationalism	  and	   cosmopolitan	   consciousness	   was	   normative	   to	   Singapore’s	   postwar	  political	  scene.10	  Optimism	  for	  Afro-­‐Asia	  solidarity	  was	  high,	  as	  evidenced	  by	  the	   attention	   given	   to	   the	   Bandung	   Conference	   of	   1955	   and	   the	   various	  international	  and	  regional	  youth	  exchanges	  and	  festivals.11	  In	  trying	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  their	  world,	  these	  students	  sought	  knowledge	  actively	  from	  outside	  the	  classroom,	  and	  applied	  theoretical	  knowledge	  to	  their	  observable	  society.	  They	   visited	   factories	   and	  manufacturers	   to	   learn	   about	   the	   application	   of	  chemistry	  and	  physics	  theories,	  and	  used	  Marxist	  economic	  theory	  to	  better	  understand	  the	  devaluation	  of	  the	  British	  Pound.12	  They	  were	  also	  exposed	  to	  extra	   lessons	   outside	   of	   the	   curriculum,	   especially	   pertaining	   to	   Marxist	  theory	  and	  Chinese	  history.	  As	  a	  former	  student	  leader	  recalled,	  	  	   “I	  can	  still	  remember	  quantitative	  change	  to	  qualitative	  change,	  synthesis	  of	   the	  opposites,	   the	  negation	  of	  negation	  etc.,	   that	  of	  dialectical	   materialism.	   We	   also	   learnt	   international	   affairs.	  While	   learning	   about	   international	   affairs,	   it	   was	   inevitable	   to	  promote	  the	  achievements	  of	  New	  (Communist)	  China.”13	  	  One	  important	  source	  of	  inspiration	  was	  the	  literature	  from	  the	  New	  Culture	  Movement	  in	  1920s	  China	  as	  it	  gave	  the	  students	  the	  vocabulary	  to	  express	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10 	  Harper,	   “Lim	   Chin	   Siong	   and	   the	   ‘Singapore	   Story’”,	   p.	   10;	   Sunil	   S.	   Amrith	  “Internationalism	   and	   Political	   Pluralism	   in	   Singapore,	   1950-­‐1963”,	   in	   Paths	   Not	  
Taken:	  Political	  Pluralism	  in	  Post-­‐war	  Singapore,	  Michael	  Barr	  and	  Carl	  Trocki,	  eds.,	  (Singapore:	  National	  University	  of	  Singapore	  Press,	  2008)	  pp.	  37-­‐57.	  	  11	  Amrith,	  “Internationalism	  and	  Political	  Pluralism	  in	  Singapore”,	  pp.	  38	  –	  44.	  12	  Ibid.,	  p.	  46.	  	  13	  Goh	  and	  Chiang,	  “Riding	  the	  Tide	  of	  Idealism”,	  p.	  215.	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their	   anti-­‐imperialistic	   sentiments	   in	   subsequent	   student	   movements.	   In	  particular,	  these	  students	  paid	  homage	  to	  Lu	  Xun	  by	  regularly	  reprinting	  his	  works	   and	   commemorating	   his	   death	   anniversary	   annually.14 	  They	   also	  extensively	  cited	  works	  by	  authors	  from	  the	  New	  Cultural	  Movement	  such	  as	  Ba	  Jin,	  Lao	  She,	  Cao	  Yu	  and	  Xia	  Yan.	  While	  China	  was	  an	  obvious	  influence	  on	  the	  middle	   school	   students,	   they	   read	   literature	   from	  all	   over	   the	  world	   as	  there	  were	  many	   readily	   available	   translations	   of	   foreign	   authors	   from	   the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  Europe	  such	  as	  Gorky,	  Fadeev,	  Tolstoy,	  Dostoyevsky,	  Hugo	  and	   Goethe.15	  A	   former	   student	   leader	   recalled	   that	   visiting	   the	   bookstore	  was	  a	  particularly	  popular	  activity	  for	  the	  students	  after	  school	  or	  during	  the	  weekends.16	  One	  might	   often	   find	   congregations	   of	   students	   in	   their	   school	  uniforms	  around	  the	  book	  stores	  of	  North	  Bridge	  Road	  such	  as	  the	  Shanghai	  Book	  Store,	  Youth	  Book	  Store	  and	  Popular	  Book	  Store.	  	  	  	  Nonetheless,	   the	   caveat	   is	   that	   the	   students’	   exposure	   to	   reading	  materials	  from	   a	   wide	   variety	   of	   sources	   and	   the	   proactive	   learning	   culture	   did	   not	  necessarily	   produce	   independent	   thinkers.	   Instead,	   the	   emphasis	   was	   on	  unity	  and	  placing	  the	  masses	  above	  the	  individual.	  As	  such,	  student	  activism	  depended	   on	   the	   initiative	   of	   student	   leaders	   who	   dictated	   the	   tone	   and	  format	  of	  these	  movements.	  Cheah	  Chee	  Kian,	  a	  student	  in	  the	  1950s,	  recalled	  that	   many	   students	   did	   not	   have	   in-­‐depth	   understanding	   of	   the	   theories	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Cheah	  See	  Kian,	  Zhongguo	  Geming	  Wenxue	  YIngxiangxia	  de	  Mahua	  Zuoyi	  Wenxue,	  pp.	  195	  –	  213.	  15	  Tan	  Kok	  Chiang,	  “My	  Story”,	   in	  The	  May	  13	  Generation:	  the	  Chinese	  middle	  schools	  
student	  movement	  and	  Singapore	  politics	  in	  the	  1950s,	  Tan	  Jing	  Quee,	  Tan	  Kok	  Chiang	  &	  Hong	  Lysa,	  eds.,	  (Petaling	  Jaya:	  Strategic	  Information	  and	  Research	  Development	  Centre,	  2011),	  pp.	  181-­‐182.	  	  16	  Ibid.,	  pp.	  149-­‐150.	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being	  taught.	  The	  incentive	  and	  pressure	  to	  act	  and	  think	  like	  their	  peers	  was	  high,	  and	  many	  of	  them	  did	  not	  fully	  comprehend	  what	  they	  were	  told.	  They	  simply	   followed	   their	   seniors	   and	   student	   leaders. 17 	  The	   emphasis	   on	  collective	   action,	   adherence	   to	   student	   leaders	   and	   the	   role	   played	   by	  idealism	  cannot	  be	  understated	  in	  these	  movements.	  	  	  The	   sense	   of	   collective	   idealism	  among	   these	   youths	  was	  driven	   in	   part	   by	  the	  feeling	  that	  they	  belonged	  to	  an	  overarching	  tide	  of	  historical	  change.	  As	  Hui	  Yew	  Foong	  suggests,	  it	  might	  be	  more	  meaningful	  to	  understand	  the	  so-­‐called	  leftists	  not	  by	  their	  ideological	  leanings	  but	  by	  the	  view	  that	  they	  were	  responding	  in	  accordance	  to	  the	  dialectical	  “progress”	  of	  history.	  18	  Likewise,	  the	   youths	   in	   Singapore	   were	   convinced	   by	   the	   inevitable	   march	   towards	  self-­‐determination,	   as	   seen	   in	   the	   most	   common	   terms	   used	   to	   describe	  themselves:	   jinbu	   (进步	   progressive),	   or	   its	   variations	   of	   jinbu	   pai	   (进步派	  progressive	   faction)	   ,	   jinbu	   fenzi	   (进步分子	   progressive	   elements)，jinbu	  
sixiang	   (进步思想 progressive	   thought).	   In	   contrast,	   anyone	   who	   marched	  against	   the	   tide	   of	   history	   was	   considered	   regressive	   or	   reactionary.	   The	  youths	  expressed	  their	  antipathy	  towards	  these	  regressive	  elements	  in	  terms	  such	   as	   tuifei	   (颓废	   decadent),	   fandong	   pai	   (反动派	   reactionary	   faction),	  
miewang	   pai	   (灭亡派	   destructive	   faction),	   which	   implied	   the	   futility	   and	  counter-­‐rationality	   in	   resisting	   the	   unstoppable	   wave	   of	   change.	   They	   also	  employed	  the	  trope	  of	  light	  and	  darkness	  (as	  in	  guangming光明	  and	  heian	  黑	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  Goh	  Sin	  Hwee	   (Transcriber),	  Toh	  Wei	  Hong	  and	  Chan	  Cheow	  Pong	   (Translator),	  “From	  Nantah	   to	   Chan	   Chiang	   College:	   A	   Dialogue	  with	  Media	   Veteran	   Cheah	   See	  Kian”,	  Tangent,	  Vol.	  4,	  No.	  1,	  April	  2004,	  p.	  103.	  18	  Hui,	  Strangers	  at	  Home,	  pp.	  73-­‐76.	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暗);	  new	  and	  old	  (as	  in	  jiushehui	  旧社会	  old	  society	  and	  xinshehui	  新社会	  new	  society)	   to	   represent	   the	   forcefulness	   of	   their	   ideals.	   These	   simplifications	  were	  necessary	  because	  of	  the	  need	  for	  mass	  mobilization.	  By	  encoding	  their	  ideology	   in	  moral	   terms	  of	   ‘right’	   and	   ‘wrong’,	   the	   youths	   could	   then	   reach	  out	  to	  a	  wider,	  assumedly	  less-­‐educated	  audience.19	  Read	  along	  this	  grain,	  the	  Anti-­‐Yellow	   Culture	   Movement,	   with	   its	   bifurcations	   of	   ‘anti-­‐yellow’	   and	  ‘yellow’,	   ‘healthy’	   and	   ‘unhealthy’	   were	   a	   manifestation	   of	   the	   binary	  worldviews	  necessary	  to	  provide	  moral	  potency	  to	  their	  cause	  and	  to	  sustain	  their	   fighting	  spirit.	  The	   language	  of	   their	  mobilization	  presents	   itself	  more	  clearly	   when	   examining	   the	   emergence	   of	   a	   specific	   genre	   of	   publication	  during	  the	  Anti-­‐Yellow	  Culture	  Movement	  –	  the	  youth	  periodical.	  	  	  	  
	  
Emergence	  of	  Youth	  Periodicals	  	  	  Taking	  inspiration	  from	  the	  youth	  publications	  of	  the	  New	  Culture	  Movement	  in	   China	   such	   as	   the	  New	  Youth,	  many	   students	   responded	   to	   the	   threat	   of	  ‘yellow	   culture’	   by	   participating	   in	   the	   manufacturing	   of	   ‘healthy	   culture’	  through	  the	  youth	  periodicals.	  These	  were	  bi-­‐weekly	  or	  monthly	  publications	  that	   contained	   an	   assortment	   of	   social	   commentary,	   literary	   materials,	  artwork	   and	   readers’	   letters.20	  The	   initial	   years	   of	   the	   Anti-­‐Yellow	   Culture	  Movement	   in	   1953	   –	   1956	   saw	   the	   rise	   of	   at	   least	   a	   dozen	   youth-­‐oriented	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Ji,	  Linguistic	  Engineering,	  pp.	  62-­‐70.	  	  20	  See	  Appendix:	  Figure	  2.	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periodicals,	   with	   over	   half	   of	   those	   stating	   their	   ‘anti-­‐yellow’	   mission	  explicitly	  in	  their	  founding	  issues.21	  	  	  Among	  the	  dozen	  youth-­‐oriented	  publications	  at	  the	  time,	  a	  few	  titles	  stood	  out.	  Huangdi,	  (荒地 Deserted	  Land)	  was	  the	  first	  of	  its	  kind.	  This	  fortnightly	  periodical	  was	   launched	  on	  1	  September	  1953	  and	  ceased	  publication	  after	  its	   last	   issue	  on	  20	  May	  1954.22	  At	   the	   inception	  of	   the	  Anti-­‐Yellow	  Culture	  Movement	  in	  October	  1953,	  it	  was	  the	  first	  publication	  to	  voice	  its	  support	  by	  printing	   a	   special	   issue.23	  Its	   tone	   appeared	   more	   polemical	   than	   other	  periodicals	  of	  its	  type,	  as	  its	  articles	  frequently	  used	  vernacular	  swear	  words	  or	   expressive	   language	   and	   were	   often	   highly	   critical	   about	   a	   variety	   of	  subjects,	   and	   even	   directing	   their	   criticisms	   at	   other	   youth-­‐oriented	  periodicals	   at	   the	   time.24	  This	   publication	   only	   lasted	   for	   less	   than	   a	   year	  before	  the	  authorities	  ordered	  it	  to	  shut	  down	  due	  to	  its	  alleged	  strong	  anti-­‐colonial	  stance.	  	  	  
Gengyun	  (耕耘 Cultivation)	  was	  a	  relatively	  influential	  periodical	  which	  had	  a	  20-­‐issue	  run	  from	  10	  April	  1954	  to	  15	  March	  1955.	  At	  one	  point	  it	  garnered	  sufficient	  readership	  and	  readers’	  contribution	  that	  it	  expanded	  the	  number	  of	  pages	  from	  28	  to	  32.25	  Like	  Huangdi,	  it	  claimed	  to	  be	  predominantly	  run	  by	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  For	  instance,	  the	  Editor’s	  Comments	  of	  the	  first	  issue	  of	  Gengyun,	  it	  stated	  that	  its	  operating	  mission	  was	  to	  counter	  ‘yellow	  culture’	  by	  producing	  literature	  of	  ‘healthy’	  standards.	  See	  Gengyun,	  Issue	  1,	  10	  April	  1954.	  	  22	  I	   am	   unfortunately,	   unable	   to	   track	   down	   the	   first	   few	   issues	   and	   trace	   its	  inaugural	  editorial	  note	  which	  would	  have	  provided	  some	  context	  for	  its	  founding.	  	  23	  Huangdi,	  Issue	  6,	  15	  November	  1953.	  See	  Appendix:	  Figure	  3	  and	  Figure	  4.	  24	  Swear	  words	  such	  as	  “王八蛋”	  “妈的”	  or	  ”	  哼！“	  25	  Gengyun,	  Issue	  7,	  15	  August	  1954.	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students	  and	  the	  editors	  took	  care	  to	  apologise	  to	  its	  readers	  for	  their	  youth	  and	   inexperience	   in	   managing	   a	   publication	   on	   top	   of	   their	   studies. 26	  Compared	  with	  other	  periodicals	  at	  the	  time,	  Genyun	  was	  a	  strong	  advocate	  for	  unity	  among	  differences.	  Although	  there	  were	  lively	  discussions	  between	  writers	   and	   readers	   that	   continued	   across	   a	   few	   issues,	   the	   editors	   always	  ended	  with	  a	  call	   for	  constructive	   feedback.	   It	  appeared	   to	  be	  a	   rather	  self-­‐reflexive	  publication	  as	  editors	  frequently	  published	  self-­‐criticisms	  on	  how	  it	  could	   be	   improved.	   Gengyun	   was	   highly	   regarded,	   as	   social	   commentaries	  often	  cited	  its	  forced	  cessation	  in	  1955	  as	  an	  example	  of	  colonial	  injustice	  and	  oppression.27	  	  	  Unlike	   other	   youth-­‐oriented	   periodicals,	   Wenyibao	   (文艺报 Literary	   Post)	  was	   not	   run	   by	   students,	   but	   by	   a	   former	   newspaper	   editor,	   Yao	   Zi	  姚紫.	  Nonetheless,	   it	  participated	   in	   the	  dialogic	  community	  of	  youth	  writers	  and	  readers.	   The	   periodical	   ran	   its	   first	   issue	   on	   15	   February	   1954,	   and	  experienced	  a	  restructuring	  and	  renaming	  itself	  as	  Wenyibao	  Fukan	  in	  1955.	  It	   featured	   literary	   pieces	   that	   were	  much	  more	   subtle	   and	   less	   rhetorical	  than	   other	   periodicals.	   Because	   Wenyibao	   was	   more	   experimental	   in	   its	  contents,	  which	  were	  mostly	  written	  by	  its	  chief	  editor,	  it	  came	  under	  fire	  of	  being	   ‘yellow’	   and	   was	   one	   of	   the	   more	   controversial	   papers	   among	   the	  morally	   univocal	   youth	   publishing	   scene.	   	   These	   accusations	   will	   be	   more	  closely	   examined	   in	   Chapter	   Two	   of	   this	   thesis.	   Other	   notable	   publications	  include	  Shidaibao	  时代报,	  a	  current	  affairs-­‐focused	  periodical	  that	  reached	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  Gengyun,	  Issue	  2,	  25	  April	  1954.	  27	  Wenyibao,	  Vol.	  2,	  No.	  3,	  3	  January	  1956;	  SP,	  15	  March	  1956.	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circulation	  of	  8000	  copies	  per	  issue	  in	  its	  peak	  and	  was	  frequently	  under	  the	  surveillance	  of	   the	  colonial	  government	   for	   its	   left-­‐leaning	  stance;28	  Xuewen	  (学文	   Learning)	  and	   its	   successor	  Huiliu	   	   (汇流	   Convergence);29	  Renjian	   (人
间),	  Renwen	  (人闻)	  and	  Jiaofeng	  (蕉风,	  more	  in	  Chapter	  Two). 	  	  As	   youth-­‐oriented	   publications,	   these	   periodicals	   emphasized	   the	   student	  status	  of	  their	  editorial	  teams.	  The	  editors	  often	  wrote	  about	  the	  difficulties	  in	  coping	  with	  the	  competing	  demands	  of	  schoolwork	  and	  maintaining	  these	  publications.	  In	  one	  instance,	  the	  editor	  cited	  school	  examinations	  and	  lack	  of	  quality	  contributions	  as	  main	  reasons	  for	  a	  two-­‐week	  delay,	  and	  sought	  the	  readers’	   forgiveness	   and	   understanding.30	  Even	   though	   these	   publications	  appeared	  to	  be	  staffed	  by	  students	  or	  youths,	  they	  maintained	  a	  professional	  front	  and	  each	  of	  these	  periodicals	  had	  an	  editorial	  office.	  A	  former	  student	  leader	  recalled	  that	  his	  first	  encounter	  with	  these	  writers	  had	  been	  a	  visit	  to	  the	   head	   office	   of	   a	   certain	   publication	   at	   Geylang	   (presumably	  Huangdi).	  While	  he	  had	  envisioned	  a	  casual	  atmosphere	  among	   these	   intellectuals,	  he	  was	  astounded	  by	  how	  serious	  they	  were	  at	  work.31	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  PRO202/56	  “Times”	  Magazine,	  13	  April	  1956.	  29	  Xuewen	   was	   published	   intermittently,	   with	   only	   a	   handful	   of	   issues,	   and	   its	  successor	  Huiliu	  which	  started	  with	  much	  enthusiasm	   in	  1956	  lasted	  only	  3	   issues	  before	   it	   was	   ordered	   to	   cease	   publications.	   	   The	   principal	   of	   Chung	   Cheng	   High	  School,	  Mr	  Chuang	  Chu	  Lin	  wrote	  the	  inauguration	  statement	  for	  the	  	  reinstating	  of	  
Xuewen	  in	  1954,	  and	  gave	  full	  endorsement	  to	  the	  effort	  of	  the	  students	  and	  teachers	  that	  made	  this	  publication	  happen.	  See	  Xuewen,	  1	  September	  1954.	  	  30	  Renjian,	  Vol.	  2,	  No.	  9,	  10	  April	  1956.	  31	  Lin	   Qingru林清如,	  Wode	  Heibai	  Qingchun我的黑白青春	   (My	   youth	   in	   black	   and	  white),	  (Singapore:	  Jiding	  Tushu	  Chubanshe	  脊顶图书出版社,	  2014),	  p.	  42.	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These	   periodicals	   sustained	   themselves	   primarily	   through	   sales	   and	  subscription.	   Advertisements	  were	  minimal,	   and	   kept	   to	   two	   to	   four	   small	  vignettes	   at	   the	   back	   cover	   of	   each	   issue.32	  The	   advertisers	   were	   largely	  bookshops,	   drama	   clubs	   publicizing	   their	   plays,	   and	   other	   newspapers.	   In	  terms	  of	  circulation,	  these	  publications	  printed	  around	  four	  to	  five	  thousand	  copies	   for	   each	   issue.33	  The	   readership	   was	   likely	   even	   higher	   as	   these	  publications	   were	   often	   shared	   among	   friends	   or	   placed	   in	   the	   school	  library.34	  From	   the	   readers’	   letters,	   it	   appeared	   that	   these	   periodicals	  were	  read	   not	   only	   in	   Singapore,	   but	   also	   in	   Penang,	   Ipoh,	   and	   Sarawak.	   These	  publications	  were	  also	  reasonably	  priced	  at	  an	  average	  of	  30	  cents	  per	  issue	  while	  Chinese	  dailies	  like	  Nanyang	  Siang	  Pau	  sold	  for	  20	  cents	  and	  the	  Straits	  
Times	  sold	  for	  15	  cents	  in	  1954.	  These	  periodicals	  also	  offered	  a	  subscription	  service,	  and	  readers	  had	  the	  choice	  of	  subscribing	  for	  3	  months,	  6	  months	  or	  a	  year.	  Apart	   from	  sales	  revenue,	  some	  of	  these	  periodicals	  were	  supported	  by	   donations.	   For	   instance,	   in	   late	   1953,	  Huangdi	  publicly	   acknowledged	   a	  donation	   of	   $72.85	   from	   a	   group	   of	   young	   readers.	   The	   donors	   stated	   that	  these	   funds	  were	   collected	   from	  a	   zealous	   group	  of	   friends	  who	  wanted	   to	  show	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   community	   that	   youths	   have	   the	   energy	   and	  resourcefulness	  to	  do	  something	  meaningful,	  and	  the	  donors	  hoped	  to	  inspire	  other	   youths	   to	   do	   so.35	  It	   appeared	   that	   among	   the	   challenges	   that	   the	  editors	   faced	   in	   running	   the	   periodicals,	   financial	   sustainability	   was	   not	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  See	  Appendix:	  Fgure	  5.	  33	  Ji	  Yan,	  “Malayan	  Chinese	  Literature”,	  in	  The	  May	  13	  Generation:	  the	  Chinese	  middle	  
schools	  student	  movement	  and	  Singapore	  politics	  in	  the	  1950s,	  Tan	  Jing	  Quee,	  Tan	  Kok	  Chiang	   &	   Hong	   Lysa,	   eds.,	   (Petaling	   Jaya:	   Strategic	   Information	   and	   Research	  Development	  Centre,	  2011),	  p.	  192.	  34	  Tan	  Kok	  Chiang,	  “My	  Story”,	  pp.	  149-­‐150.	  35	  Huangdi,	  Issue	  9,	  1	  Jan	  1954.	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ostensibly	  emphasized	  even	   though	   the	   lack	  of	   funding	   could	  be	  one	  of	   the	  reasons	  for	  their	  closures.	  36	  	  	  	  Despite	   the	   overall	   popularity	   of	   this	   genre	   among	   students,	   these	  publications	  were	  often	  short-­‐lived,	  lasting	  for	  only	  one	  to	  two	  years.	  One	  of	  the	   main	   challenges	   faced	   by	   these	   publications	   was	   the	   scrutiny	   and	  proscription	   by	   the	   colonial	   government.	   But	   censorship	   was	   not	   only	  conducted	   by	   the	   government	   authorities,	   as	   schools	   would	   at	   times	   ban	  students	  from	  reading	  these	  materials	  in	  part	  due	  to	  fear	  of	  official	  reprisal.	  For	  instance,	  one	  reader	  wrote	  to	  the	  editor	  of	  Sin	  Pao	  asking	  if	  the	  paper	  and	  
Huangdi	  were	   banned	   publications	   as	   the	   reader’s	   school	   had	   discouraged	  students	  from	  reading	  them.	  The	  editor	  defended	  his	  paper	  vehemently	  and	  threatened	   to	   take	   legal	   action	   against	   those	   who	   spread	   such	   malicious	  rumours. 37 	  In	   one	   issue	   of	   Gengyun,	   a	   writer	   wrote	   a	   fervent	   article	  complaining	   about	   the	   banning	   of	   youth	   periodicals	   in	  middle	   schools,	   and	  made	  an	  extreme	  analogy	  to	  the	  burning	  of	  books	  by	  the	  Qin	  Emperor	  in	  the	  Qin	   Dynasty.	   The	   writer’s	   comparison	   was	   especially	   ironic	   in	   light	   of	   the	  mass	  burning	  of	  ‘yellow’	  publications	  in	  these	  schools.38	  	  Given	   the	  amount	  of	  dialogue	  and	   interaction	   in	   these	  periodicals,	  one	  may	  come	   away	  with	   the	   impression	   of	   extensive	   participation	   from	   among	   the	  student	   community.	   On	   one	   hand,	   the	   youth	   periodicals	   were	   indeed	   a	  common	   platform	   for	   the	   exchange	   of	   ideas	   among	   youths	  who	  were	   both	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  Wang,	  He	  and	  Huang,	  Xinjiapo	  Huanwen	  Qikan	  50	  Nian,	  pp.	  16	  –	  18.	  	  37	  SP,	  17	  October	  1953;	  SP,	  22	  October	  1953.	  38	  Gengyun,	  Issue	  8,	  1	  September	  1954.	  
	   31	  
their	   writers	   and	   readers.	   The	   editors	   acquired	   content	   largely	   from	  freelance	  writers,	  and	  it	  was	  common	  to	  see	  calls	  for	  contributions	  in	  specific	  genres	   such	  as	  poetry	  or	   short	   essays.39	  These	   contributors	  were	  paid	  $5-­‐7	  for	  every	  1,000	  words,	  and	  due	  to	  the	  large	  volume	  of	  contributions,	  most	  of	  these	  periodicals	  had	  content	  filling	  up	  around	  16	  to	  32	  pages	  per	  issue.	  40	  	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  these	  conversations	  may	  have	  been	  limited	  to	  a	  minority	  of	  the	  educated	  youths	  and	  may	  not	  be	  reflective	  of	  the	  concerns	  of	  the	  larger	  Chinese	  community,	  or	  the	  ‘masses’	  that	  these	  periodicals	  claimed	  to	  serve.41	  Perhaps	  to	  make	  up	  for	  the	  lack	  of	  quality	  content,	  and	  surely	  to	  defend	  his	  own	   materials,	   the	   editor	   of	   Wenyibao	   adopted	   at	   least	   fifteen	   known	  pseudonyms	   that	   interacted	   among	   themselves.42	  This	   indicates	   a	   limited	  number	  of	  students	  who	  were	  actively	  involved	  in	  the	  production	  of	  content,	  while	   influencing	   the	   values	   and	   standards	   of	   morality	   for	   the	   wider	  community.	   Furthermore,	   the	   use	   of	   multiple	   public	   identities	   to	   enforce	  one’s	  own	  opinions	   casts	  doubt	  on	  how	  dialogic	   the	   community	   really	  was.	  The	  editors	  also	  admitted	  the	  difficulty	  in	  attracting	  a	  more	  diverse	  profile	  of	  readers	  apart	  from	  students	  and	  educated	  youths.43	  When	  one	  reader	  wrote	  to	  Gengyun	  to	   suggest	   the	   inclusion	  of	  more	  works	  written	  by	  workers,	   the	  editor	   replied	   that	  workers	   remained	   a	   small	  minority	   of	   their	   readership,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  Ibid.	  	  40	  Wenyibao,	  Issue	  2,	  15	  March	  1954.	  41	  The	   total	   number	  of	   students	   enrolled	   in	  Chinese-­‐language	   schools	   in	  1953	  was	  79,934,	   which	   was	   around	   9%	   of	   the	   total	   Chinese	   population	   in	   Singapore	   of	  860,509.	  Source:	  Colony	  of	  Singapore	  Annual	  Report	  1953,	  pp.	  9,	  90.	  42	  Ang	   Yee	   Tien,	   “Yaozi’s	   Response	   during	   the	   Anti-­‐Yellow	   Culture	   Movement”,	  Academic	  Exercise,	  Nanyang	  Technological	  University,	  2012,	  p.	  5.	  Chapter	  2	  of	   this	  thesis	  will	  address	  this	  particular	  editor	  in	  greater	  detail.	  43	  Ibid.	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and	   acknowledged	   that	   their	   periodical	   might	   be	   too	   advanced	   for	   many	  semi-­‐literate	   workers.44	  Thus,	   the	   ‘masses’	   that	  many	   of	   these	   publications	  defended	   remained	   as	   an	   idealized	   version	   of	   society	   where	   these	   youths	  projected	  their	  hopes	  and	  anxieties.	  	  	  
Youth	  Suffering	  as	  Strength	  	  The	   students’	   brand	   of	   advocacy	   in	   the	   Anti-­‐Yellow	   Culture	   Movement	  emphasized	  their	  vulnerability	  and	  moral	  innocence.	  They	  projected	  a	  sense	  of	   siege	   that	   Chinese	   education	   and	   culture	   was	   under	   threat	   from	   the	  colonial	  authorities,	  and	   this	  reinforced	   their	  desire	   to	  create	  a	  culture	   that	  was	  independent	  of	  the	  state.	  Just	  like	  how	  Chong	  Geok	  Tin	  was	  portrayed	  as	  an	   innocent	   student	   who	   was	   unjustly	   murdered,	   the	   students	   who	  perpetuated	  the	  Anti-­‐Yellow	  Culture	  Movement	  asserted	  their	  innocence	  as	  a	  source	   of	   strength	   as	   well	   as	   defensive	   mechanism	   against	   any	   perceived	  attacks	  from	  the	  colonial	  government.	  One	  of	  the	  youth	  periodicals	  asserted,	  “Everyone	   knows	   that	   we	   are	   innocent	   students.	   Yet	   our	   purity	   is	   being	  capitalized	   by	   an	   abnormal	   education	   system.	   We	   cannot	   see	   justice	   and	  truth,	  and	  can	  only	  be	  oppressed	  daily	  by	  the	  harsh	  reality.”45	  	  The	   triumph	   of	   the	   innocent	   against	   the	   aggressive	   was	   clear	   in	   the	   play	  “Beating	   the	   Yellow	  Wolf”	   (打黄狼,	   Dahuanglang),	   which	   became	   an	   iconic	  allegory	   for	   combating	   ‘yellow	   culture’.	   This	   play	   was	   particularly	   popular	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	  Gengyun,	  Issue	  14,	  1	  Dec	  1954.	  45	  Huangdi,	  Issue	  15,	  1	  April	  1954.	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during	  the	  graduation	  concerts	  in	  1953	  and	  1954,	  and	  was	  repeatedly	  staged	  by	  various	  drama	  clubs,	  and	  the	  image	  of	  the	  yellow	  wolf	  was	  often	  satirized	  in	  short	  stories	  and	  poems.	  In	  the	  story,	  the	  main	  antagonist	  is	  a	  cunning	  wolf	  escaping	   the	   persecution	   of	   an	   angry	  mob	   of	   villagers.	   Along	   the	   way,	   the	  wolf	  encountered	  a	  young	  farm	  girl	  (in	  some	  versions	  it	  is	  a	  white	  rabbit)	  and	  begged	  her	  to	  hide	  it	  from	  the	  pursuers.	  However,	  after	  the	  mob	  has	  passed,	  the	  wolf	  told	  its	  benefactor	  that	  it	  has	  not	  eaten	  in	  days	  and	  she	  was	  to	  be	  its	  next	  meal.	   In	  some	  darker	  versions	  of	   the	  story,	   the	  wolf	  has	   the	  girl	  raped	  before	   declaring	   its	   intention	   to	   devour	   her.46	  Fortunately	   for	   the	   girl,	   the	  mob	  of	  villagers	  returned	  in	  time	  to	  save	  her	  and	  beat	  the	  wolf	  to	  its	  death.	  The	   cunning,	   exploitative	   and	   hypocritical	   wolf	   came	   to	   represent	   all	   that	  was	  contemptuous	  about	  the	  perceived	  perpetuators	  of	  ‘yellow	  culture’	  –	  the	  peddlers	   of	   ‘yellow’	   publications	   and	   the	   colonial	   government.	   There	   is	   a	  gender	  element	  to	  this	  narrative	  as	  well	  –	  the	  aggressive,	  predatory,	  beastly	  and	   therefore	   hyper-­‐masculine	   wolf	   is	   contrasted	   with	   the	   compassionate,	  gullible	  (and	  therefore	  naïve	  and	  sexually	  innocent)	  farm	  girl.	  Eventually	  the	  situation	  needed	  to	  be	  resolved	  by	  the	  androgynous	  masses.	  Represented	  by	  the	   village	  mob,	   the	  masses	   saved	   the	   girl	   and	  were	   therefore	   seen	   as	   the	  protector	   of	   the	   weak	   and	   champions	   for	   the	   underclasses.	   Moreover,	   it	  points	  to	  the	  strength	  of	  collective	  action	  and	  the	  dissolving	  of	  the	  sexualized	  individuality	  for	  the	  good	  of	  all.47	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	  NYSP,	  5	  March	  1954.	  	  47	  Harriet	   Evans,	   in	   her	   study	   of	   sexuality	   in	   Communist	   China,	   noted	   that	   sexual	  androgyny,	   or	   sexual	   sameness	   seemed	   to	   be	   the	   socialist	   ideal.	   Harriet	   Evans,	  
Women	  and	  Sexuality	  in	  China:	  Female	  Sexuality	  and	  Gender	  since	  1949,	  (New	  York:	  Continuum,	  1997),	  p.	  2.	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There	   was	   another	   important	   development	   in	   the	   1950s	   that	   further	  reinforced	   the	   sense	   of	   vulnerability	   among	   the	   Chinese	   community	   and	  generated	   the	   conditions	   for	   youth	   activism.	   In	   1953,	   Chinese	   community	  leaders	  announced	  plans	  to	  establish	  a	  Chinese-­‐language	  university,	  the	  first	  and	   only	   one	   of	   its	   kind	   in	   Southeast	   Asia	   –	   Nanyang	   University,	   or	  colloquially	  known	  as	  Nantah.	  This	  project	  galvanized	  the	  support	  across	  the	  whole	   spectrum	   of	   the	   Chinese	   community	   in	   Malaya	   and	   Singapore.	   This	  communal	  spirit	  of	  uniting	  and	  giving	  for	  a	  common	  cause	  came	  to	  represent	  collective	   longing	   to	   put	   down	   the	   roots	   of	   Chinese	   culture	   in	   Southeast	  Asia.48	  However,	  when	  Nantah	  was	  later	  suspected	  of	  habouring	  communist	  activities,	  the	  students	  also	  reacted	  in	  a	  highly	  defensive	  manner.	  One	  article	  in	  Huangdi	  called	  the	  authorities	  “despicable	  cultural	  thugs”	  and	  “traitors	  of	  Chinese	   culture”,	   and	   blamed	   them	   for	   forcing	   the	   hat	   of	   Communism	   on	  Nantah,	   “deliberately	   endangering”	   an	   institution	   that	   “protected	   and	  preserved	  the	  pride	  of	  Chinese	  culture.”49	  	  
	  Despite	   presenting	   themselves	   as	   victims,	   these	   youths	   also	   saw	   their	  suffering	   as	   a	   necessary	   rite	   of	   passage	   to	   legitimize	   their	   activism.	   In	   the	  inaugural	   issue	   of	   Gengyun,	   the	   editor	   wrote	   a	   heroic-­‐sounding	   piece	   that	  proclaims	  that	  the	  periodical	  will	  “fight	  layers	  of	  obstacles”	  in	  order	  to	  “knock	  back	   on	   the	   harshness	   of	   reality.”	   It	   added	   rousingly,	   “Gengyun	   is	   finally	  borne	   in	   the	  midst	  of	   suffering!	  …In	   this	  day	  and	  age	  of	  mass	   suffering,	  we	  shall	  not	  be	  silent.	  Therefore	  let	  us	  roar	  and	  use	  our	  hands	  to	  ‘cultivate’	  (the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  48	  Yao,	  “All	  Quiet	  on	  Jurong	  Road”,	  p.	  174.	  49	  Huangdi,	  Issue	  15,	  1	  April	  1954.	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cultural	  desert	  of	  Malaya).”50	  This	  martyrized	  tone	  was	  common	  in	  the	  advice	  that	   these	   periodicals	   dispense	   to	   their	   readers.	   To	   reinforce	   the	   image	   of	  these	  youths	  as	  lone	  warriors	  battling	  the	  odds,	  these	  publications	  advocated	  rebelling	  against	  parents	  and	  figures	  of	  authority.	  In	  one	  instance,	  a	  writer	  at	  
Huangdi	  declared	  that	  one	  of	   the	  major	  mistakes	  made	  by	  youths	  was	  their	  inability	   to	   rise	   above	   familial	   obligations.	   To	   him,	   the	   comforts	   of	   staying	  within	  a	  family	  were	  preventing	  youths	  from	  experiencing	  the	  joy	  of	  serving	  the	  welfare	  of	  the	  masses,	  and	  he	  called	  on	  youths	  to	  break	  away	  from	  their	  feudal	   or	   reactionary	   households.51	  In	   another	   advice	   column,	   the	   editor	   of	  
Gengyun	  advised	  a	  female	  reader	  to	  stand	  up	  against	  her	  parents	  who	  were	  preventing	   her	   from	   participating	   in	   school	   activities.	   Another	   reader	   of	  
Gengyun	  wrote	  an	  account	  of	  how	  his	  female	  classmate	  decided	  to	  run	  away	  from	  home	   to	   escape	  an	  arranged	  marriage,	   and	   the	  editors	   lauded	  her	   for	  her	  bravery.52	  	  	  For	  these	  youth	  periodicals,	  the	  ability	  to	  withstand	  suffering	  was	  a	  source	  of	  strength.	   They	   portrayed	   youths	   to	   be	   in	   a	   unique	   position	   to	   embark	   on	  changes	  in	  society	  due	  to	  their	  idealism,	  passion	  and	  desire	  to	  act	  collectively	  –	   attributes	   that	   were	   glaringly	   absent	   among	   the	   adults	   in	   society.	   One	  writer	  in	  Huangdi	  affirmed	  youths	  as	  “vanguards	  of	  social	  change.”53	  	  Another	  article	  proclaimed	  with	  zealous	  poeticism:	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50	  Gengyun,	  Issue	  1,	  10	  April	  1954.	  51	  Huangdi,	  Issue	  16,	  15	  April	  1954.	  52	  Gengyun,	  Issue	  8,	  1	  September	  1954.	  53	  Huangdi,	  Issue	  13,	  1	  March	  1954.	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“What	   has	   the	   youth	   got	   in	   abundance?	   Vitality!	   When	   we	  encounter	   the	   forest,	   we	   can	   raze	   it	   to	   the	   ground.	   When	   we	  encounter	   the	   plains,	   we	   can	   cover	   it	   with	   trees.	   When	   we	  encounter	   the	   desert,	  we	   can	   dig	   up	   a	   spring.	   It	   is	   this	   kind	   of	  vitality	   that	   is	   in	   all	   the	   youths.	   With	   so	   many	   companions	  around	  us,	  would	  we	  still	   fear	  the	  distance	  and	  difficulty	  of	  our	  road	  ahead?”54	  	  The	   unique	   strengths	   of	   youths	   were	   juxtaposed	   with	   the	   relative	  weaknesses	   of	   adults,	   who	   were	   perceived	   as	   too	   cynical	   and	   resistant	   to	  change.	  One	  writer	  at	  Wenyibao	  criticized	  the	  adults	  in	  society	  for	  using	  their	  experience	  to	  belittle	  the	  enthusiasm	  of	  the	  youths	  and	  that	  they	  should	  learn	  from	   the	   youths	   instead.55 	  It	   was	   noteworthy	   that	   this	   sense	   of	   youth	  vanguardism	  was	  shared	  among	  the	  University	  Socialist	  Club	  in	  University	  of	  Malaya	   at	   the	   same	   period,	   pointing	   to	   the	   zeitgeist	   of	   youth	   optimism	   in	  Singapore	   across	   various	   segments.	   This	   English-­‐speaking	   group	   also	   saw	  itself	   as	   “the	   vanguard	   of	   progressive	   youths”	   and	   was	   keen	   to	   join	   with	  youths	   in	   neighboring	   countries	   to	   study	   of	   the	   “origins	   and	   causes	   of	   the	  decadence	   and	   injustice	   of	   our	   present	   society	   and	   of	   how	   to	   eliminate	  them.”56	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  54	  Huangdi,	  Issue	  12,	  15	  February	  1954.	  55	  Wenyibao,	  Issue	  1,	  15	  Feb	  1954.	  56	  Loh,	  The	  University	  Socialist	  Club	  and	  the	  Contest	  for	  Malaya,	  p.	  83.	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Conclusion	  	  In	   Miriam	   Kingsberg’s	   study	   on	   the	   banning	   of	   narcotics	   in	   Japan,	   she	  introduces	   the	   notion	   of	   “Moral	   Nation”,	   in	   which	   the	   legitimacy	   of	   a	  civilization	  lies	  in	  its	  ability	  to	  stigmatize,	  pathologize,	  criminalize	  and	  finally	  eliminate	   ‘deviants”. 57 	  In	   the	   era	   of	   nation-­‐building	   as	   various	   factions	  wrestled	   over	   their	   claim	   to	   the	   nation,	   challenges	   to	   the	   legitimacy	   of	   the	  state	   frequently	   appeared	   as	  moral	   attacks.	   The	   rhetoric	   of	   youth	   suffering	  and	   victimization	   was	   crucial	   in	   the	   Anti-­‐Yellow	   Culture	   Movement	   in	   the	  following	  ways.	  First,	   it	   lent	  moral	  potency	  to	  the	  crusade	  against	  perceived	  deviants	  in	  the	  community.	  The	  rhetoric	  of	  suffering	  gave	  the	  youths	  a	  sense	  of	   moral	   mission.	   The	   idealism	   that	   drove	  many	   youths	   in	   support	   of	   this	  movement	  was	   crystallized	   by	   a	   sense	   of	   siege	   and	   their	   determination	   to	  prevail	  against	  a	  clear	  enemy.	  Second,	  the	  perceived	  siege	  on	  ‘healthy	  culture’	  gave	  the	  small	  segment	  of	  educated	  youth	  leaders	  the	  legitimacy	  to	  direct	  and	  dictate	  the	  shape	  of	  this	  movement.	  	  	  The	   irony	   of	   youth	   vanguardism	  was	   that	   despite	   them	   claiming	   to	   act	   on	  behalf	  of	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  masses,	  the	  boundaries	  which	  they	  enacted	  were	  highly	   prescriptive	   and	   didactic.	   As	   they	   imposed	   their	   values	   on	   their	  compatriots	   through	   the	   essays	   in	   the	   youth	   periodical,	   they	   were	   also	  articulating	  a	  values	  system	  that	  the	  masses	  did	  not	  necessarily	  identify	  with.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  57	  At	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century,	  Japan	  was	  eager	  to	  join	  the	  ranks	  of	  ‘civilized	  nations’	   in	   the	  West,	   and	   the	   domestic	   drug-­‐addiction	   problem	  was	   seen	   to	   have	  international	   implications.	  See	  Miriam	  Kingsberg,	  Moral	  Nation:	  Modern	   Japan	  and	  Narcotics	  in	  Global	  History,	  (Berkeley:	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  2014).	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What	   these	   students	   considered	   as	   ‘yellow	   culture’	   was	   the	   normative	  entertainment	   culture	   among	   the	   workers,	   hawkers,	   housewives	   and	   the	  person	   on	   the	   street	   while	   the	   literary	   works	   promoted	   by	   the	   youth	  periodicals	  remained	  relatively	  highbrow	  and	  consumed	  by	  a	   limited	  group	  of	   educated	   youths.58	  Thus,	   while	   they	   claimed	   to	   serve	   the	   masses,	   they	  were	  also	  setting	  themselves	  apart	  through	  dictating	  how	  the	  rest	  of	  society	  should	   consume	   culture.	   Through	   positioning	   themselves	   as	   vanguards	   of	  society,	   and	   spurred	   by	   youthful	   idealism	   and	   innocence,	   they	   framed	  suffering	  as	  a	  rite	  of	  passage	  before	  one	  could	  gain	  common	  understanding	  with	  the	  masses.	  In	  this	  imagining,	  ‘yellow	  culture’	  was	  a	  crucial	  enemy.	  But	  this	   created	   enemy	   was	   ultimately	   problematic,	   debated,	   incongruent,	   and	  divisive.	  	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  58	  For	   a	  more	   thorough	   investigation	   of	   Singapore’s	   popular	   entertainment	   in	   the	  1950s,	   see	  Ho	  Hui	   Lin,	   “The	  1950s	   Striptease	  Debates	   in	   Singapore:	  Getai	  and	   the	  Politics	  of	  Culture”,	  Academic	  Exercise,	  Department	  of	  History,	  National	  University	  of	  Singapore,	  2014.	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CHAPTER	  2	  	  
“Different	  Shades	  of	  Yellow”:	  
Contested	  Rhetoric	  of	  Mass	  Mobilisation	  and	  Ideological	  Adherence	  	  	  The	  ‘yellow	  culture’	  debate	  brought	  ‘healthy’	  and	  ‘unhealthy’	  forms	  of	  culture	  into	  sharp	  relief.	  Culture	  became	  starkly	  and	  narrowly	  dichotomized	  into	  two	  opposing	   camps.	   The	   first	   was	   characterized	   as	   ‘yellow’,	   ‘unhealthy’	   and	  decadent,	  whereas	   the	   second	  was	  portrayed	  as	   ‘progressive’,	   ‘healthy’	   and	  hopeful.	  Despite	   the	   students’	   vehement	  determination	   to	   eradicate	   ‘yellow	  culture’	   and	   other	   forms	   of	   ‘unhealthy’	   culture,	   these	   categories	  were	   fluid	  and	   were	   constantly	   debated,	   negotiated,	   created	   and	   challenged.	   While	  ‘yellow	  culture’	  overtly	  referred	  to	  pornographic	  culture	  in	  the	  initial	  stages	  of	   the	   Anti-­‐Yellow	   Culture	   Movement,	   it	   would	   later	   encompass	   a	   broad	  range	  of	  cultural	  material	  that	  was	  deemed	  inimical	  to	  the	  development	  of	  a	  robust	  Malayan	  culture.	  This	  includes	  jazz	  music,	  supernatural	  films,	  martial	  arts	   films,	   science	   fiction,	   and	   so	  on.	  The	   looseness	  with	  which	   the	   label	   of	  ‘yellow	   culture’	   was	   applied,	   and	   the	   force	   with	   which	   it	   was	   deployed	  reveals	   its	   nature	   as	   a	   rhetorical	   tool	   to	   police	   ideological	   or	   aesthetical	  adherence	  among	  the	  literary	  community,	  even	  as	  these	  standards	  remained	  uneven	   and	   contested.	  While	   the	   earlier	   chapter	   examines	   the	  platforms	  of	  mobilization,	   this	   chapter	   explores	   the	   discourse	   of	   their	   activism	   by	  untangling	   the	  various	   strands	  of	  meanings	   that	   these	   students	   attached	   to	  the	  term	  ‘yellow	  culture’.	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‘Yellow	  Culture’	  as	  Pathology	  	  The	   language	   of	   contagion	   and	   pathology	   was	   a	   consistent	   theme	   in	  discussions	  about	  ‘yellow	  culture’	  in	  Singapore.	  Writers	  diagnosed	  it	  as	  both	  a	  disease	  as	  well	  as	  a	  symptom	  of	  larger	  systemic	  inequalities	  brought	  about	  by	   colonialism	   and	   capitalist	   oppression.	   Writers	   generally	   explained	   the	  causes	  of	  ‘yellow	  culture’	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  conditions	  that	  allowed	  this	  ‘disease’	  to	  thrive,	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  immunity	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  infected.	  For	  the	  former,	  writers	  reasoned	  that	  the	  state’s	  drastic	  measures	  in	  the	  Malayan	  Emergency	  had	   created	   an	   oppressive	   atmosphere	   that	   discouraged	   the	   production	   of	  works	   that	   engaged	  with	   politics	   or	   social	   commentary.	   In	   lieu	   of	   ‘serious’	  works,	   cultural	   workers	   resorted	   to	   producing	   frivolous,	   lewd	   and	   risqué	  forms	  of	  popular	  entertainment	  to	  make	  a	  living.	  This	  was	  made	  worse	  by	  the	  spread	   of	   ‘yellow’	   disease	   from	   abroad.	   As	   one	   writer	   argued,	   “Hollywood	  and	  French	  romantic	  ways	  are	  exactly	  the	  kinds	  of	  yellow	  and	  pornographic	  culture	  that	  corrupts	  our	  minds	  like	  viruses,”	  causing	  many	  people	  to	  become	  overly	   “romantic,	   lewd,	  materialistic,	   selfish,	   vulgar,	   and	   decadent.”1	  	   These	  ‘anti-­‐yellow’	  protagonists	  held	  great	  disdain	  for	  imported	  fashion	  trends,	  and	  accused	  men	  with	   the	   ‘bun-­‐head’	   or	   the	   ‘curry-­‐puff’	   hairstyles	   and	  women	  with	   thick	   make-­‐up	   of	   “looking	   like	   evil	   spirits”	   and	   engaging	   in	   “irksome	  behaviour”.2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Gengyun,	  Issue	  2,	  25	  April	  1954.	  2	  Chang	  Kong	  Yin,	   (translated	  by	  Edgar	  Liao),	   “The	  Awakening	  of	  a	  Chinese	  School	  Youth”	   in	  The	  May	  13	  Generation:	  the	  Chinese	  middle	  schools	  student	  movement	  and	  
Singapore	  politics	   in	   the	  1950s,	   Tan	   Jing	   Quee,	   Tan	   Kok	   Chiang	  &	  Hong	   Lysa,	   eds.,	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  The	   supply	   and	   spread	   of	   this	   ‘disease’	  was	   exacerbated	   by	   the	   conditions	  that	  created	  a	  demand	  for	  it.	   In	  other	  words,	  society	  was	  not	  well	  equipped	  with	   sufficient	   immunity	   to	   deny	   the	   effects	   of	   ‘yellow	   culture’.	   Writers	  argued	   that	   the	   high	   rates	   of	   unemployment	   and	   low	   wages	   in	   the	   1950s	  encouraged	  many	  workers	  to	  turn	  to	  crass	  culture	  as	  an	  easy	  way	  to	  escape	  their	  bitter	  realties.	  This	  has	  generated	  a	  demand	  for	  cultural	  products	  that	  aimed	   at	   stimulating	   the	   senses	   through	   sexually	   suggestive	   imageries	   or	  fantastical	   stories.3	  This	   combination	  of	   factors	   led	   to	  a	   thriving	   industry	  of	  gossip	  and	  tabloid	  publications	  that	  uncovered	  the	  frivolous	  and	  private	  lives	  of	  actors	  and	  actresses,	   fantastical	  movies	   from	  Hong	  Kong	  and	  Hollywood,	  and	   cabaret	   shows	   featuring	   scantily	   clad	   female	   dancers,	   all	   of	   which	  became	   the	   staple	   of	   popular	   culture	   in	   Singapore.4	  However,	   this	   lack	   of	  immunity	   was	   particularly	   sinister	   and	   terrifying	   because	   the	   writers	   saw	  ‘yellow	  culture’	  as	  a	  deliberate	  strategy	  used	  by	  the	  ruling	  classes	  to	  cement	  their	   power	   over	   the	   underclasses.	   The	   following	   quote	   aptly	   encapsulates	  the	   tone	   of	   pathological	   conspiracy	   common	   in	   discourses	   found	   in	   youth	  periodicals:	  	  “Yellow	  culture	  is	  the	  product	  of	  this	  unequal	  social	  structure,	  because	  it	  serves	  the	  elite	  ruling	  classes…	  The	  cruelest	  control	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (Petaling	   Jaya:	   Strategic	   Information	   and	   Research	   Development	   Centre,	   2011),	   p.	  213.	  3	  Chen,	  “Fanlun	  Fandui	  Huangse	  Wenhua	  Yundong”.	  4	  Gengyun,	  Issue	  9,	  15	  September	  1954.	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mechanism	  at	   the	  disposal	  of	   the	   ruling	   class	   is	  decadent	   and	  vile	  music,	   lascivious	   films	  and	  vulgar	  publications,	  which	  are	  used	  to	  anaesthetize	  the	  people,	  making	  them	  forget	  about	  the	  pains	   of	   being	   oppressed	   and	   lose	   their	   fight	   for	   life.	   In	   the	  worse	  situation,	  they	  become	  like	  reckless	  wild	  beasts,	  capable	  of	  doing	  anything!”5	  	  	  The	  result	  of	  the	  presence	  of	  ‘yellow	  culture’	  was	  moral	  decay	  and	  disease	  of	  society,	   directly	   increasing	   crime	   rate	   in	   society.	  Using	   the	  Chong	  Geok	  Tin	  rape	  and	  murder	  case	  as	  an	  example,	  the	  author	  claimed	  that	  ‘yellow	  culture’	  has	   taught	   its	   consumers	   to	   lose	   their	   senses	   and	   imitate	   the	   violence	   and	  sexual	  acts	  as	  portrayed	  in	  popular	  films.6	  In	  one	  gravely	  worded	  warning,	  a	  writer	  wrote	  that	  ‘yellow	  culture’	  is	  “extremely	  dangerous”	  as	  it	  causes	  one’s	  mind	  to	  fall	  ill.	  Once	  inflected,	  one	  “becomes	  redundant	  in	  society”	  and	  would	  even	   become	   “the	   enemy	   of	   the	   people.”	   He	   added	   that	   this	   disease	   was	  immensely	   transformative,	   for	   “even	   a	   useful	   person	  will	   become	   a	   useless	  person.”7	  	  	  The	  vocabulary	  of	  madness	  and	  infection	  of	  the	  mind	  was	  clearly	  presented	  in	   the	   critique	   against	   jazz	  music	   and	   popular	   songs,	   or,	   ‘yellow	  music’.	   To	  these	   writers,	   ‘healthy’	   music	   was	   built	   upon	   the	   foundations	   of	   classical	  theory	  and	  form,	  and	  composers	  such	  as	  Mozart,	  Beethoven	  and	  Tchaikovsky	  were	   celebrated.	   Jazz	   music	   came	   under	   attack	   because	   it	   “followed	   no	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Huangdi,	  Issue	  15,	  1	  April	  1954.	  	  6	  Huangdi,	  Issue	  7,	  1	  December	  1953.	  7	  Gengyun,	  Issue	  2,	  25	  April	  1954.	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structure”	  and	  its	  effect	  on	  the	  listener	  is	  akin	  to	  being	  “trapped	  in	  a	  mental	  hospital.”8	  To	  these	  writers,	  the	  use	  of	  syncopation	  and	  improvisation	  in	  jazz	  went	  against	  human	  nature,	  and	  were	  “non-­‐scientific,	  unnatural,	  unrealistic,	  and	   displayed	   an	   extreme	   level	   of	   decadence	   and	   crazed	   mentality.”9	  An	  author	  explained	  that	  jazz	  music	  was	  suppressive	  to	  the	  mind	  because	  it	  was	  “borne	  out	  of	  a	  culture	  of	  slavery	  and	  exploitation,”	  referring	   to	   the	  African	  slave	  workers	  in	  American	  plantations	  who	  originated	  the	  genre.10	  Instead	  of	  showing	  solidarity	  with	  art	  forms	  created	  by	  these	  underclasses	  in	  the	  West,	  a	  writer	  claimed	  that	  these	  forms	  of	  music	  were	  weapons	  used	  by	  the	  ruling	  classes	  to	  “seduce	  the	  poor	  souls,	  render	  them	  helpless,	  (and)	  enslaving	  them	  into	  a	  cycle	  of	  decadence.”	  He	  argued	  that	  this	  was	  especially	  the	  case	  during	  the	   Japanese	   Occupation	   in	   Shanghai	   and	   Hong	   Kong,	   when	   the	   Japanese	  purportedly	   opened	   up	   many	   dance	   halls	   and	   encouraged	   a	   decadent	   and	  hedonistic	   lifestyle	   for	   Chinese	   intellectuals	   who	   sought	   to	   numb	   their	  suffering	  and	  to	  escape	  the	  despairing	  reality.	  11	  	  	  	  A	   distinctive	   thread	   in	   these	   discourses	  was	   how	   these	  writers	   analogized	  Malayan	   society	   as	   a	   biopolitical	   entity	   that	   could	   evolve	   or	   degenerate	  according	   to	   ‘progressive’	   or	   ‘regressive’	   cultural	   elements. 12 	  The	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Gengyun,	  Issue	  4,	  10	  June	  1954.	  9	  Gengyun,	  Issue	  8,	  1	  September	  1954.	  10	  Gengyun,	  Issue	  4,	  10	  June	  1954.	  11	  Huangdi,	  Issue	  10,	  15	  January	  1954;	  There	  were	  arguments	  against	  ‘yellow	  music’	  in	  Shanghai	  in	  the	  1930s	  and	  1940s	  as	  well.	  See	  Jones,	  Yellow	  Music.	  12	  Several	   scholars	   have	   examined	   the	   nation	   as	   a	   biopolitical	   entity.	   See	   Susan	  Brownell,	   Training	   the	   Body	   for	   China:	   Sports	   in	   the	   Moral	   Order	   of	   the	   People’s	  
Republic,	   (Chicago:	   University	   of	   Chicago	   Press,	   1995);	   Gao	   Yunxiang,	   “Nationalist	  and	  Feminist	  Discourses	  on	  Jianmei	  (Robust	  Beauty)	  during	  China's	  ‘National	  Crisis’	  in	   the	   1930s”,	   Gender	   and	   History,	   Vol.	   18,	   No.	   3,	   (2006),	   pp.	   546	   –	   573;	   Heath,	  
Purifying	  Empire.	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‘somatization’	  of	  the	  nation	  is	  significant	  in	  two	  ways.	  First,	  it	  meant	  that	  the	  nation,	   like	   a	   human	   body,	   was	   susceptible	   to	   contagion	   and	   disease.	   Like	  viruses,	   this	   ‘yellow	   culture’	   poison	   could	   not	   be	   immediately	   visible	   and	  therefore	  harder	  to	  guard	  against	  and	  created	  a	  greater	  degree	  of	  panic.	  The	  rapist	   and	   murderer	   of	   Chong	   Geok	   Tin	   was	   a	   classic	   example	   of	   a	   man	  infected	   by	   the	   virus	   of	   ‘yellow	   culture’.	   In	   a	   commentary	   about	   the	   Chong	  case,	  an	  author	  wrote	  that	  the	  ‘yellow	  culture’	  poison	  had	  varying	  degrees	  of	  effect.	   Some	   people	   like	   the	   rapist-­‐murderer	   “committed	   grave	   crimes	   and	  lost	   their	   humanity,”	   while	   others	   became	   “obsessed	   with	   lascivious	  pleasures	  and	  became	  indolent	  to	  studies	  or	  work.”	  To	  him,	  “‘yellow	  culture’	  has	   sowed	   the	   seeds	   of	   all	   kinds	   of	   crime	   and	   destruction	   within	   the	  society.”13	  The	  second	  implication	  for	  this	  pathological	  discourse	  was	  that	  the	  sick	   national	   body	   required	   ‘antibodies’	   to	   resist	   the	   ‘yellow	   culture’	   virus	  and	  to	  restore	  the	  ‘health’	  of	  the	  society.	  This	  allowed	  the	  student	  writers	  and	  activists	   to	   position	   themselves	   as	   the	   righteous	   remedy	   to	   rectify	   the	  national	  illness.	  By	  inducing	  the	  panic	  of	  moral	  contagion,	  these	  youths	  could	  present	   themselves	   as	   beacons	   of	   purity	   and	   incorruptibility	   against	   the	  infection	   of	   ‘yellow’	   poison.	   As	   discussed	   in	   the	   previous	   chapter	   these	  students	  often	  adopted	  a	  discourse	  of	   vitality	   and	  moral	   innocence	   in	   their	  mobilising	  discourse,	  and	  the	  pathologizing	  of	   ‘yellow	  culture’	  was	  a	  crucial	  “suasive	  image”.14	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  NYSP,	  14	  November	  1953.	  14	  Stanley	  Cohen,	  Folk	  Devils	  and	  Moral	  Panics,	  p.	  43.	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Dialogue,	  Rivalry	  and	  Exclusions	  	  After	   the	   initial	  enthusiasm	  of	  school-­‐based	  forums	   in	  1953	  subsided,	  some	  writers	   felt	   that	   the	   momentum	   and	   unity	   of	   the	   literary	   community	   was	  diffusing,	   and	   that	   the	   Anti-­‐Yellow	   Culture	   Movement	   was	   losing	   steam.	  Writers	   expressed	   concerns	   that	   the	   cultural	   scene	   was	   factionalised,	  resulting	  in	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  “friendism”	  (朋友主义	  pengyou	  zhuyi),	  where	  writers	   sang	   undeserved	   praises	   of	   their	   friends’	  works.15	  The	   unity	   of	   the	  movement	   was	   also	   greatly	   undermined	   by	   inter-­‐publication	   rivalries,	   and	  the	  label	  of	   ‘yellow	  culture’	  was	  often	  loosely	  applied	  to	  attack	  one	  another.	  One	  of	  the	  more	  notable	  ‘war-­‐of-­‐pens’	  in	  the	  name	  of	  the	  Anti-­‐Yellow	  Culture	  Movement	   was	   between	   Sin	   Chew	   Jit	   Po	   (SCJP)	   and	   NYSP	   –	   long-­‐time	  competitors	  in	  the	  newspaper	  industry	  in	  Singapore.	  In	  December	  1953,	  SCJP	  published	   an	   anthology	   of	  Malayan	   Chinese	   novels,	   and	   it	   featured	   several	  works	   which	   portrayed	   swindlers	   and	   gamblers	   in	   a	   sympathetic	   light.16	  
SCJP’s	  selection	  criteria	  came	  under	  fire,	  as	  NYSP	  published	  a	  satirical	  essay	  mocking	   the	   themes	   of	   this	   anthology.17	  Not	   long	   after,	   NYSP	   published	  another	  more	   blatant	   criticism,	  which	   attacked	   SCJP	   for	   placing	   a	   group	   of	  “snobbish”,	   “unenlightened”	   and	   “out-­‐dated”	   authors	   on	   a	   pedestal.	   This	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  Gu	  Xin古辛,	  “Lun	  Zhengque	  Chuli	  Shiliao	  yu	  Mahua	  Wenyi	  Fazhan	  de	  Luxiang论
正确处理史料与马华文艺发展的路向”	   (On	   the	   correct	   way	   of	   handling	   historical	  sources	   and	   the	   direction	   of	   development	   of	   Malayan	   Chinese	   Literature	   and	   the	  Arts),	   in	  Mahua	  Wenyi	  de	  Qiyuan	  yiqi	  Fazhan(1946-­‐1963)	  马华文艺的起源及其发展
（1946-­‐1963）(The	   Origins	   and	   Development	   of	   Malayan	   Chinese	   Literature	   and	  the	  Arts),	   (Singapore:	  Nanyang	  Daxue	  Zhongguo	  Yuwen	  Xuehui	  南洋大学中国语文
学会,	  1964),	  p.	  29.	  16	  Wuzi	  伍子,	   ed.,	  Mahua	  Xiaoshuo	  Xuanji	  马华小说选集	  (An	  Anthology	   of	  Malayan	  Chinese	  Novels),	  (Singapore:	  Xingzhou	  Ribao	  Chongshu	  星洲日报丛书,	  1953).	  17	  NYSP,	  31	  December	  1953.	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author	  also	  claimed	  that	  the	  works	  included	  in	  the	  collection	  was	  “mediocre”,	  “poisonous”,	  and	  subverted	  the	  spirit	  of	  the	  Anti-­‐Yellow	  Culture	  Movement.	  18	  In	  January	  1954,	  SCJP	  retaliated	  by	  publishing	  a	  full	  page	  rebuttal	  against	  the	  claims	  of	  NYSP.	  It	  asserted	  that	  NYSP	  was	  hypocritical,	  since	  it	  only	  published	  a	   “pornographic	  piece	  of	   ‘yellow	   literature”	   a	   day	  before	   it	   decided	   to	  do	   a	  drastic	  turnaround	  and	  accusing	  SCJP	  of	  being	  ‘yellow’.	  19	  A	  third-­‐party	  in	  this	  conflict,	  Gengyun,	  later	  published	  an	  article	  siding	  with	  SCJP,	  insinuating	  that	  the	  writers	  at	  NYSP	  had	  picked	  up	  a	  “baseless”	  fight	  out	  of	  factional	  loyalties	  rather	   than	   appraising	   a	   work	   for	   their	   artistic	   merit. 20 	  This	   incident	  demonstrated	  that	  the	  term	  ‘yellow	  culture’	  was	  synonymous	  with	  anything	  that	   the	  writers	   disagreed	  with.	   The	   debate	   over	   ‘yellow-­‐ness	   revealed	   the	  rivalries	   among	   the	   periodicals	   more	   so	   than	   their	   substantive	  understandings	  of	   ‘yellow	  culture’,	  and	   it	  became	  a	  potent	  weapon	   in	   inter-­‐publication	  rivalries.	  	  	  Furthermore,	   these	   rivalries	   were	   often	   shrouded	   in	   overtones	   of	   name-­‐calling,	   sarcasm	  and	   anonymity,	  making	   it	   difficult	   to	  discuss	   issues	   openly	  and	  directly.	   Unless	   one	  was	   kept	   updated	   on	   the	   events	   and	   relationships	  between	  the	  different	  publications	  and	  writers,	   it	  would	  be	  difficult	   to	  even	  know	  which	  parties	  these	  criticisms	  were	  directed	  at.	  Huangdi	  employed	  this	  tactic	  most	  often	  by	  publishing	  sharply	  worded	  criticisms	  against	  unnamed	  or	   codenamed	   targets.	   In	   one	   issue,	   the	   editors	   called	   a	   certain	   other	  newspaper	  miewangbao	  灭亡报,	   or	   ‘Destruction	   Paper’,	   and	   redacting	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  NYSP,	  14	  January	  1954;	  NYSP,	  15	  January	  1954.	  	  19	  SCJP,	  18	  January	  1954.	  20	  Gengyun,	  Issue	  14,	  1	  December	  1954.	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names	   of	   ‘yellow	   authors’	   as	   “冯 xx”	   or	   “孟 xx”.21	  Attacks	   on	   its	   purported	  enemies	  were	  often	   veiled	   in	   sarcasm.22	  For	   instance,	   in	   an	   article	   titled	   “A	  Laughable	  Bunch”,	  the	  author	  wrote,	  	  	   “Recently	   a	   bunch	   of	   possessed	   fools	   in	   school	   decided	   to	  campaign	   against	   yellow	   culture.	   They	   have	   meetings	   almost	  everyday,	   turning	   the	   whole	   world	   upside	   down,	   telling	  everyone	   to	   stop	   reading	   pornographic	   publications,	   stop	  watching	   yellow	   films	   or	   listening	   to	   popular	   music	   because	  these	  things	  corrupt	  minds.	  Don’t	  they	  understand	  that	  these	  are	  noble	   forms	  of	  entertainment?	  Don’t	  we	  all	  know	  that	  our	  wise	  government	   authorities	   had	   never	   classified	   them	   as	   ‘banned	  materials’?	   	  On	   the	  contrary,	   the	  government	  has	  banned	  many	  books	  that	  these	  youths	  claimed	  are	  healthy.	  Undoubtedly,	  this	  is	  the	  way	  that	  our	  government	  expresses	  concern	  and	  love	  for	  the	  youths,	  so	  why	  should	  these	  youths	  kick	  up	  such	  a	  fuss?”23	  	  	  	  This	  form	  of	  passive	  aggressive	  criticisms	  of	  the	  government	  was	  perhaps	  a	  deliberate	   strategy	   to	   avoid	   proscription.	   Given	   the	   frequency	   of	   youth	  periodicals	   being	   shut	   down	   by	   the	   authorities,	   the	   writers	   would	   have	  known	  that	  their	  writings	  were	  constantly	  monitored	  and	  sought	  to	  express	  their	  criticisms	  in	  roundabout	  ways.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  Huangdi,	  Issue	  8,	  15	  December	  1953.	  22	  For	  instance,	  Issue	  9	  featured	  a	  criticism	  on	  a	  certain	  Towkay,	  and	  it	  was	  written	  as	  a	  “compliment”	  to	  the	  competence	  of	  this	  Towkay	  in	  amassing	  huge	  fortunes	  for	  himself	  while	  his	  workers	  had	  to	  sleep	  on	  the	  streets.	  	  	  23	  Huangdi,	  Issue	  9,	  1	  January	  1954.	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  For	   these	   students,	   to	   be	   ‘anti-­‐yellow’	   was	   necessarily	   also	   to	   adhere	   to	  socialist-­‐realist	  aesthetic	  standards.	  As	  such,	  ‘yellow	  culture’	  was	  also	  a	  label	  to	  express	  their	  staunch	  intolerance	  of	  youth	  publications	  that	  did	  not	  pursue	  these	   aesthetic	   standards	   as	   forcefully	   as	   they	   did.	   Jiaofeng	  《蕉风》and	  
Xuesheng	  Zhoubao	  《学生周报》were	  two	  youth	  periodicals	  that	  avoided	  the	  ‘anti-­‐yellow’	   movement	   and	   focused	   on	   the	   lyrical,	   sentimental	   and	   daily	  happenings	   of	   the	   student	   community	   rather	   than	   political	   and	   current	  affairs	   topic.	   As	   a	   result	   of	   their	   non-­‐adherence	   to	   the	   dominant	   socialist-­‐realist	   aesthetic,	   these	   two	   publications	   were	   boycotted	   by	   the	   Chinese	  middle	   school	   students	   and	   were	   forced	   to	   relocate	   to	   Kuala	   Lumpur	   in	  1957.24	  One	   of	   the	   first	   literary	   scholars	   who	   categorized	   the	   corpus	   of	  literary	  works	  under	  the	  banner	  of	  Anti-­‐Yellow	  Culture	  Movement,	  Fang	  Xiu,	  did	  not	  even	  include	  these	  two	  publications	  in	  his	  extensive	  study	  because	  he	  did	   not	   consider	   them	   representative	   of	   the	   anti-­‐imperial,	   anti-­‐feudal	   and	  socialist-­‐realist	   spirit	   that	   characterized	   Malayan	   Chinese	   literature	   at	   the	  time. 25 	  Thus,	   the	   Anti-­‐Yellow	   Culture	   Movement	   operated	   within	   an	  ideologically	   inflected	   aesthetic	   where	   ‘healthy’	   culture	   is	   also	   necessarily	  anti-­‐colonial	  and	  engaged	  in	  political	  criticism.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  It	  was	   later	   found	  out	   that	   these	   two	  publications	  were	  backed	  by	  a	  Hong	  Kong	  anti-­‐communist	   publishing	   house	   and	   had	   the	   underlying	   purpose	   of	   promoting	  ‘liberal’	   values	   among	   the	   Chinese-­‐speaking	   world	   amidst	   the	   influence	   of	  communist	   ideologies	   originating	   in	   China.	   They	   might	   have	   chosen	   to	   relocate	  because	  they	  did	  not	  have	  the	  ideological	  room	  to	  establish	  themselves	  in	  the	  leftist-­‐inflected	  Singapore	  Chinese	  community.	  See	  Shen	  Shuang,	  “A	  Cold	  War	  Trans-­‐Pacific	  Cultural	  Network:	  A	  Study	  of	  Youlian’s	  History	   in	  Hong	  Kong	  and	  Southeast	  Asia”,	  Research	  Seminar	  presented	  at	  Asia	  Research	  Institute,	  Singapore,	  15	  October	  2015.	  	  25	  Cheah,	  Zhongguo	  Geming	  Wenxue	  Yingxiangxia	  de	  Mahua	  Zuoyi	  Wenxue,	   pp.	   195-­‐196.	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Defying	  the	  Binary	  –	  Case	  of	  Yao	  Zi	  	  Despite	  the	  fervent	  attempts	  to	  use	  ‘yellow	  culture’	  as	  a	  label	  to	  fixate	  a	  set	  of	  literary	   standards	   and	   values,	   there	   were	   attempts	   from	   within	   the	  intellectual	   community	   to	   resist	   the	   stark	   dichotomy	  between	   ‘progressive’	  or	  ‘decadent’	  culture.	  The	  controversy	  surrounding	  the	  novelist,	  Yao	  Zi姚紫,	  was	  an	  example	  of	  how	  these	  boundaries	  were	  negotiated	  and	  how	  one	  could	  carve	  out	  a	  discursive	  space	  in	  the	  polarised	  debate	  on	  ‘yellow	  culture’.	  	  	  Yao	  Zi’s	  birthname	   is	  Zheng	  Mengzhou	  郑梦周	   and	  he	  was	  born	   in	  1920	   in	  Quanzhou,	  China.	  Yao	  Zi	  was	  once	  fired	  as	  the	  editor	  of	  a	  daily	  in	  Xiamen	  due	  to	  his	  criticisms	  of	  the	  KMT	  government.	  In	  1947,	  he	  arrived	  in	  Singapore	  and	  began	  to	  work	  as	  an	  elementary	  school	  teacher.	  In	  1949,	  he	  published	  a	  novel	  titled	   “Miss	  Xiuzi”	   (秀子姑娘)	   in	   the	  Nanyang	  Siang	  Pau,	  which	   sold	  16,000	  copies,	  gaining	  prominence	  among	  the	  literary	  circles	  and	  earning	  him	  a	  job	  as	   an	   editor	   in	   the	   newspaper.26	  In	   1956,	   he	   left	   Nanyang	   Siang	   Pau	   to	  establish	   a	   highbrow	   literary	   journal,	  The	  Literary	  Post	   (文艺报),	  where	   he	  was	  the	  chief	  editor	  as	  well	  as	  the	  main	  writer.	  	  	  Over	   the	   course	   of	   Yao	   Zi’s	   career,	   his	   contemporaries	   have	   repeatedly	  accused	   him	   as	   a	   ‘yellow	   writer’	   and	   not	   being	   anti-­‐colonial	   enough.	  Paradoxically,	  the	  colonial	  authorities	  have	  also	  suspected	  his	  publications	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  Ang,	  “Yaozi’s	  Response	  during	  the	  Anti-­‐Yellow	  Culture	  Movement”,	  p.	  5.	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being	  too	  anti-­‐colonial	  and	  for	  spreading	  communist	  propaganda.27	  Perhaps	  as	   a	  way	  of	   avoiding	   surveillance	  or	   to	  defend	  his	  works	   against	   critics,	   he	  adopted	  up	  to	  fifteen	  pseudonyms	  that	  interacted	  with	  one	  another.28	  Each	  of	  his	   pen-­‐names	   had	   a	   different	   persona	   –	   for	   instance,	   Tang	   Xi	  唐兮	   often	  provided	   literary	   analysis,	   Fu	   Jian	   符劍 	   was	   a	   commentator	   on	   the	  happenings	   of	   the	   local	   literary	   happenings,	   Xi	   Men	   Feng	  西门鳳	   writes	  general	  reflections	  about	  life,	  and	  he	  reserves	  the	  name	  of	  Yao	  Zi	  for	  novels	  and	  short	  stories.	  	  	  One	   of	   Yao	   Zi’s	   most	   controversial	   stories,	   Orang	   Lali,	   was	   a	   first-­‐person	  narration	   of	   a	   love	   affair	   between	   “I”,	   a	   young	   Chinese	   artist,	   and	   Lana,	   a	  Dutch	   former	   socialite	   turned	   escaped	   prisoner-­‐of-­‐war.	   Set	   in	   Sumatra	  during	  the	  Japanese	  Occupation,	  the	  story	  unfolds	  when	  “I”	  found	  Lana	  in	  the	  jungles	  after	  her	  harrowing	  escape	  from	  an	  internment	  camp	  and	  decided	  to	  hide	  her	  from	  the	  Japanese	  soldiers.	  Over	  time,	  Lana	  and	  “I”	  developed	  a	  love	  affair,	  but	  he	  was	  soon	  disillusioned	  by	  her	  willingness	  to	  prostitute	  herself	  to	   other	   men	   in	   exchange	   for	   petty	   items	   like	   lipsticks	   and	   dresses.	  Nevertheless,	   he	   continued	   to	   protect	   her	   from	   the	   Japanese	   soldiers	   and	  tried	   his	   best	   to	   fulfill	   her	  material	   needs.	   After	   the	   war,	   Lana	   left	   “I”	   and	  resumed	  her	  place	  in	  the	  colonial	  social	  hierarchy.	  A	  few	  years	  later	  when	  “I”	  met	   Lana	   again,	   she	   feigned	   ignorance	   and	   haughtily	   cast	   him	   aside	   as	   a	  “despicable	  China	  man”.29	  Throughout	  the	  story,	  Yao	  Zi	  portrayed	  Lana	  as	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  PRO80/56	  “Reports	  by	  Press	  Liaison	  Officer:	  Chinese	  and	  Chinese	  Translator	  on	  Mosquito	  Papers),	  3	  February	  1956.	  28	  Ang,	  “Yaozi’s	  Response	  during	  the	  Anti-­‐Yellow	  Culture	  Movement”,	  p.	  5.	  29	  Wenyibao,	  Issue	  1,	  15	  February	  1954.	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deceiving,	  materialistic	  and	  opportunistic	  woman	  who	  took	  advantage	  of	  the	  young	  “I”	  for	  her	  own	  protection	  and	  gain.	  In	  the	  story,	  “I”	  often	  felt	  exploited	  and	  their	  relationship	  was	  an	  allegory	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  colonialism	  itself.	  The	   story	   ends	   on	   a	   poignant	   note	   when	   “I”	   witnessed	   Queen	   Elizabeth’s	  coronation	   parade	   on	   the	   streets	   of	   Singapore	   and	   reflected	   bitterly	   about	  how	  people	  were	  celebrating	  the	  prolonging	  of	  the	  colonial	  enterprise	  when	  Lana,	  as	  a	  representative	  of	  the	  colonial	  masters,	  could	  be	  so	  conniving.	  	  	  Despite	  Yao	  Zi’s	  allusions	  to	  the	  exploitative	  and	  deceptive	  nature	  of	  colonial	  rule,	  what	  caught	  the	  attention	  of	  the	  readers	  was	   instead	  how	  Lana’s	  body	  was	  described	  through	  the	  lens	  of	  “I”.	  One	  scathing	  critique	  read:	  “Its	  theme	  and	  writing	   style	   is	   no	   different	   from	   ‘yellow’	   literature.	   This	   story	   has	   no	  social	  meaning,	   and	   is	   nothing	   but	   an	   exciting	   love	   story…	   after	   reading	   it,	  there	   is	   nothing	   to	   be	   gained	   except	   a	   feeling	   of	   disgust.”30	  	   Another	   critic	  argued	   that	   Yao	   Zi’s	   ostensible	   descriptions	   of	   romance	   was	   “formalistic,	  lustful,	  superficial,	  narrow	  and	  based	  on	  physical	  attraction.”	  Worst	  of	  all,	  the	  critic	   claimed	   that	   Yao	   Zi	   prioritized	   personal	   romance	   over	   love	   for	   the	  country	   or	   for	   the	   people,	   which	   in	   turn	   made	   this	   romance	   “vulgar	   and	  tasteless”.31	  The	   illustrations	   within	   the	   story	   also	   received	   flack	   for	   being	  overtly	  pornographic	  as	  they	  featured	  nude	  women.32	  	  However,	   Yao	   Zi	   defended	   against	   these	   criticisms	   and	   argued	   that	   the	  literary	   community	   needed	   a	   more	   nuanced	   understanding	   of	   ‘yellow’	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  Huangdi,	  Issue	  14,	  15	  March	  1954.	  	  31	  Huangdi,	  Issue	  16,	  15	  April	  1954.	  32	  See	  Appendix:	  Figure	  6.	  
	   52	  
literature.	  As	  the	  editor,	  he	  considered	  the	  mission	  of	  Wenyibao	  as	  expanding	  the	   range	   of	   acceptable	   and	   ‘healthy’	   literature	   in	  Malaya.	   Not	   only	   did	   he	  undertake	  the	  bold	  move	  of	  publishing	  his	  story	  Orang	  Lali	  in	  the	  inaugural	  issue	  of	  Wenyibao,	  he	  appeared	  to	  have	  understood	  its	  potential	  controversy	  and	  published	  an	  essay	  defending	  his	  story	  in	  the	  same	  issue.	  Entitled	  “What	  is	  Good	  Literature?”,	  Yao	  Zi	   chided	  his	  potential	   critics	  by	  accusing	   them	  of	  mindlessly	  labelling	  cultural	  products	  into	  simplistic	  categories:	  	  “In	   today’s	  Malayan	  cultural	  circle,	   there	  are	  many	   ‘progressive	  writers’	   who	   do	   not	   have	   an	   in-­‐depth	   understanding	   of	   the	  theories	   of	   progressive	   literature…	   especially	   those	   self-­‐proclaimed	  ‘critics’	  who	  twist	  the	  logic	  of	  progressive	  literature.	  They	   find	   descriptions	   of	   body	   parts	   in	   the	   decadent	   literary	  works	  of	  the	  petite	  bourgeois,	  and	  label	  them	  as	  ‘yellow	  cultural	  products’.	  They	  nitpick	  on	  any	  mention	  of	   love	   in	   the	  works	  of	  socialist	   realist	   writers,	   and	   claim	   that	   these	   are	   ‘yellow	  culture’.”33	  	  	  In	   a	   subsequent	   issue	   of	  Wenyibao,	   Yao	   Zi	   (using	   a	   different	   pseudonym)	  offered	  a	  distinction	  between	  ‘yellow’	  and	  ‘pornographic’.	  Using	  the	  example	  of	   prostitution,	   he	   argued	   that	   while	   prostitutes	   were	   considered	   ‘yellow’,	  they	  were	  also	  victims	  of	  social	  oppression	  and	  it	  would	  not	  be	  fair	  to	  vilify	  them.	  He	  urged	  readers	  to	  recognize	  that	  pornography	  had	  its	  own	  historical	  background	   and	   cultural	   logic.	   The	   real	   cause	   of	   ‘yellow	   culture’,	   in	   his	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opinion,	  was	  the	  feudal	  and	  backward	  social	  ideology,	  and	  pornography	  was	  merely	  a	   symptom.	  He	   suggested	   that	  despite	   the	   fervor	  of	   the	  Anti-­‐Yellow	  Culture	  Movement,	  there	  was	  still	  no	  central	  ideological	  structure	  or	  guiding	  philosophy,	   which	   resulted	   in	   the	   movement	   becoming	   very	   divisive	   and	  susceptible	   to	   “external	   manipulation”.34	  In	   his	   private	   correspondence,	   he	  revealed	  an	  even	  sharper	  distaste	  against	  his	  critics,	  whom	  he	  claimed	  paid	  no	  attention	  to	  the	  context	  of	  using	  nudity	  in	  literature:	  “Beneath	  the	  skin	  of	  these	   ‘progressives’	   are	   ‘feudal’	  bones.	  Their	  minds	  are	  embedded	  with	   the	  most	  decadent	  of	  thoughts,	  and	  as	  such,	  they	  immediately	  think	  of	  the	  lewd	  whenever	   they	   see	   any	   writing	   on	   nudity…	   they	   project	   their	   own	  lasciviousness	  on	  other	  people.”35	  His	  resentment	  highlighted	  the	  dangers	  of	  adhering	   to	   a	   mob	   mentality,	   when	   ‘yellow	   culture’	   simply	   became	   a	  mobilization	   tool	   that	   the	   youths	   blindly	   applied	   to	   anything	   they	   did	   not	  agree	  with.	  Even	  though	  these	  youths	  claimed	  to	  promote	  ‘healthy	  culture’,	  to	  Yao	  Zi,	   they	  were	  only	   interested	   in	   the	  specific	   type	  of	  culture	  that	  echoed	  their	   values	   and	   interests,	  while	   criticizing	   and	   silencing	   the	  other	   types	  of	  literature	  such	  as	  his	  own.	  	  	  
	  
Portrayal	  of	  Malays	  	  	  As	  much	  as	  these	  Chinese	  students	  were	  championing	  a	  distinctive	  national	  identity	   based	   on	  Malaya’s	  multi-­‐cultural	   landscape,	   their	   position	   towards	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	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  2,	  15	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  1954.	  35	  Ang,	  “Yaozi’s	  Response	  to	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  Anti-­‐Yellow	  Culture	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the	  Malays	   and	  other	   races	  was	   ambiguous,	   and	   at	   times,	   contradictory.	  At	  the	  same	  time	  that	  discussions	  of	  progress	  and	  the	  revitalization	  of	  a	  Malayan	  culture,	   similar	   but	   separate	   debates	   were	   taking	   place	   in	   the	   Malay	  vernacular	  press,	  radio	  and	  film.	  The	  terms	  of	  these	  Malay	  debates	  reflect	  an	  acute	   awareness	   of	   the	   cosmopolitan	   character	   of	   their	   cultural	   milieu,	   as	  they	  negotiated	  the	  position	  of	  Malay	  language	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  Chinese	  language	  and	  the	  Anglophone	  cultures.36	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  these	  debates	  centered	  on	  the	  modernization	   of	   the	  Malay	   language,	   as	   Malay	   intellectuals	   expressed	  their	  resentment	  at	  colonial	  attempts	  to	  reinforce	  Malay	  as	  a	  language	  fit	  only	  for	  the	  marketplace.37	  Despite	  the	  parallel	  developments	  in	  both	  the	  Chinese	  and	   Malay	   intellectual	   circles	   and	   both	   their	   commitments	   to	   building	   a	  Malayan	   culture	   that	   embraces	   its	   internal	   diversity,	   there	  was	   little	   cross-­‐fertilization	   of	   ideas	   in	   the	   Chinese	   language	   print.	   	   Instead,	   these	   youth	  publications	  expressed	  their	  awareness	  of	  the	  multi-­‐cultural	  environment	  in	  pedestrian	   and	   superficial	   ways.	   For	   instance,	   Wenyibao	   had	   a	   regular	  column	  that	  described	  traditional	  clothing,	  songs	  and	  dances	  from	  the	  Malay	  Archipelago,	   underlining	   a	   ‘tribal’	   image	   of	   the	   featured	   groups.	   	   Other	  authors	  took	  to	  including	  tropical	  motifs	  in	  their	  works,	  such	  as	  coconut	  trees	  and	   the	   hot	   and	   humid	   climate,	   and	   transliterating	   simple	  Malay	  words	   or	  Chinese	  dialects	  in	  their	  short	  stories.	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  See	   Timothy	   Barnard	   and	   Jan	   van	   der	   Putten,	   “Malay	   Cosmopolitan	   Activism	   in	  Post-­‐war	   Singapore”,	   in	   Paths	   Not	   Taken,	   Michael	   Barr	   and	   Carl	   Trocki,	   eds.,	  (Singpaore:	  National	  University	  of	  Singapore	  Press,	  2008),	  pp.	  132	  –	  153.	  37	  T.N.	  Harper,	  The	  End	  of	  Empire	  and	  the	  Making	  of	  Malaya,	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1999),	  p.	  300.	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This	   focus	  on	  “Malay	  backwardness”	  was	  reinforced	   in	   the	  ways	  that	  Malay	  characters	  were	  portrayed	   in	  short	  stories.	   In	   fact,	   it	  was	  glaring	  that	  while	  Yao	  Zi’s	  descriptions	  of	  female	  bodies	  invited	  criticisms	  from	  readers	  for	  its	  alleged	   ‘yellow’	   content,	   there	   were	   no	   discussions	   surrounding	   similar	  descriptions	   on	  Malay	   bodies	   despite	   an	   ostensible	   discourse	   of	   the	   exotic	  and	   sensual	   Malay.	   In	   one	   of	   the	   stories	   published	   by	   Gengyun,	   the	   writer	  began	  with	  a	  detailed	  description	  of	  the	  two	  Malay	  protagonists:	  	  	   “The	  children	  of	  Nanyang	  mature	  early.	  Her	  body	  is	  voluptuous,	  and	  she	  has	  a	  pair	  of	  deeply	  sentimental	  eyes	  on	  her	  brownish	  red	   face.	   She	   has	   an	   innocent,	   naïve	   and	   child-­‐like	   heart,	   an	  unspoken	  dream...	  The	  peoples	  of	  the	  equator	  are	  full	  of	  emotion.	  This	  healthy	  and	  strong	  young	  man	  tend	  to	  use	  little	  of	  his	  brains	  beneath	  his	  naturally	  curly	  hair,	  but	  indeed	  there	  is	  little	  use	  for	  it	  in	  the	  primitive	  life	  in	  a	  kampong.”38	  	  The	   image	  of	   the	   carefree,	   child-­‐like	  and	  sexually	  uninhibited	  Malay	   female	  was	  detailed	  in	  a	  short	  story	  in	  another	  periodical:	  	   	  “Her	  hair	  is	  deep	  black	  and	  curly,	  matching	  her	  round	  face,	  her	  light	   brown	   skin	   emits	   a	   robust	   glow;	   a	   pair	   of	   dark	   eyes	   is	  always	  shimmering	  under	  her	  long	  and	  dense	  eyelashes	  like	  the	  stars	   of	   a	   spring	   night;	   her	   small	   red	   lips	   is	   always	   wearing	   a	  peaceful	   smile…The	  Malay	   girls	   are	  more	   straightforward	   than	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we	  are!	  The	  layers	  of	  propriety	  and	  rituals	  has	  heavily	  bounded	  our	  natural	  personalities.”39	  	  Embedded	   within	   the	   above	   two	   descriptions	   were	   a	   few	   strands	   of	  stereotypes	  that	  were	  attributable	  to	  the	  unique	  tropical	  climate	  of	  Nanyang.	  First,	   the	   writer	   emphasized	   the	   child-­‐like	   characteristics	   of	   the	   Nanyang	  community.	   Second,	   the	   climate	   has	   also	   affected	   the	   level	   of	   passion	   that	  they	   exhibited.	   On	   one	   hand,	   the	  Malay	   climate	   allowed	   true	   expression	   of	  “natural	   personalities”,	   and	   yet	   on	   the	   other	   it	   inhibits	   progress	   and	   social	  change.	  In	  showing	  disdain	  over	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  tropical	  climate	  on	  literary	  output,	  one	  author	  went	  as	  far	  as	  to	  assert	  that	  Malayan	  Chinese	  writers	  were	  “infected”	  by	  the	  heat	  and	  thus	  were	  unable	  to	  break	  out	  of	  their	  colonial	  and	  feudal	  thinking.40	  It	  was	  interesting	  to	  note	  that	  while	  the	  erotic	  and	  sensual	  were	   labeled	   ‘yellow’	   and	  pathologized	   as	   a	   disease	  when	   exhibited	   among	  youths	   in	   the	   Chinese	   middle	   school	   community,	   the	   same	   characteristics	  were	   considered	   authentic	   and	   natural	   when	   displayed	   in	   the	   Malays.	  Nonetheless,	  the	  Chinese	  students	  were	  clear	  in	  presenting	  their	  rhetoric	   in	  multi-­‐cultural	   terms,	   even	   if	   it	  was	   an	   apparent	   strategy	   in	   garnering	  mass	  support	   and	   evading	   the	   Colonial	   government’s	   suspicions	   of	   them	   being	  overly	  influenced	  by	  Communist	  China.	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Conclusion	  	  This	   chapter	   examines	   the	   highly	   contested	   label	   of	   ‘yellow	   culture’.	   As	   a	  disease,	  it	  gave	  the	  youth	  activists	  a	  vocabulary	  to	  pathologize	  the	  condition	  of	   colonialism	   and	   justify	   the	   need	   for	   activism	   and	   intervention.	   Yet	   the	  unifying	   rhetoric	   of	   the	   Anti-­‐Yellow	   Culture	   Movement	   concealed	   the	  difficulties	  in	  actual	  organization,	  as	  inter-­‐publication	  rivalries	  remained	  and	  substantive	  understandings	  of	   ‘yellow	  culture’	  were	  divided.	  The	  distinctive	  binary	   between	   ‘healthy’	   and	   ‘yellow’	   forms	   of	   culture	   became	   an	   effective	  weapon	  to	  alienate	  or	  criticize	  rivals	  within	  the	  literary	  community.	  The	  case	  of	   Jiaofeng,	  Xuesheng	  Shibao	  and	  Yao	   Zi	   in	   being	   on	   the	   ‘wrong	   side’	   of	   the	  debate	  demonstrated	  how	  ‘yellow	  culture’	  was	  deployed	  as	  a	  tool	  for	  policing	  ideological	   and	   aesthetical	   adherence	   among	   the	   writers	   and	   publications.	  Despite	  a	  commitment	  to	  producing	  ‘healthy’	  literature	  that	  served	  the	  multi-­‐cultural	  realities	  of	  Malaya,	  the	  portrayal	  of	  Malays	  in	  Anti-­‐Yellow	  literature	  betrayed	  a	  sense	  of	  cultural	  superiority	  among	  the	  Chinese	  writers	  that	  saw	  the	   Malay	   community	   as	   ‘backward’	   and	   innately	   sensual.	   These	   widely	  differing	  meanings	  point	  to	  the	  moral	  potency	  and	  malleability	  of	  this	   label.	  	  In	   the	   eyes	   of	   the	   Colonial	   government,	   however,	   ‘yellow	   culture’	   would	  become	  synonymous	  with	  Communist	  culture.	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CHAPTER	  3	  
	  “There	  must	  be	  an	  ulterior	  motive”:	  	  
The	  Logic	  of	  Counter-­‐Insurgency	  and	  British	  Failure	  in	  	  
Moral	  Leadership	  
	  
	  Throughout	  the	  heady	  days	  of	  mass	  movements	  in	  the	  1950s,	  the	  British	  kept	  a	  close	  watch	  on	  the	  Chinese	  middle	  school	  students.	  Examining	  the	  British	  files	   reveals	   an	   interconnected	   world	   of	   surveillance,	   covert	   operations,	  censorship,	   and	   counter-­‐propaganda	   as	   the	   Empire	   edges	   towards	   a	   new	  postcolonial	   Cold	  War	   reality.	   The	   colonial	   government	   in	   Singapore	   found	  itself	   in	   a	   difficult	   bind	   between	   competing	   demands	   of	   “the	   exercise	   of	  freedom	   which	   is	   so	   essential	   for	   the	   promotion	   of	   democracy,	   and…	   the	  control	  which	   is	  necessary	   to	  curb	   the	  subversive	  and	   terrorist	  activities	  of	  those	  whose	  declared	  object	  is	  revolution	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  few.”1	  Nonetheless,	  the	   logic	   of	   counter-­‐insurgency,	   coupled	   with	   the	   need	   to	   configure	   a	  strategically	   advantageous	   decolonization	   arrangement	   ultimately	   shaped	  the	   authoritarian	   tenor	   of	   colonial	   governance	   in	   immediate	   postwar	  Singapore.	  	  	  Against	  this	  backdrop,	  the	  Anti-­‐Yellow	  Culture	  Movement	  championed	  by	  the	  students	   became	   a	   very	   different	   beast	   in	   the	   eyes	   of	   the	   colonial	   officials.	  The	   moral	   argument	   became	   irrelevant	   insofar	   as	   the	   alleged	   political	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  SCA55/49,	   “Governor	  Gimson	   to	   Chief	   Inspector	   of	   Chinese	   Schools”,	   28	  October	  1948.	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inclinations	   of	   the	   protagonists	   were	   concerned.	   Caught	   in	   a	   defensive	  position	   as	   students	   tore	   down	   the	   moral	   fiber	   of	   colonialism,	   the	   British	  resorted	  to	  framing	  the	  issue	  of	  ‘yellow	  culture’	  in	  security,	  rather	  than	  moral	  terms.	  Their	  understanding	  of	  the	  Chinese	  students	  was	  also	  greatly	  shaped	  by	   the	   exigencies	   of	   the	   Communist	   threat,	   which	   created	   a	   “powerful	  discourse	  of	  conspiracy	  and	  collusion”	  within	  the	  bureaucracy.2	  Information	  Officers	  operating	  within	  this	  coloured	  framework	  often	  found	  exactly	  what	  they	   were	   looking	   for	   –	   the	   links	   between	   terminology	   used	   in	   the	   Anti-­‐Yellow	  Culture	  Movement	  and	  in	  the	  Soviet-­‐controlled	  Communist	  bloc.	  State	  propaganda	   campaigns	   were	   launched	   in	   both	   directions	   -­‐	   to	   expose	   the	  Communist	  “ulterior	  motives”	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  to	  promote	  the	  virtues	  of	  the	   British	   Empire	   on	   the	   other.	   However,	   despite	   the	   large	   amount	   of	  resources	   devoted	   to	   winning	   the	   ‘hearts	   and	   minds’	   of	   the	   Chinese	  community	  from	  which	  the	  middle	  school	  students	  drew	  support,	  the	  British	  ultimately	   relied	   on	   the	   use	   of	   force.3	  Ironically,	   their	   desire	   to	   project	   an	  image	   of	   freedom	  and	  democracy	   among	   the	   people	   fell	   short	  when	   it	  was	  becoming	   clear	   that	   this	   campaign	  was	   gaining	  momentum	   across	   a	   larger	  spectrum	  of	  the	  community	  than	  had	  been	  expected.	  	  	  Numerous	   studies	   have	   dealt	   with	   the	   intents	   and	   methods	   of	   British	  propaganda	   during	   the	   Malayan	   Emergency.	   Here,	   propaganda	   is	   broadly	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Harper,	  “Lim	  Chin	  Siong	  and	  the	  ‘Singapore	  Story’”,	  p.	  21.	  3 	  The	   “Hearts	   and	   Minds”	   approach	   was	   coined	   by	   Sir	   Gerald	   Templer,	   High	  Commissioner	  to	  Malaya,	  at	  the	  height	  of	  the	  Malayan	  Emergency.	  This	  strategy	  was	  often	   credited	   as	   the	   reason	   for	   British	   success	   against	   the	   Malayan	   Communist	  Party.	   See	   Susan	   Carrathus,	   Winning	   hearts	   and	   minds:	   British	   governments,	   the	  
media,	   and	   colonial	   counter-­‐insurgency,	   1944-­‐1960,	   (London:	   Leicester	   University	  Press,	  1995).	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defined	   as	   the	   projection	   of	   a	   moral	   international	   image	   for	   the	   political	  survival	  of	  the	  British	  Empire.4	  Early	  studies	  tend	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  operational	  aspects	  of	  psychological	  warfare	   in	   the	  years	  of	   jungle	  wars.5	  These	  studies	  positioned	   propaganda	   specifically	   as	   a	   method	   for	   convincing	   the	   MCP	  guerillas	  to	  surrender,	  and	  the	  educational	  attempts	  to	  prevent	  New	  Villagers	  from	   providing	   food	   supply.	   Recent	   studies	   began	   to	   shift	   away	   from	   the	  tactical	   aspects	   of	   propaganda,	   and	   examined	   the	   broader	   politics	   of	   the	  colonial	  machinery	  in	  shaping	  the	  use	  of	  propaganda.	  For	  instance,	  Ian	  Aitken	  argued	   that	   propaganda	   policy	   in	   Malaya	   was	   shaped	   by	   the	   competing	  interests	   of	   various	   governmental	   institutions	   as	   they	   resisted	   or	   asserted	  lines	  of	  authority	  over	  each	  other.6	  T.N.	  Harper	  took	  a	  cultural	  approach	  as	  he	  explained	  how	  the	  British	  promoted	  an	  Anglicized	  Malayan	  Identity	  through	  the	   culture	   and	   the	   arts,	   but	   it	   ultimately	   failed	   to	   take	   root	   due	   to	  competition	   from	   primordial	   and	   communal	   forms	   of	   cultural	   identity.7	  While	   these	   studies	   have	   been	   insightful	   in	   shedding	   light	   on	   the	  management	   of	   propaganda	   and	   British’s	   attempts	   at	   defeating	   terrorist	  confidence	  in	  rural	  Malaya,	  less	  attention	  was	  paid	  to	  urban	  Singapore.	  This	  is	  surprising	  given	  that	  the	  Regional	  Office	  of	  the	  British	  Information	  Service,	  the	  Foreign	  Office’s	  Information	  and	  Research	  Department,	  the	  Departments	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  John	   MacKenzie,	   Propaganda	   and	   Empire,	   (Manchester:	   Manchester	   University	  Press,	  1982),	  p.	  125.	  	  5	  Richard	   Stubbs,	   Hearts	   and	   Minds	   in	   Guerilla	   Warfare:	   The	   Malayan	   Emergency	  
1948-­‐1960,	   (Oxford:	   Oxford	   University	   Press,	   1989);	   Clutterbuck,	   Riot	   and	  
Revolution	   in	   Singapore	   and	   Malaya;	   The	   most	   recent	   full	   length	   study	   of	   the	  Emergency	  Propaganda	  that	  also	  focused	  on	  its	  operations	  was	  Kumar	  Ramakrishna,	  
Emergency	   Propaganda:	   The	   Winning	   of	   Malayan	   Hearts	   and	   Minds,	   1948-­‐1958,	  (Richmond:	  Curzon	  Press,	  2002).	  	  6	  Ian	  Aitken,	   “British	  Governmental	   Institutions,	   the	  Regional	   Information	  Office	   in	  Singapore	   and	   the	   Use	   of	   the	   Official	   Film	   in	  Malaya	   and	   Singapore,	   1948–1961”,	  
Historical	  Journal	  of	  Film,	  Radio	  and	  Television,	  Vol.	  35	  No.	  1	  (2015),	  pp.	  27	  –	  52.	  	  7	  Harper,	  End	  of	  Empire,	  pp.	  274	  –	  307.	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of	   Broadcasting	   and	   Censorship,	   and	   Radio	   Malaya	   were	   all	   based	   in	  Singapore.	  Moreover,	  apart	  from	  Harper,	  most	  of	  these	  studies	  focused	  on	  the	  policy	   and	   operations	   of	   propaganda	   rather	   than	   the	   discursive	   tools	   of	  naming	  and	  understanding	  the	  ‘enemy’.	  	  	  As	  the	  previous	  chapters	  demonstrated,	   the	  Anti-­‐Yellow	  Culture	  war	  waged	  by	   the	   students	  was	  a	   rhetorical	   one,	   conducted	   through	   the	  print	  medium	  and	  the	  label	  of	  ‘yellow	  culture’	  often	  had	  variations	  as	  well	  as	  contested	  and	  contradictory	  meanings.	   Thus,	   it	   would	   be	   useful	   to	   also	   examine	   how	   the	  British	   understood	   this	   campaign	   and	   conducted	   their	   counter-­‐propaganda	  against	   it.	   This	   chapter	   thus	   explores	   the	   discursive	   environment	   in	  which	  the	  British	   viewed	   and	   reacted	   to	   the	  Anti-­‐Yellow	  Culture	  Movement.	   Even	  though	  the	  British	  conducted	  propaganda	  campaigns	  across	  all	   segments	  of	  the	   population,	   they	   saw	   the	   ‘yellow	   culture’	   issue	   largely	   as	   a	   Chinese	  problem,	   and	   so	   I	   will	   focus	   on	   their	   strategies	   that	   targeted	   the	   Chinese	  population.	   Of	   particular	   interest	   is	   the	   network	   of	   colonial	   information	  services	   and	   their	   role	   in	   managing	   the	   public	   relations	   between	   the	  government	  and	  the	  people	  at	  the	  height	  of	  the	  global	  Cold	  War	  -­‐	  “a	  conflict	  in	  which	  almost	  every	  move	  was	  made	  with	  one	  eye	  to	  its	  propaganda	  value.”8	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Paul	  Lashmar	  and	  James	  Oliver,	  Britain’s	  Secret	  Propaganda	  War,	   (Stroud:	  Sutton,	  1998),	  p.	  xv.	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Colonial	  Propaganda	  and	  the	  ‘Communist	  Plot’	  	  	  The	  British	   colonial	   propaganda	   system	   that	  was	   set	   up	  during	   the	   Second	  World	   War	   continued	   and	   expanded	   in	   its	   functions	   in	   the	   decades	   after.	  Malaya	   took	   on	   great	   importance	   as	   it	   was	   one	   of	   the	   major	   sources	   of	  revenue	   for	   the	   bankrupt	   postwar	   Britain.	   In	   1945,	   the	   dollar	   earnings	   of	  Malaya	   outweighed	   the	   entire	   industrial	   output	   of	   Britain. 9 	  Moreover,	  Britain’s	   involvement	   in	   the	   emerging	   Cold	  War	  meant	   that	   Singapore	  was	  now	  a	  strategically	  significant	  military	  outpost	  in	  the	  Far	  East.	  The	  reluctant	  and	  violent	  decolonization	  in	  India,	  Pakistan,	  Sri	  Lanka	  and	  Burma	  in	  1947-­‐48	  was	  unexpected,	  and	  it	  provided	  the	  impetus	  for	  Britain	  to	  have	  a	  firmer	  grip	   on	   its	   existing	   colonies.	   As	   a	   result,	   Britain	   returned	   to	   Malaya	   and	  Singapore	  with	  a	  stronger	  determination	  to	  maintain	  control.	  Its	  strategy	  was	  to	  delay	   the	  granting	  of	   independence	   for	   as	   long	  as	   it	   took	   to	  put	   in	  place	  structures	   that	  would	   sustain	   long-­‐term	   British	   interests.10	  This	   required	   a	  delicate	   management	   of	   public	   relations	   between	   the	   government	   and	   the	  people,	  and	  the	  Information	  Services	  played	  a	  crucial	  role.	  	  	  While	   the	  propaganda	  campaign	   in	  Malaya	  and	  Singapore	  during	   the	   initial	  years	   of	   1945-­‐1951	   was	   mostly	   directed	   from	   London,	   the	   immediate	  military	   needs	   of	   the	   Malayan	   Emergency	   called	   for	   the	   growth	   of	   a	   large	  number	   of	   ancillary	   information	   agencies	   in	   the	   colonies.	   This	   includes	   the	  Central	   Office	   of	   Information	   (COI,	   based	   in	   London),	   the	   Regional	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Aitken,	  “British	  Governmental	  Institutions”,	  p.	  29.	  10	  Ibid.,	  p.	  28.	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Information	   Office	   (based	   in	   Singapore),	   the	   Foreign	   Office	   Information	  Research	   Department	   (IRD,	   based	   in	   Singapore),	   the	   Department	   of	  Information	  Services	   in	  Federation	  of	  Malaya	   (based	   in	  Kuala	  Lumpur)	  and	  the	  Public	  Relations	  Office	  (PRO,	  in	  Singapore).	  These	  coordinating	  agencies	  further	   controlled	   a	   range	   of	   supporting	   institutions	   such	   as	   the	   Malayan	  Film	   Unit,	   Department	   of	   Broadcasting,	   Film	   Censorship	   Board,	   and	   Radio	  Malaya.	   In	   addition	   to	   the	   above,	   the	   Secretariat	   for	   Chinese	   Affairs,	   the	  Special	   Branch,	   the	   Police,	   and	   the	   Secretariat	   for	   Defense	   and	   Internal	  Security	   each	   had	   their	   own	   intelligence	   gathering	   and	   dissemination	  mechanisms	  whose	  functions	  often	  overlapped	  with	  the	  Information	  Services.	  The	   large	   number	   of	   state	   agencies	   involved	  meant	   that	   coordination	   was	  often	  messy	  and	  goals	  were	  not	  always	  clear	  or	  aligned.	  	  	  In	   the	   initial	   years	   of	   the	  Malayan	  Emergency,	   the	  British	  were	   il-­‐prepared	  for	   the	   large-­‐scale	   propaganda	   that	  was	   increasingly	   necessary	   to	   curb	   the	  influence	  of	  the	  MCP.	  This	  was	  in	  part	  due	  to	  a	  policy	  mistake	  in	  1945,	  when	  the	  Colonial	  Office	  had	  the	  opinion	  that	  a	  separate	  department	   that	  catered	  exclusively	  to	  the	  Chinese	  community	  was	  counterproductive	  to	  the	  goal	  of	  a	  united	  Malaya	  and	  so	  it	  abolished	  the	  Chinese	  protectorate	  in	  Malaya.11	  The	  devastating	   implication	  was	  that	  the	  government	  was	  receding	   its	   influence	  from	   the	   Chinese	   community	   at	   the	   very	   same	   time	   that	   the	   MCP	   was	  beginning	   to	   gain	   ground	   with	   the	   discontented	   urban	   and	   rural	   Chinese	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  The	  SCA	  continued	  operations	  in	  Singapore,	  and	  in	  1955	  it	  was	  subsumed	  under	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Labour	  and	  Welfare.	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workers.12	  The	  British	   in	   Singapore	  was	   confronted	  with	   another	   dilemma:	  going	   too	   hard	   on	   the	   Communists	   publicly	   might	   alienate	   the	   Chinese	  population	  at	  a	  time	  when	  leftist	  ideology	  upheld	  a	  favourable	  public	  image;	  while	   hesitancy	   could	   permit	   an	   intensification	   of	   pro-­‐Communist	  sentiments.13	  A	   Secretary	   for	   Chinese	   Affairs	   (SCA)	   report	   to	   the	   Defense	  Secretariat	  admitted	  “we	  still	  have	  a	  lot	  to	  learn	  in	  conditioning	  the	  people	  to	  accept	   policies	  which	   can	   easily	   be	   twisted	   by	   the	   opposition	   to	   appear	   as	  acts	  of	  colonial	  oppression.”14	  	  Propaganda	   in	   the	   early	   phase	   of	   the	   Malayan	   Emergency	   was	   largely	  conducted	  though	  distributing	  leaflets	  simply	  via	  airdrop,	  radio	  talks	  and	  the	  press.	   These	   methods	   were	   ineffective	   due	   to	   the	   mostly	   illiterate	   rural	  population	  in	  Malaya,	  and	  it	  called	  for	  a	  change	  in	  strategy	  to	  focus	  on	  word-­‐of-­‐mouth	   propaganda.	   However,	   the	   British	   faced	   a	   severe	   shortage	   of	  Chinese-­‐speaking	  ground	  officers	  who	  had	  intimate	  knowledge	  and	  access	  to	  the	   people.15	  J.P.	   Biddulph,	   the	   Secretary	   for	   Chinese	   Affairs	   in	   Singapore,	  admitted	   in	  1951	   that	  he	   remained	  an	   ‘outsider’	  during	  a	  meeting	  with	   the	  Chinese	  Chamber	  of	  Commerce	  –	  the	  main	  organization	  that	  the	  British	  relied	  on	   to	   influence	   the	  Chinese	  community.	   It	  was	  only	   in	  1956	   that	   the	  Public	  Relations	   Office	   in	   Singapore	   appointed	   a	   Chinese	   Press	   Liaison	   Officer	   to	  keep	   tabs	   on	   Chinese	   pubic	   opinion	   and	   to	   offer	   an	   alternative	   source	   of	  intelligence	   apart	   from	   the	   SCA,	   which	   was	   originally	   set	   up	   to	   resolve	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Ramakrishna,	  Emergency	  Progaganda,	  p.	  60.	  	  13	  Pillay	   Krishnan,	   “Press	   and	   Film	   Censorship	   in	   Colonial	   Singapore”,	   Academic	  Exercise,	  Department	  of	  History,	  National	  University	  of	  Singapore,	  1990,	  p.	  31.	  14	  CO1022/148	  “Chinese	  Resistance	  to	  Communism	  in	  Southeast	  Asia”,	  6	  June	  1951.	  15	  Stubbs,	  “Hearts	  and	  Minds”	  in	  Guerilla	  Warfare,	  p.	  183.	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problems	   of	   Chinese	   secret	   societies	   and	  monitor	   political	   activities	   of	   the	  Kuomintang	  and	  Chinese	  Communist	  Party	  in	  the	  colony.	  	  	  Lacking	  in	  ground	  intelligence,	  the	  Information	  Services	  relied	  heavily	  on	  the	  few	   Chinese	   assistants	   they	   had,	   and	   often	  made	   sweeping	   judgments	   and	  decisions	   based	   on	   stereotypes	   and	   limited	   knowledge.	   For	   example,	   the	  prevailing	   orthodoxy	   among	   the	   top	   British	   administrators	   in	   Malaya	   and	  Singapore	  were	  that	  the	  Chinese	  community	  collectively	  possessed	  a	  ‘streak	  of	   hysteria’,	   and	   were	   easily	   subjected	   to	   the	   so-­‐called	   ‘secret	   society	  complex’.16	  In	  dealing	  with	  the	  controversial	   issue	  of	  providing	   financial	  aid	  to	  Chinese	   schools	   in	  1955,	  Governor	  of	   Singapore	   John	  Nicoll	   commented,	  perhaps	   with	   a	   note	   of	   self-­‐congratulation,	   that	   the	   policy	   had	   worked	  because	   “money	   talks	   loudly	  among	   the	  Chinese”.17	  The	   fact	   that	  most	  MCP	  supporters	  were	  Chinese	  meant	  that	  it	  could	  not	  possibly	  represent	  a	  broad-­‐based	  Malayan	  nationalist	  movement.18	  Indeed,	  the	  British	  often	  justified	  the	  banning	  of	  cultural	  performances	  or	  societies	  by	  accusing	  them	  of	  being	  “un-­‐Malayan”	  and	  “subversive”.	  An	  example	  was	  the	  Chinese	  Brass	  Gong	  Musical	  Party,	  which	  had	  put	   forth	   a	  performance	  agenda	   that	   featured	   songs	   from	  Mainland	   China	   and	   thus	   they	   were	   “communistic”,	   “predominantly	   alien”	  and	  “is	  in	  no	  sense	  Malayan”.19	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  Ramakrishna,	  Emergency	  Progaganda,	  p.	  73.	  17	  Ibid.	  18	  Carruthers,	  Winning	  Hearts	  and	  Minds,	  p.	  78.	  19	  Colony	  of	  Singapore	  Annual	  Report	  1956,	  p.	  7.	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These	   factors	   greatly	   shaped	   how	   the	   colonial	   government	   viewed	   student	  unrest	   and	   the	   subsequent	   Anti-­‐Yellow	   Culture	   Movement,	   even	   as	   the	  Information	  Services	  expanded	  in	  its	  functions	  in	  the	  mid	  1950s.	  In	  Harper’s	  characterization	  of	  the	  Special	  Branch	  and	  the	  British	  intelligence	  system,	  he	  argued	   that	   their	   basis	   of	   equating	   the	   disorder	   with	   an	   international	  ‘Communist	  plot’	  was	  ultimately	  made	  as	   a	   “leap	  of	   faith”.	  He	  added:	   “once	  this	   leap	   was	   made,	   however,	   the	   British	   pursued	   white	   terror	   with	   a	  vengeance.” 20 	  Institutional	   goals	   have	   in	   part	   spurred	   on	   the	   tone	   of	  conspiracy.	  As	  scholars	  have	  uncovered,	  the	  Foreign	  Office’s	  IRD	  –	  one	  of	  the	  most	  secretive	  organizations	  in	  Britain	  –	  had	  played	  an	  overwhelming	  role	  in	  convincing	   other	   parts	   of	   the	   British	   government	   to	   take	   the	   Communist	  threat	  seriously.21	  Where	  the	  threat	  of	  Communism	  was	  present,	  IRD	  ensured	  that	  it	  was	  understood	  in	  the	  correct	  framework,	  as	  a	  battle	  against	  a	  global	  Communist	  movement.	  	  	  The	  British	  files	  drew	  many	  impressionistic	  parallels	  between	  the	  methods	  of	  the	   students	  with	   the	   global	  Communist	  movement,	   yet	   solid	   evidence	  was	  often	  wanting.	  Thus,	  even	  as	  the	  May	  1954	  report	  on	  mass	  student	  protests	  hesitantly	  pointed	  out	   that	   it	  was	   “indicative	  of	  good	  organization,	  possibly	  Communist”,	  and	  of	  a	  “strong	  Communist	  flavor”,	  subsequent	  reporting	  of	  the	  protests	   leapt	   to	   the	   conclusion	   of	   “strong	   circumstantial	   evidence	   of	  Communist	  Direction”.	  22	  Suspicions	  regarding	  the	  schools	  were	  compounded	  with	   the	   difficulties	   of	   infiltration	   and	   surveillance.	   Due	   to	   the	   transient	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  Harper,	  “Lim	  Chin	  Siong	  and	  the	  ‘Singapore	  Story’”,	  p.	  13.	  21	  Lashmar	  and	  Oliver,	  Britain’s	  Secret	  Propaganda	  War,	  p.	  84.	  22	  Harper,	  “Lim	  Chin	  Siong	  and	  the	  ‘Singapore	  Story’”,	  p.	  21.	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population,	   the	   Special	   Branch	   found	   it	   difficult	   to	   keep	   track	   of	   any	   cell	  members,	   or	   detect	   communist	   activities	   within	   student	   organizations.23	  Because	   of	   these	   groups’	   relative	   opacity	   and	   resilience	   against	   external	  monitoring,	  the	  Special	  Branch	  was	  ever	  more	  hard-­‐pressed	  to	  find	  evidence	  of	   infiltration	   and	   assumed	   subversion	   at	   the	   slightest	   clues.	   Student-­‐led	  charitable	  work,	  cultural	  performances	  or	  social	  gatherings	  were	  reflexively	  construed	   as	   opportunities	   for	   “communist	   indoctrination”	   and	   were	  subjected	   to	   close	   scrutiny.	   Yet,	   various	   studies	   have	   questioned	   the	  plausibility	  of	  a	  widespread	  communist	  network	  within	  the	  schools,	  and	  the	  general	  understanding	  among	  scholars	  was	  that	  it	  was	  unlikely.	  Clutterbuck	  evaluated	   that	   communist	   party	   members	   inside	   Chinese	   middle	   schools	  were	   rare,	   “since	   it	   was	   almost	   impossible	   for	   a	   boy	   to	   graduate	   to	   full	  membership	  before	   leaving.”24	  Even	  Nicoll	  had	  reservations	  upon	  surveying	  the	  seized	  documents	  in	  1954.	  Although	  he	  found	  the	  students’	  tactics	  were	  similar	   to	   the	   Communists’,	   “we	   cannot	   say	   that	   that	   is	   real	   evidence	   that	  there	  was	  direct	  Communist	   influence	  on	  the	  students.	  The	  tactics…	  are	  the	  common	   and	   well-­‐known	   type	   adapted	   in	   the	   past	   in	   various	   countries	   in	  similar	  situations	  and	  it	  may	  well	  be	  that	  the	  students	  got	  them	  from	  outside	  sources.”25	  Yet	   in	   the	   heat	   of	   pursuing	   communist	   leads,	   the	   schools	   were	  nonetheless	  subjected	  to	  heavy	  surveillance	  and	  police	  actions.	  	  	  It	  did	  not	  help	  matters	  that	  concerned	  informants	  also	  shaped	  the	  perception	  of	   Chinese	   schools	   as	   breeding	   grounds	   for	   Communism.	   One	   particularly	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  Clutterbuck,	  Riot	  and	  Revolution	  in	  Singapore	  and	  Malaya,	  p.	  65.	  24	  Ibid.,	  p.	  78.	  25	  Harper,	  “Lim	  Chin	  Siong	  and	  the	  ‘Singapore	  Story’”,	  p.	  16.	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paranoid	  British	  mining	   company	   in	   Johor	  wrote	  exasperated	   letters	   to	   the	  Colonial	  Secretary	  in	  1952	  urging	  the	  government	  to	  take	  action	  against	  the	  Chinese	  schools	  near	  the	  mining	  sites:	  “ALL	  Chinese	  schools	  must	  be	  closed	  and	   the	  Government	   take	   them	  over…	   It	   seems	   rather	  a	  nonsense,	  killing	  a	  few	   grown	   up	   ‘commies’	   today	   while	   allowing	   the	   steady	   production	   of	  thousands	   of	   young	   ones	   for	   tomorrow.” 26 	  To	   these	   complaints	   the	  government	   could	   only	   reply	   with	   an	   apologetic	   tone	   that	   the	   Special	  Branch’s	  surveillance	  was	  “less	  than	  might	  be	  desired	  because	  of	  lack	  of	  staff	  and	   training.”27 	  The	   implication	   was	   that	   the	   shorthanded	   British	   were	  already	   acting	   on	   insufficient	   knowledge	   of	   Chinese	   schools,	   out	   of	   the	  anxiety	   that	   they	   were	   inscrutable,	   transient,	   susceptible	   to	   communist	  infiltration,	  and	  now	  commercial	  and	  private	  interests	  were	  pressuring	  them	  to	   take	   drastic	   action.	   No	   doubt,	   these	   factors	   have	   compounded	   the	  magnitude	   of	   the	   issue	   and	   spurred	   the	   British	   to	   take	   a	   hardline	   stance	  against	  these	  students	  where	  opportunities	  arose.	  	  	  	  	  	  
The	  Public	  Relations	  Office’s	  Surveillance	  	  
	  The	   British	   kept	   an	   eye	   on	   the	   Anti-­‐Yellow	   Culture	  Movement	   since	   1953,	  and	   stepped	   up	   their	   surveillance	   the	   students’	   cultural	   activism	   following	  the	  Anti-­‐National	  Service	  protests	  on	  13	  May	  1954.	  The	  Special	  Branch	  and	  the	  PRO	  monitored	  the	   lyrics	  of	  songs	  sung	  at	  student	  gatherings,	  regularly	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  CO1022/150	  “British	  monitoring	  of	  the	  Chinese	  Schools”,	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  September	  1952.	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reviewed	   student	   literary	   publications,	   and	   ordered	   for	   a	   ban	   under	   the	  Emergency	  (Publications	  –	  Import	  Control)	  Regulations	  as	  soon	  as	  they	  were	  deemed	   to	   contain	   “pro-­‐Communist	   propaganda”.28	  These	   periodicals	   were	  often	   viewed	  within	   the	   frame	   of	   subversion,	   as	   the	   Chief	   Public	   Relations	  Officer	  G.	  G.	  Thomson	  wrote:	  “the	  tenor	  of	  these	  periodicals,	  both	  the	  literary	  ones	  and	  the	  others,	  is	  to	  spread	  the	  impression	  that	  society	  in	  the	  free	  world	  is	  degenerate	   and	  bankrupt,	   and	   that	   it	   is	  necessary	   to	  build	   a	  new	  society	  from	  the	  beginning,	  as	  has	  been	  done	  in	  China.	   In	  the	  final	  analysis	  this	  can	  only	  mean	  revolution.”29	  
	  The	  main	  agency	  for	  keeping	  pulse	  on	  the	  Chinese	  publications	  was	  the	  PRO,	  which	  in	  1957	  was	  renamed	  as	  the	  Department	  of	  Information	  Services	  (DIS).	  As	   the	   public	   face	   of	   the	   government,	   its	   mission	   was	   to	   communicate	  government	   policies	   and	   actions,	   with	   the	   emphasis	   that	   “it	   is	   done	   in	   the	  name	  of	  the	  people	  and	  for	  their	  purposes,	  in	  order	  to	  break	  down	  the	  feeling	  
of	  a	  separate	  colonial	  government	   and	  build	  up	   the	   feeling	  of	   a	   government	  representative	  of,	  and	  responsible	  to	  the	  electors	  from	  whom	  their	  authority	  and	   power	   is	   derived”	   (emphasis	   added).30	  Despite	   its	   benign	  mission,	   the	  PRO	   was	   also	   responsible	   for	   monitoring	   the	   vernacular	   newspapers	   and	  publications	  as	  well	  as	  warning	  or	  banning	  papers	  for	  any	  seditious	  content.	  The	   task	   of	   press	   surveillance	   was	   done	   by	   the	   Translation	   Section	   and	   it	  circulated	  daily	   translated	   summaries	   of	   these	  papers	   to	   other	   Information	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  PRO/Conf/253/53,	   “Gramophone	  Records	   –	   Banning	   of	   Chinese	   Songs”,	   18	  May	  1955.	  29	  PRO/Conf/47/53,	  ‘Sin	  Pao’,	  6	  March	  1953.	  	  30	  Colony	  of	  Singapore	  Annual	  Report	  1956,	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Service	   agencies	   and	   the	   Special	   Branch.	   Some	   of	   these	   daily	   press	   digests	  even	  reached	  20	  pages	  on	  some	  days.31	  	  In	  1956,	  the	  importance	  of	  keeping	  tabs	  on	  Chinese	  newspapers	  increased	  as	  it	   appointed	   a	   Chinese	   Press	   Liaison	   Officer	   by	   the	   name	   of	   Yeh	   Sui	   Yen	  whose	   office	   resided	   within	   the	   Chief	   Minister’s	   Office.32	  Yeh	   was	   born	   in	  Fujian,	   China	   and	   moved	   to	   Sarawak	   when	   he	   was	   8.	   He	   completed	   his	  primary	  education	  in	  Singapore	  and	  subsequently	  attended	  secondary	  school	  and	   university	   in	   China.	   In	   his	   career,	   he	   was	   a	   bilingual	   veteran	   press	  correspondent	  for	  The	  Union	  Post,	  The	  Straits	  Times,	  Chung	  Shing	  Jit	  Pao,	  and	  the	  Singapore	  Far	  Eastern	  Radio	  before	  joining	  the	  British	  Office	  of	  Southeast	  Asian	  Affairs	  in	  Singapore.	  	  After	  his	  stint	  as	  the	  Chinese	  Press	  Liaison	  Officer,	  he	  was	   assigned	   the	   role	  of	   Information	  Officer	   for	   Singapore	   in	  London	   in	  1959,	   and	   in	   1963	   he	  was	   appointed	   the	   Chief	   Executive	   Secretary	   for	   the	  Malayan	  Chinese	  Association.	   	   In	  the	  crucial	  years	  of	  being	  the	  first	  Chinese	  Press	   Liaison	   Officer	   in	   1956	   -­‐	   1959,	   Yeh’s	   apparent	   role	   was	   to	   flag	  noteworthy	  news	  articles	  and	  keep	  check	  on	  public	  sentiment	  on	  the	  Chinese	  community.	  His	   reports	  were	   regularly	   circulated	   to	   the	  Chief	  Minister,	   the	  Special	   Branch,	   the	   Secretariat	   for	   Chinese	   Affairs	   and	   the	   Police.	   He	   often	  went	   beyond	   merely	   translating	   the	   Chinese	   press	   articles	   to	   providing	  contextual	   information	   about	   Communism	   and	   tactics	   of	   the	   Communist	  Information	   Bureau	   (Cominform),	   a	   Soviet-­‐dominated	   international	  propaganda	  organization.	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  Ibid.,	  pp.	  233	  -­‐	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  NYSP,	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  1956.	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Perhaps	  due	  to	  special	  instructions,	  it	  appeared	  that	  all	  the	  reports	  from	  the	  Chinese	  Press	  Liaison	  Officer	  were	  intently	  focused	  on	  looking	  for	  links	  with	  Communism.	   Yeh’s	   press	   digests	   were	   filled	   with	   analysis	   on	   whether	   a	  newspaper’s	  views	  were	  similar	  to	  the	  Soviet	  Union’s,	  or	  whether	  the	  slogan	  used	  were	  similar	  to	  those	  found	  in	  the	  PRC.	  Unsurprisingly,	  he	  always	  found	  what	  he	  was	  looking	  for.	  In	  deciding	  whether	  a	  paper	  was	  leftist,	  Yeh	  would	  check	   its	   vocabulary	   against	   common	   ‘Communist’	   terminologies.	   For	  instance,	   Yeh	   reported	   that	   the	   writing	   style	   of	   Shidaibao	   was“highly	  theatrical	  and	  typical,	   it	   is	  not	  easy	  for	  common	  men	  to	  understand	  its	   true	  meaning”,	  and	  proceeded	  to	  break	  down	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  terms	  used	  in	  the	  paper.	  He	  explained	   that	   the	   term	  “patriotism”	  was	  defined	  as	   “love	   for	   the	  masses”,	  and	  the	  “terminology	  used	  is	  typical	  that	  of	  the	  Cominform’s.	  “Peace”	  referred	   to	   Communist	   or	   pro-­‐Communist	   objects,	   “people”	   to	   Communist,	  “war-­‐mongers’	  to	  Western	  powers.”	  As	  such,	  Yeh	  concluded	  that	  “this	  paper	  is	  obviously	  run	  by	  pro-­‐Communist	  elements	  for	  the	  consumption	  of,	  besides	  others,	   extreme	   leftist	   readers	   such	   as	   Chinese	   school	   students.”	   He	   added	  that	  the	  paper	  was	  “outspoken	  and	  blunt”,	  and	  that	  it	  “makes	  no	  attempt	  to	  conceal	   its	   pro-­‐Communist	   attitude	   on	   world	   events	   as	   well	   as	   Malayan	  affairs.	  Even	  its	  advertisers	  are	  all	  of	  the	  same	  notorious	  front,	  such	  as	  the	  Sin	  
Pao	   and	   Ta	   Chong	   Pau.”33	  In	   his	   report	   on	   the	   news	   coverage	   of	   a	   certain	  World	   Peace	   Council,	   he	   offered	   the	   background	   analysis	   that	   Communist	  pronouncements	  habitually	  referred	  to	  “front”	  organisations	  as	  “democratic”	  and	  to	  the	  satellite	  States	  as	  “the	  people’s	  democracies”.	  Because	  of	  the	  use	  of	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such	   terms	   during	   the	  World	   Peace	   Council,	   it	  was	   beyond	   doubt	   a	   “front”	  organization	   for	   the	  Cominform.34	  Not	  only	  did	  Yeh	   focus	  on	   the	   text	  of	   the	  articles,	  he	  provided	  reports	  on	  the	  political	  cartoons	  and	  cover	  image	  of	  the	  periodicals	   as	   well.	   In	   Yeh’s	   report	   of	  Wenyibao	   (the	   youth	   periodical	   that	  some	   writers	   accused	   of	   being	   too	   ‘yellow’	   in	   Chapter	   2),	   attention	   was	  brought	  to	  the	  slogans	  on	  the	  political	  cartoon	  on	  the	  periodical’s	  front	  page:	  “The	  first	  banner	  reads:	   ‘Support	  Peace,	  Oppose	  to	  war!’	  The	  second	  banner	  reads	   ‘Long	   Live	   Freedom,	   Democracy,	   Independence’.	   The	   third	   banner:	  “Merdeka”	   and	   the	   last,	   a	   peace	   dove.”	   These	   various	   symbolisms	   were	  “typical	  example	  of	  pro-­‐communist	  version	  of	  Merdeka”,	  and	  thus	  Yeh	  lept	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  the	  periodical	  was	  “very	  leftist”.	  	  	  	  His	  surveillance	  of	  newspapers	  was	  thorough,	  as	  he	  not	  only	  focused	  on	  the	  main	  Chinese	  newspapers	  but	  also	  the	  ‘mosquito	  presses’	  (gossip	  and	  tabloid	  publications).	   Yeh	   Teng	   Pao,	   considered	   by	   Chinese	   middle	   schools	   as	   a	  notorious	   ‘yellow’	   paper	   for	   its	   frivolous	   entertainment	   reporting,	   came	  under	   the	  attention	  of	   the	  PRO	   too.	  Amidst	   the	  paper’s	   reviews	  on	  popular	  movies	   and	   celebrity	   gossip,	   it	   had	   published	   a	   small	   blurb	   about	   a	   set	   of	  audio	  recordings	  of	   the	  Chorus	  of	  the	  Yellow	  River	  being	  sold	   in	  Hong	  Kong.	  These	   recordings	   were	   banned	   in	   Singapore	   because	   of	   its	   Communist	  content,	  and	  Yeh	  wrote	  a	  report	  about	  this	  advertisement,	  implying	  that	  the	  paper	   was	   complicit	   in	   publicizing	   illegal	   recordings.35	  This	   points	   to	   the	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level	  of	  detail	  that	  the	  PRO	  was	  prepared	  to	  observe,	  casting	  its	  watchful	  eyes	  not	  only	  on	  the	  ‘known’	  leftist	  papers	  but	  all	  types	  of	  vernacular	  press.	  	  	  	  	  Despite	   the	   close	  monitoring	   of	   ‘Communist’	   or	   ‘subversive’	   content	   in	   the	  Chinese	  papers,	  the	  government	  was	  often	  in	  want	  of	  solid	  evidence	  to	  take	  action.	   Comparing	   the	   situation	   of	   Singapore	   to	   Malaya,	   the	   Director	   of	  Special	  Branch	  wrote	  that	  it	  was	  “difficult	  to	  prove	  that	  possession	  of	  an	  MCP	  statement	   by	   a	   newspaper	   in	   Singapore	   was	   an	   offence…	   unless	   the	  document	   concerned	   contained	   an	   obvious	   prejudicial	   propaganda.”36	  This	  could	   stem	   from	   increased	   sophistication	   of	   the	   Communists	   in	   publicizing	  their	   messages,	   or	   a	   refusal	   to	   acknowledge	   that	   ground	   sentiment	   was	  leaning	  to	  the	  left	  regardless	  of	  Communist	  manipulation.	  At	  times,	  the	  PRO	  was	  more	  eager	  to	  insinuate	  subversiveness	  than	  what	  the	  security	  agencies	  were	   prepared	   to	   accept.	   When	   monitoring	   Shidaibao,	   PRO	   recommended	  that	  based	  on	  the	  paper’s	  stand	  on	  various	  international	  issues,	  “its	  leanings	  are	   quite	   clear	   and	   it	   may	   be	   possible	   to	   consider	   action	   against	   this	  magazine.” 37 	  However,	   the	   Secretary	   for	   Defence	   and	   Internal	   Security	  disagreed,	  as	  “it	  is	  not	  thought	  that	  the	  case	  is	  yet	  strong	  enough	  for	  action.”38	  	  	  It	  was	  not	  until	  1956	  when	  the	  movement	  garnered	  support	  from	  the	  wider	  community	   that	   the	  British	   took	   serious	   action.	   In	  March	  1956,	   77	   cultural	  groups	  submitted	  a	  petition	  to	  Chief	  Minister	  David	  Marshall	  protesting	  the	  stringent	   regulations	   placed	   upon	   the	   cultural	   industry.	   They	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these	   stringent	   laws	   as	   limiting	   on	   their	   goals	   of	   cultural	   revitalization	   in	  Malaya,	   and	   urged	   the	   government	   to	   take	   stronger	   action	   against	   ‘yellow	  publications’.39	  Because	  of	   the	  presumptive	  discourse	  of	  Communism,	   it	  did	  not	  take	  long	  for	  Yeh	  to	  draw	  the	  clear	  connection	  between	  the	  Anti-­‐Yellow	  Cultural	   Movement	   and	   Communism.	   His	   report	   prepared	   for	   the	   Deputy	  Chief	   Minister	   noted	   that	   the	   “anti-­‐Communist	   movement	   in	   school	   is	  branded	   as	   ‘yellow	   movement’”.	   He	   explained	   that	   the	   movement	   was	  “originally	  organized	  by	  leftist	  groups	  in	  Chinese	  schools	  for	  urging	  students	  to	   read	   and	   take	   interest	   in	   pro-­‐communist	   materials	   as	   against	   non-­‐Communist	  matters	  which	  are	  branded	  as	  Yellow.”40	  	  Riding	  on	  the	  wave	  of	  cultural	  activism	  brought	  on	  by	  the	  petition	  to	  Marshall,	  several	   cultural	   and	  civic	   groups	   led	  by	   the	  Singapore	  Women’s	  Federation	  (SWF)	   came	   together	   to	   rally	   for	   the	   setting	   up	   of	   the	  Anti-­‐Yellow	  Cultural	  Council	   in	   August	   1956.	   The	   rally	   attracted	   over	   800	   attendees	   from	  more	  than	  400	  organizations,	  and	  altogether	  more	  than	  20	  persons	  addressed	  the	  4-­‐hour	  meeting.	  The	  list	  of	  speakers	  included	  Lee	  Kuan	  Yew,	  representing	  the	  PAP	  and	  he	   spoke	   in	  Malay,	   Lim	  Chin	  Siong,	   Lim	  Cher	  Kheng,	   and	  De	  Cruz,	  Secretary	  of	   the	  Singapore	  Labour	  Front.	  Despite	  a	  key	  organizer	  being	   the	  Singapore	   Chinese	   Middle	   Schools	   Student	   Union,	   the	   Council	   nonetheless	  attracted	   a	   spectrum	   of	   pan-­‐communal	   interest	   groups.	   	   Among	   the	  participating	   organisations	   were	   overwhelmingly	   non-­‐student	   and	   non-­‐Chinese	   groups	   such	   as	   the	   SWF,	   the	   Malayan	   Cultural	   Association,	   1950	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Malayan	   Writers’	   Association	   (ASAS50),	   Indian	   Cultural	   Association,	   and	  Tamil	  Moral	  Improvement	  Association.	  This	  event	  was	  also	  widely	  reported	  not	   only	   in	   the	   Chinese	   press,	   but	   also	   in	   the	   Malay	   newspaper	   Utusan	  
Zaman.41	  The	  pan-­‐communal	  character	  of	  the	  movement	  reflected	  a	  common	  concern	  of	  generating	  a	  robust	  national	  culture	  that	  would	  install	  pride	  in	  an	  eventual	  independent	  Malayan	  nation,	  and	  this	  necessitates	  a	  more	  thorough	  eradication	  of	  unhealthy	  ‘yellow’	  elements.	  	  	  However,	  the	  momentum	  generated	  by	  this	  Council	  was	  abruptly	  halted.	  The	  diversity	   and	   reach	   of	   the	   Anti-­‐Yellow	   Culture	   Council	   had	   alarmed	   the	  Special	   Branch,	   which	   feared	   that	   the	   communist	   influence	   would	   now	  extend	   beyond	   the	   Chinese	   community.	   In	   an	   anxious	   note,	   the	  Director	   of	  Special	  Branch	  wrote	  to	  the	  PRO,	  	  	   “We	   are	   trying	   to	   warn	   the	   Malay	   and	   Indian	   organisations	  privately	   and	   anything	   you	   can	   do	   to	   help	   disillusion	   them	  should	  be	  well	  worthwhile.	   In	   their	  propaganda	  statements	   the	  Chinese	   leftist	   have,	   of	   course,	   made	   the	   most	   prominent	   use	  possible	   of	   the	   part	   which	   the	  Malay	   and	   Indian	   organisations	  are	  taking	  in	  this	  (Anti-­‐Yellow	  Culture)	  campaign.”42	  	  	  Unlike	  the	  Marshall	  administration	  which	  had	  a	  relatively	  benign	  approach	  to	  civic	   movements,	   the	   Lim	   Yew	   Hock	   government	   maintained	   a	   hardline	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stance	   against	   pro-­‐Communist	   activities	   and	   took	   punitive	   actions	   against	  these	  cultural	  and	  civic	  organisations.	  Shortly	  after	  the	  inaugural	  meeting	  of	  the	  Council,	  the	  government	  arrested	  several	  members,	  including	  Linda	  Chen,	  the	   president	   of	   SWF	   and	   Soon	   Loh	  Boon,	   the	   president	   of	   SCMSSU	   on	   the	  basis	  of	  alleged	  communist	  activities.	  	  	  Calling	   the	   Anti-­‐Yellow	   Culture	   Council	   a	   “well-­‐established	   pattern	   of	  Communist	  subversion”,	  the	  PRO	  together	  with	  the	  Special	  Branch	  embarked	  on	  a	  counter-­‐propaganda	  campaign	  on	  the	  Anti-­‐Yellow	  Culture	  Council	  in	  the	  English	   Press.	   43 	  PRO	   prepared	   a	   confidential	   document	   entitled	   “The	  Communist	  Front	   ‘Anti-­‐Yellow’	  campaign	  in	  Proper	  Perspective”,	  which	  was	  sent	  to	  the	  Straits	  Times.44	  A	  certain	  Lloyd	  Morgan	  rewrote	  the	  story	  under	  the	  exposé-­‐sque	  title	  of	  “Red	  Culture	  in	  Schools	  and	  Societies”,	  though	  it	  was	  certainly	   a	   pen	   name	   as	   there	  were	   no	   other	   articles	   written	   by	   the	   same	  author	   in	   the	  Straits	  Times	  archive.	  The	  news	  story	  used	   large	  segments	  of	  the	  confidential	  PRO	  document,	  pointing	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  PRO	  was	  behind	  this	   covert	   counter-­‐propaganda	   campaign.	   The	   stated	   purpose	   of	   this	  offensive	  was	  to	  expose	  the	  “ulterior	  motives”	  behind	  this	  Communist	  “front	  organization”.	  Both	  the	  report	  and	  the	  news	  article	  wrote:	  	   “The	  superficial	   laudable	  object	  of	  countering	  the	  evil	  effects	  of	  obscenity	  is	  accepted	  by	  all.	  Thus	  it	  is	  understandable	  that	  some	  organisations	   approached	   by	   the	   agitators	   have	   innocently	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promised	   support.	   But	   what	   about	   the	   ulterior	   motives?	   As	   in	  Communist	   China,	   the	   chief	   motive	   is	   to	   stir	   political	  consciousness	  –	  using	  a	  moral	  issue	  for	  political	  ends.”45	  	  Responding	  to	  the	  Council’s	  critique	  on	  the	  government’s	  banning	  of	  cultural	  organisations	   and	   student	   performances,	   the	   report	   retorted,	   “these	  publications	   were	   proscribed	   because	   they	   contained	   pro-­‐Communist	  propaganda	  not	  because	  they	  attacked	  ‘yellow	  culture’.	  (underline	  is	  theirs)”	  Furthermore,	  the	  argument	  on	  the	  un-­‐Malayan	  character	  of	  their	  appeals	  was	  emphasized:	   “The	   publications	   which	   have	   been	   proscribed	   and	   the	  performances	  which	  have	  been	  banned	  have	  been	   the	   subversive	  efforts	  of	  these	   organisations	   or	   their	   ‘agit-­‐prop’	  manipulators	   –	   pro-­‐communist	   and	  un-­‐Malayan.”	  The	  news	  story	  went	  one	  step	   further	   than	   the	  PRO	  report	   to	  insinuate	  the	  Singapore	  Women’s	  Federation’s	  connection	  to	  Communism	  as	  it	   celebrates	  Women’s	   International	  Day,	  which	   is	   “a	  Communist	   festival.”46	  The	   methods	   that	   the	   PRO	   took	   to	   undermine	   the	   Anti-­‐Yellow	   Cultural	  Council	   was	   constituted	   as	   negative	   propaganda,	   which	   was	   aimed	   at	  informing	  and	  educating	  the	  public	  of	  subversive	  activity.	  However,	  its	  effects	  must	   have	   been	   limited	   as	   this	   denunciation	   was	   conducted	   only	   in	   the	  English	   press.	   The	   Nanyang	   Siang	   Pau	   continued	   to	   publish	   sympathetic	  reports	  about	   the	  Anti-­‐Yellow	  Cultural	  Council,	   as	   it	   struggled	   to	  pursue	   its	  mission	   despite	   the	   arrests	   of	   its	   leaders.47	  This	   also	   shows	   that	   despite	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PRO’s	  attempts	  to	  influence	  public	  opinion,	  in	  reality	  it	  has	  little	  leverage	  on	  the	   Chinese	   press	   except	   through	   hard	   line	   methods	   of	   surveillance	   and	  proscription.	  	  	  
Projecting	  Britain	  as	  a	  Moral	  Exemplar	  
	  Whitehall’s	  Cold	  War	  propagandists	  adopted	  a	  dual	  approach	  towards	  their	  mission:	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   using	   ‘negative’	   publicity	   to	   spread	   the	   evils	   of	  communism,	   while	   on	   the	   other	   disseminating	   ‘positive’	   material	   at	   home	  and	  overseas	  about	  the	  ‘virtues	  and	  advantages	  of	  our	  system’.	  Promoting	  the	  British	  way	  of	  life	  as	  “the	  highest	  exemplar	  of	  Western	  civilization’	  would,	  in	  the	   Foreign	   Office’s	   opinion,	   underpin	   and	   increase	   support	   for	   ‘us’	   while	  further	   distancing	   and	   discrediting	   ‘them’”. 48 	  Nonetheless,	   positive	  propaganda	  only	  acquired	  more	  significance	  after	  1956,	  when	  the	  immediate	  military	   threats	  posed	  by	   the	  MCP	  was	  markedly	  decreased	  -­‐	   incidentally	   it	  was	   also	   the	   year	   after	   the	   clamping	   down	   of	   the	   Anti-­‐Yellow	   Culture	  Movement.	  	  	  	  Before	   1956,	   the	   harshness	   of	   the	   Emergency	   Regulations	   and	   compulsory	  resettlement	   of	   rural	   villages	   generated	  much	   hostility	   among	   the	  Malayan	  Chinese	  community	  towards	  the	  British.	  It	  did	  not	  help	  the	  British	  image	  that	  the	   Chinese	   were	   collectively	   targeted	   as	   accomplices	   of	   the	   MCP,	   and	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innocent	   villagers	   were	   subjected	   to	   frequent	   questioning,	   detention	   and	  punishment.49	  Any	   ad-­‐hoc	   attempts	   at	   positive	   propaganda	   were	   heavily	  driven	   by	   personalities	   and	   produced	   mixed	   results.	   For	   instance,	   in	   the	  1950s,	  Donald	  Macgillivray	  as	  the	  Deputy	  Commissioner	  for	  Malaya	  was	  keen	  on	   setting	   up	   a	   regional	   publication	   centre	   that	   supplied	   schools	   with	  textbooks	   and	   literature	   that	   oriented	   to	   a	   conception	   of	   Malaya	   as	   a	  permanent	  home,	  and	  create	  as	  “a	  sense	  of	  national	  loyalty	  in	  the	  inhabitants	  of	  the	  territories	  concerned.”50	  However,	  London’s	  Colonial	  Office	  eventually	  rejected	   the	   plan	   on	   the	   basis	   that	   priority	   was	   to	   be	   given	   to	   economic	  projects.	  In	  another	  instance	  that	  succeeded,	  Commissioner-­‐General	  Malcolm	  MacDonald	  pushed	  for	  the	  use	  of	  film	  as	  a	  propagandistic	  tool	  as	  he	  believed	  that	   “the	   Chinese	   were	   highly	   susceptible	   to	   visual	   propaganda.”51 	  The	  Malayan	  Film	  Unit	  (MFU)	  produced	  as	  many	  as	  a	  hundred	  films	  a	  year	  from	  1951	   to	   1955,	   which	   included	   news	   reels	   that	   exhorted	   anti-­‐communist	  values	   and	   educational	   documentaries	   on	   identifying	   terrorists	   and	   new	  village	   living.	   Recognizing	   that	   the	   people	   may	   be	   unable	   or	   unwilling	   to	  absorb	   too	   much	   information,	   the	   MFU	   producers	   were	   urged	   to	   release	  entertainment	  films	  as	  a	  “jam”	  to	  “coat	  the	  pill	  of	  propaganda.”52	  	  
	  In	  1956,	  as	  guerilla	  warfare	  receded	  in	  Malaya	  and	  the	  MCP	  focused	  on	  urban	  subversion	   in	   Singapore,	   the	   information	   service	   adjusted	   their	   strategy	  accordingly.	   They	   began	   to	   recognize	   the	   need	   for	   a	   subtler	   approach	   to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  Ramakrishna,	  Emergency	  Propaganda,	  pp.	  92	  –	  102.	  50	  CO1022/487,	   “Establishment	   of	   Regional	   Publications	   Centre”,	   13	   November	  1953.	  51	  Harper,	  End	  of	  Empire,	  p.	  281.	  52	  Ramakrishna,	  Emergency	  Propaganda,	  p.	  111.	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counter	   the	   Communists’	   subversion	   tactics,	   which	   often	   “masqueraded	  behind	   apparently	   praiseworthy	   activities.”53	  The	   information	   service	   also	  realized	   the	   limitations	  of	   their	  existing	  methods	  –	   the	  use	  of	  Radio	  Malaya	  yielded	  little	  results	  as	  “the	  native	  population	  had	  showed	  little	  interest”,	  and	  considered	   the	   English	   programmes	   “too	   highbrow”.	   Moreover,	   the	  information	   services	   came	   to	   realize	   that	   their	   propaganda	   on	   doctrinal	  issues,	   “full	   of	   argument	   and	   precept	   had	   come	   near	   to	   saturating	   the	  market…”	  and	  it	  was	  unattractive	  to	  the	  ordinary	  man.54	  	  In	  November	   1956,	   the	   various	  Directors	   of	   Information	   Services	   from	   the	  South	  East	  Asian	   region	   consented	   to	   a	   shift	   in	   strategy	   at	   the	   Information	  Officer’s	   Conference	   held	   in	   Singapore.	   They	   outlined	   two	   main	   new	  directions	   for	   the	   development	   of	   the	   Information	   Services.	   First,	   they	  decided	  to	  spend	  their	  budgets	  on	  fewer	  and	  more	  substantial	  publications	  of	  “positive	  merit	   and	   avowed	   origins”,	   rather	   than	   to	   douse	   the	  masses	  with	  	  pamphlets.	   The	   second	   approach	   was	   to	   evoke	   Asian	   sympathies	   “by	  reflecting	  as	  much	  as	  possible	   the	   favourable	  views	  expressed	  by	  Asians.”55	  The	  strategy	  of	  using	  local	  knowledge	  to	  target	  colonial	  populations	  was	  not	  new.	  As	  early	   as	  1948	  at	   the	   inception	  of	   the	  Malayan	  Emergency,	  Colonial	  Secretary	   Arthur	   Creech	   Jones	   had	   argued	   for	   the	   use	   of	   local	   information	  officers	   rather	   than	   expatriates	   because	   such	   work	   is	   “dependent	   on	   an	  intimate	  knowledge	  of	  the	  people,	  their	  language,	  customs,	  traditions	  and	  so	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  PRO426/56	  “Summary	  Record	  of	   Information	  Officer’s	  Conference”,	  6	  November	  1956.	  54	  Ibid.	  55	  Ibid.	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on.”56	  Similarly,	   early	   Malayan	   Emergency	   propaganda	   strategy	   favoured	  using	   Surrendered	   Enemy	   Personnel	   to	   convince	   existing	   guerillas	   to	  surrender,	   and	   influencing	   storytellers	   to	   pass	   off	   anti-­‐Communist	   news	  items	   as	   their	   own.57	  The	  difference	   in	   this	   strategy	   is	   that	   the	   information	  service	  now	  decided	  that	  the	  scope	  of	  propaganda	  should	  enlarge	  beyond	  the	  immediate	   concerns	   of	   warfare	   and	   project	   general	   positive	   sentiments	  about	  Britain.	  	  	  Funds	   were	   thus	   set	   aside	   for	   visitors	   from	   the	   colonies	   to	   the	   United	  Kingdom	   to	   enable	   “Asians	   to	   speak	   to	   Asians”,	   and	   Chinese	   youths	   were	  identified	   as	   one	   of	   the	   primary	   targets	   of	   propaganda.58	  As	   an	   example	   of	  such	  efforts,	   the	  COI	  produced	  and	  circulated	  a	   film	  to	  Malaya,	   “I	  Looked	  at	  Britain”	   in	   1957,	   which	   depicts	   Britain	   and	   the	   British	   people	   through	   the	  eyes	   of	   an	  Malayan	   student	   living	   in	   London.	   	   The	   film	   followed	  him	   as	   he	  visited	   coalmines,	   shipyards,	   mechanized	   agricultural	   fields,	   and	   various	  places	  of	  historic	  and	  cultural	  interest.	  Through	  his	  commentary,	  the	  student	  “discerns	   some	   of	   the	   enduring	   qualities	   of	   character	   and	   tradition	   which	  distinguish	  the	  British	  as	  a	  nation.”59	  This	  film	  was	  featured	  as	  part	  of	  the	  700	  titles	   that	   the	   COI	   made	   available	   to	   the	   colonies	   for	   the	   purposes	   of	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  CO875/22.	   “Federation	   of	   Malaya,	   to	   the	   Right	   Honourable	   Mr	   Arthur	   Creech	  Jones,	   Colonial	   Office”,	   29	   August	   1948,	   quoted	   in	   Aitken,	   “British	   Governmental	  Institutions”,	  p.	  35.	  57	  Ramakrishna	   provided	   much	   information	   on	   the	   use	   of	   Surrendered	   Enemy	  Personnel.	   See	   Ramakrishna,	   Emergency	   Propaganda,	   pp.	   70-­‐71,	   107-­‐111;	   PRO	  records	  contain	  Chinese	  scripts	  in	  Chinese	  that	  were	  meant	  for	  various	  community	  storytellers.	  They	  have	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  written	  such	  that	  “it	  does	  not	  appear	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  listener	  to	  be	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  inspired	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  supplied.”	  See	  PRO47/53	  “PRO	  Confidential	  Report	  by	  APRO”,	  6	  January	  1953.	  58	  PRO426/56	  “Information	  Officers’	  Conference”,	  30	  October	  1956.	  59	  PRO312/56	  “C.O.I.	  Overseas	  Film	  Library”,	  1	  March	  1957.	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projecting	   an	   amiable	   image	   of	   Britain.	   Yet,	   not	   all	   films	   were	   received	  equally	   even	  within	   the	   Information	  Service.	   In	  1958,	   Sarawak	   Information	  Officer	  Phillips	  Jones	  upon	  receiving	  a	  film	  made	  by	  COI,	  commented	  tongue-­‐in-­‐cheek	  that	  it	  was	  “the	  worst	  film	  I	  have	  ever	  seen	  in	  many	  years	  of	  looking	  at	  bad	  films…	  The	  purpose	  of	  the	  film,	  as	  far	  as	  one	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  dim,	  half-­‐witted	  production,	  appears	  to	  be	  to	  encourage	  an	  increase	  in	  agricultural	  production	  in	  England	  in	  1952.	  It	  is	  now	  1958	  –	  even	  in	  Sarawak.”60	  	  	  The	   British	   were	   well	   aware	   of	   the	   moral	   arguments	   that	   the	   Anti-­‐Yellow	  Culture	   perpetuators	   were	   making	   when	   the	   latter	   asked	   for	   more	  censorship	   of	  morally	   questionable	   publications	   and	   films.	   Censorship	  was	  not	   new	   in	   the	   British	   Empire,	   even	   though	   its	   purposes	   leaned	   more	   on	  protecting	  imperial	  authority	  and	  Western	  superiority	  rather	  than	  the	  moral	  corruption	  of	   the	  people.	  The	  Cinematograph	  Films	   (Control)	  Ordiance	  was	  enacted	   in	  1927,	  after	  a	  colonial	  official	   toured	  Malaya	  and	  reported,	   to	  his	  horror,	  that	  Western	  cinema	  had	  enabled	  “the	  vast	  mass	  of	  black,	  brown	  and	  yellow	   people	   (to	   form)…	   a	   deplorable	   impression	   of	   the	   morality	   of	   the	  white	  man	  and,	  worse	  still,	  of	   the	  white	  woman…”61	  After	   the	  war,	   the	  Film	  Censor’s	   Office	   in	   Singapore	   operated	   on	   the	   principle	   of	   maintaining	  stability	  and	  order	  among	  the	  races,	  and	  prohibited	  or	  cut	  films	  that	  “would	  offend	   the	   susceptibilities	   of	   one	   particular	   race	   or	   people”.	   However,	   the	  number	  of	  films	  banned	  or	  cut	  were	  relatively	  small.	  From	  1953	  to	  1957,	  an	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  Ibid.	  61	  Benjamin	   McKay,	   Fringe	   Benefits:	   Essays	   and	   Reflections	   on	   Malaysian	   Arts	   and	  
Cinema,	   (Petaling	   Jaya:	   Strategic	   Information	   and	   Research	   Development	   Centre,	  2011),	  pp.	  59-­‐	  	  60.	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average	  of	   1741	   films	  were	   submitted	   to	   the	  Film	  Censor’s	  Office	  per	   year,	  and	  only	  14.2	  films,	  or	  0.8%	  of	  films	  were	  subjected	  to	  prohibition	  a	  year.62	  This	   could	   be	   contrasted	   to	   the	   PAP	  Government	   in	   1961,	  which	   banned	   a	  startling	  51%	  of	  all	  films	  that	  year63	  –	  surely	  an	  extreme	  figure	  but	  one	  that	  reflected	   the	  determination	  of	   the	  new	  self-­‐government	   to	  purge	   society	  of	  negative	   influences.	   The	   fact	  was	   that	   the	   British	   in	   Singapore	   did	   little	   to	  attempt	   to	   correct	   the	   perception	   among	   the	   Chinese	  masses	   that	   Colonial	  rule	   was	   the	   reason	   for	   the	   existence	   of	   moral	   decadence	   in	   society.	   This	  continued	   to	   provide	   fodder	   for	   the	   Anti-­‐Yellow	   Culture	   movement,	   and	  gravely	  undermined	  the	  moral	  leadership	  of	  the	  British	  colonial	  government.	  	  	  	  
Conclusion	  
	  Despite	  the	  heavy	  resources	  invested	  in	  influencing	  the	  ‘hearts	  and	  minds’	  of	  the	   Singapore	   people,	   the	   British	   ultimately	   failed	   to	   appeal	   to	   Chinese	  community.	  On	   the	  one	  hand,	   the	  British	  were	  never	   really	   serious	  nor	  did	  they	  dedicate	  enough	  resources	  in	  their	  attempts	  to	  provide	  moral	  leadership	  to	  its	  colonies.	  When	  it	  comes	  to	  managing	  subversive	  elements,	  the	  logic	  of	  security	   and	   momentum	   of	   the	   Cold	   War	   narrative	   prevailed	   in	   both	   the	  words	  and	  deeds	  of	  the	  British	  Information	  Service.	  As	  such,	  the	  moral	  issue	  of	   ‘yellow	  culture’	  was	  dismissed	  as	  a	   front	   for	  a	  more	   insidious	  but	  hardly	  substantiated	   Communist	   plot.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   the	   Chinese	   community	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  Film	  Censor’s	  Office,	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did	  not	  see	  the	  British	  as	  its	  morally	  legitimate	  rulers.	  The	  sense	  of	  siege	  that	  Chinese	   culture	   and	   education	   was	   under	   threat	   and	   proscription	   from	  colonial	  encroachment	  produced	  a	  Chinese	  community	   that	   looked	  towards	  the	  radical	  left	  for	  leadership.	  As	  Harper	  described	  of	  the	  cultural	  politics	  of	  the	  1950s,	  “the	  national	  culture	  was	  plainly	  up	  for	  grabs,	  and	  the	  struggle	  for	  its	  soul	  intensified	  as	  many	  individuals	  from	  radical	  political	  movements	  took	  the	   lead	   in	   cultural	   life.”64	  It	   was	   in	   this	   space	   that	   PAP,	   with	   its	   socialist	  programme,	  managed	   to	   ride	   on	   the	   rising	   tide	   of	   this	   leftist	  movement	   as	  they	  brought	  Singapore	  society	  into	  an	  era	  of	  mass	  politics	  and	  won	  control	  of	   the	   government.	   The	   Anti-­‐Yellow	   Culture	   Movement	   was	   to	   become	   an	  important	  component	  of	  PAP	  claiming	  the	  moral	  leadership	  of	  the	  country.	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  End	  of	  Empire,	  p.	  291.	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CHAPTER	  4	  	  
“No	  more	  pin-­‐tables	  and	  Yankee	  jeans””	  
PAP’s	  National	  Disciplining	  and	  Forging	  a	  Hegemonic	  Regime	  	  	  The	  Anti	  Yellow	  Culture	  Movement	  was	  revived	  in	  1959	  by	  a	  newly	  elected	  PAP	   government.	   Significantly,	   among	   the	  many	   other	   priorities	   that	   must	  have	   been	   on	   its	   governance	   agenda	   after	   achieving	   self-­‐government,	   the	  curbing	  of	   ‘yellow	  culture’	  was	   to	   take	  precedence.	  A	  mere	  eight	  days	  after	  swearing	   in,	   Home	  Affairs	  Minister	  Ong	   Pang	  Boon	   revoked	   the	   permits	   of	  eight	  publications	   that	  were	  deemed	  as	   “examples	  of	   sex-­‐obsessed	   culture”	  and	   setting	   in	   motion	   a	   new	   wave	   of	   Anti-­‐Yellow	   Culture	   Movement	   that	  lasted	  until	  1961.1	  The	  PAP-­‐led	  campaign	  was	  an	  intensification	  as	  well	  as	  a	  reorientation	   of	   its	   previous	   incarnation.	   Like	   its	   student-­‐led	   predecessor,	  this	   was	   a	   movement	   based	   on	   a	   discursive	   strategy	   of	   moralising	   the	  production	   and	   consumption	  of	   culture.	   Categories	  of	   ‘healthy’	   and	   ‘yellow’	  were	   drawn	   up,	   and	   the	   government	   embarked	   on	   a	   swift	   and	   decisive	  campaign	  sieving	  the	  former	  from	  the	  latter.	  The	  difference	  was	  that,	  as	  new	  incumbents,	   PAP’s	   rendition	   of	   this	  movement	  was	   driven	   by	   the	   needs	   of	  state	   formation	   and	   therefore	   took	   on	   an	   institutional	   and	   bureaucratic	  overtone.	  The	  party	  had	  taken	  power	  at	  a	  critical	  juncture	  of	  decolonisation	  on	   an	   uneasy	   alliance	   with	   the	   Chinese-­‐educated	   leftists,	   which	   held	   sway	  over	   the	  masses.	   From	   the	  perspective	   of	   Lee	  Kuan	  Yew	  and	   the	  moderate	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  ST,	  9	  June	  1959.	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faction,	  the	  party’s	  political	  legitimacy	  depended	  upon	  distancing	  themselves	  from	   the	   colonial	   regime,	  while	   its	   political	   survival	   rested	   on	   its	   ability	   to	  cultivate	  hegemony	  with	  the	  mass	  base.	  	  	  In	   light	  of	   the	  goals	  of	  projecting	  a	  righteous	  and	  anti-­‐colonial	   image	  of	   the	  party,	  and	  to	  consolidate	  its	  political	  capital	  among	  the	  left-­‐swaying	  masses,	  the	   Anti-­‐Yellow	   Culture	  Movement	   was	   an	   immediately	   useful	   tool	   for	   the	  nascent	   ruling	   party	   for	   several	   reasons.	   First,	   it	  was	   a	  moral	   crusade	   that	  had	  already	  gained	  momentum	  among	  the	  Chinese-­‐speaking	  politically	  active	  community.	   PAP	   was	   able	   to	   utilize	   the	   familiar	   vocabulary	   of	   ‘yellow’,	  ‘progressive’	   and	   ‘healthy	   culture’	   to	   justify	   their	   new	   regulations	   and	  prohibitions.2	  Second,	   the	   movement’s	   anti-­‐colonial	   messages	   were	   in	   line	  with	  PAP’s	  desire	  to	  establish	  itself	  as	  a	  progressive	  and	  nationalistic	  political	  party.	  Third,	  the	  movement	  gave	  the	  state	  the	  moral	  legitimacy	  to	  intervene	  in	   the	   cultural	   production	   and	   consumption	   habits	   of	   the	   people,	   thereby	  crafting	   a	   new	   set	   of	   national	   ethics	   and	   values	   based	   on	   hard	   work,	  discipline	  and	  prudence.	  	  	  The	   need	   to	   regulate,	   control	   and	   moderate	   social	   behavior	   was	   in	   part	  influenced	  by	  the	  values	  of	  Chinese-­‐educated	  personalities	  from	  within	  PAP’s	  ranks,	   in	   particular,	   Ong	   Pang	   Boon.	   Yet,	   it	   was	   not	   merely	   a	   unilateral	  enforcement	   of	   PAP’s	   governing	   rationality,	   for	   the	   very	   act	   of	   disciplining	  society	   was	   seen	   as	   the	   key	   to	   generate	   hegemony.	   Gramsci	   defines	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  The	  transitioning	  of	  old	  messages	  by	  new	  masters	  was	  a	  known	  propaganda	  strategy.	  See	  Barak	  Kushner,	  The	  Thought	  War:	  Japanese	  Imperial	  Propaganda,	  (Honolulu	  :	  University	  of	  Hawaii	  Press,	  2006).	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hegemony	  as	  the	  incorporation	  of	  the	  culture	  of	  the	  subordinate	  classes	  into	  the	  dominant	  classes	  as	  a	  means	  of	  generating	  consent	  in	  the	  latter’s	  exercise	  of	  power.	   In	   this	  process,	   the	  dominant	  group	   is	  also	  required	   to	  adopt	   the	  ideals	  and	  imperatives	  of	  the	  subordinate	  group,	  thereby	  transforming	  itself.3	  The	   PAP	   government’s	   genius	   in	   the	   initials	   years	   rested	   on	   its	   ability	   to	  absorb	   the	   prevalent	   values	   from	   its	   more	   radical	   members	   while	  maneuvering	  around	  those	  who	  posed	  direct	  challenges.	  By	  presenting	  itself	  in	   powerful	   revolutionary	   terms	   such	   as	   championing	   the	   removal	   of	  decadent	   culture,	   or	   protecting	   the	   rights	   of	   women,	   workers	   and	   the	  underclasses,	  PAP	  echoed	  and	  approximated	  the	  discourse	  of	  their	  Chinese-­‐educated	   competitors. 4 	  Thus,	   the	   Anti-­‐Yellow	   Culture	   Movement	   was	   a	  dialogue	   between	   PAP	   and	   the	   people	   as	   it	   negotiated	   a	   new	   governing	  relationship.	  This	  chapter	  thus	  serves	  to	  highlight	  three	  main	  strands	  within	  PAP’s	   rendition	   of	   the	   movement	   –	   first	   its	   institutional	   tone	   and	  implementation,	   second	   the	   role	   played	   by	   the	   Chinese-­‐speaking	   elements	  and	  what	  the	  movement	  revealed	  about	  their	  governing	  rationality,	  and	  third,	  the	  political	   imperatives	   that	  drove	   the	  PAP	   to	  place	  such	  emphasis	  on	   this	  movement.	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Antonio	   Gramsci,	   Selections	   from	   the	   Prison	  Notebooks,	   (New	   York:	   International	  Publishers,	   1972);	  Wong	  Tin-­‐Hong,	  Hegemonies	  compared:	  State	   formation	  and	  the	  
Chinese	  school	  politics	   in	  postwar	  Singapore	  and	  Hong	  Kong,	   (New	  York:	   Routledge	  Falmer,	  2002),	  pp.	  3,	  24;	  Steven	  Jones,	  Antonio	  Gramsci,	  (Oxon:	  Routledge,	  2006),	  pp.	  4,	  45.	  	  4	  Geraldine	  Heng,	   “’A	  Great	  Way	   to	  Fly’:	  Nationalism,	   the	   state	  and	   the	  Varieties	  of	  Third-­‐World	  Feminism”,	  Feminist	  Genealogies,	  Colonial	  Legacies,	  Democratic	  Futures,	  ed.	   M.	   Jacqui	   Alexander	   and	   Chandra	   Talpade	   Mohanty,	   (New	   York:	   Routledge,	  1997),	  p.	  35.	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Institutional	  Crackdown	  	  
	  Unlike	   the	   student-­‐led	   Anti-­‐Yellow	   Culture	   Movement	   in	   1953,	   which	   was	  characterized	  by	  its	  literary	  flavour,	  PAP’s	  version	  had	  a	  much	  stronger	  tone	  of	   bureaucratic	   regulation	   and	   control.	   Across	   various	   ministries,	   policies	  were	   implemented	   to	   curb	   different	   aspects	   of	   ‘yellow	   culture’.	   Ong	   Pang	  Boon	  announced	  that	  the	  government	  would	  take	  a	  “two-­‐fold	  policy”,	  where	  on	  one	  hand,	  it	  “attacks	  all	  activities	  tending	  to	  lower	  the	  standards	  of	  social	  morality	   and	   security,”	   and	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   it	   will	   “seek	   the	   creative	  cultivation	  of	  a	  healthy	  culture	  based	  on	  a	  Malayan	  outlook.”5	  Nevertheless,	  a	  greater	   emphasis	   was	   still	   placed	   on	   correcting	   social	   behaviour	   from	   the	  outset.	   On	   the	   same	   day	   that	   Ong	  made	   the	   announcement	   to	   ban	   ‘yellow	  publications’,	   Minister	   of	   Culture	   S.	   Rajaratnam	   visited	   the	   radio	  broadcasting	  company	  requesting	  them	  to	  stop	  playing	  Jazz	  and	  Swing	  music,	  what	  they	  deemed	  to	  be	  ‘yellow	  music’.6	  Other	  actions	  included	  the	  Ministry	  of	   Education	   dismissing	   eight	   teachers	   after	   they	  were	   caught	  watching	   an	  underground	  pornographic	   film	  show,	  and	   the	  Ministry	  of	  Labour	   issuing	  a	  new	  age	   limit	   for	   employment	   of	   bargirls	   to	   curb	   clandestine	  prostitution.7	  Within	   a	   few	  weeks,	   the	  Ministry	   of	  Home	  Affairs	   prohibited	   the	   sales	   and	  circulation	  of	  pornography-­‐related	  materials	   (or	   those	  accused	  of	  being	  so)	  from	  31	  publishers	   in	  Hong	  Kong,	  Europe	  and	  America.8	  These	  publications	  included	  ‘chain	  story	  picture	  books’	  (serial	  comic	  and	  graphic	  novels),	  ‘pin-­‐up’	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  ST,	  9	  June	  1959.	  See	  Appendix:	  Figure	  7.	  6	  Petir	  Weekly,	  Issue	  2,	  25	  July	  1959.	  7	  ST,	  8	  July	  1959;	  ST,	  11	  July	  1959.	  8	  Petir	  Weekly,	  Issue	  1,	  18	  July	  1959.	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magazines	  and	  ‘mosquito	  presses’.	  9	  	  By	  July	  1960,	  Ong	  stepped	  up	  his	  efforts	  by	   banning	   the	   importation,	   sale	   and	   circulation	   of	   picture	   books	   from	   a	  further	  54	  publishers	  from	  Hong	  Kong.	  A	  Malay	  magazine,	  Aneka	  Warna,	  was	  banned	  after	  receiving	  complaints,	  pointing	  to	  the	  pervasive	  curb	  of	  ‘yellow’	  materials	   across	   languages.10	  The	   Ministry	   also	   revoked	   the	   performance	  licences	  of	  various	  strip-­‐tease	  clubs	  and	  cabaret	  shows.	  	  	  PAP’s	   Anti-­‐Yellow	   Culture	   Movement	   was	   an	   opportunity	   to	   solve	   several	  other	  problems	  in	  one	  fell	  swoop	  -­‐	  youth	  delinquency,	  triads	  and	  gangsterism,	  gambling,	   crime,	   and	  prostitution.	  Under	   the	   banner	   of	   a	  moral	  movement,	  PAP	   ministers	   spoke	   of	   popular	   youth	   entertainment	   sites	   as	   the	   very	  breeding	   grounds	   for	   delinquency	   and	   crime.	   Pinball	   parlours	   and	   billiard	  tables	  were	  “not	  as	  innocent	  as	  they	  seem”,	  and	  they	  were	  part	  of	  the	  “web	  of	  crime”	   that	   bred	   gangsters	   and	   lured	   schoolboys	   and	   unemployed	   youths	  into	  delinquency.11	  In	   line	  with	   this	  reasoning,	   the	  Ministry	  of	  Home	  Affairs	  revoked	   the	  business	   licences	  of	  pinball	  parlours,	   forcing	   the	  closure	  of	   the	  industry,	   and	   required	   businesses	   to	   surrender	   their	   pinball	  machines	   and	  jukeboxes.	  The	  police	  also	  took	  this	  chance	  to	  undermine	  the	  social	  clubs	  that	  were	   deemed	   to	   be	   harbouring	   secret	   societies	   and	   criminal	   activities,	   and	  cracked	   down	   on	   several	   high-­‐profile	   Chinese	   social	   clubs	   and	   mutual	   aid	  societies	  in	  Chinatown.12	  A	  nation-­‐wide	  ban	  on	  jukeboxes	  was	  put	  in	  place	  as	  a	  preventive	  measure	  to	  curb	  the	  playing	  of	  “sexy	  songs”	  such	  as	  jazz	  music	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  SFP,	  1	  July	  1960;	  ST,	  27	  July	  1959.	  10	  ST,	  10	  July	  1959.	  11	  ST,	  25	  July	  1959.	  12	  ST,	  14	  August	  1959.	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or	   rock	   ‘n’	   roll	  music	   in	   clubs	   and	   dance	   halls.	  When	   businesses	   protested	  against	  this	  ban	  and	  pleaded	  that	  they	  will	  give	  classical	  music	  pride	  of	  place	  in	   jukebox	   selections,	   Minister	   of	   Culture,	   S.	   Rajaratnam	   responded	  sarcastically	   that	   “this	   was	   quite	   impossible.	   It	   will	   require	   at	   least	   150	  inspectors	   to	   go	   around	   everyday	   to	   see	  whether	   jukeboxes	   put	   in	   Chopin	  and	  Beethoven	  pieces	  instead	  of	  rock	  ‘n’	  roll.”13	  	  These	  regulations	  extended	  beyond	  print	  publications	  and	  pinball	   tables,	  as	  Ong	  Pang	  Boon	  pushed	  for	  an	  urgent	  amendment	  of	  the	  Cinematograph	  Bill	  in	   the	   legislative	   assembly	   within	   two	   months	   of	   setting	   up	   the	   new	  government.	  The	  new	  amendment	  would	  expand	  the	  powers	  of	  the	  Board	  of	  Film	  Censors	  within	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Home	  Affairs	  and	  allowed	  a	  small	  group	  of	   Board	   members	   to	   make	   the	   final	   decisions.	   The	   new	   Chairman	   of	   the	  Board	   was	   Jek	   Yeun	   Thong,	   a	   left-­‐leaning	   Chinese-­‐educated	   PAP	   member	  with	  a	  similar	  background	  to	  Ong	  Pang	  Boon.	  The	  Board	  was	  also	  staffed	  by	  other	   prominent	   Chinese-­‐educated	   PAP	   members	   like	   Chan	   Choy	   Siong	  (more	   on	   her	   later),	   and	   Ho	   Puay	   Choo	   (who	   later	   defected	   to	   Barisan	  Sosialis).	   The	   committee	  met	   every	   once	   a	  week	   and	   viewed	   an	   average	   of	  two	  films	  at	  each	  meeting.	  By	  1961,	  over	  the	  period	  of	  a	  year	  and	  a	  half,	  they	  banned	  692	  films	  out	  of	  1354	  –	  a	  startling	  51%.	  These	  censored	  films	  were	  mainly	  from	  USA,	  Japan,	  Hong	  Kong,	  and	  Britain,	  and	  they	  featured	  nudity	  or	  “contravened	  good	  taste	  in	  matters	  of	  sex.”14	  The	  government’s	  suspicions	  on	  films	  could	  be	  summed	  up	  in	  the	  following	  quote	  by	  Ong	  Pang	  Boon:	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  ST,	  16	  June	  1959.	  14	  ST,	  5	  July	  1959;	  ST,	  14	  July	  1961.	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   “No	  one	  can	  deny	  that	  the	  widespread	  publication	  and	  screening	  of	   films	   which	   emphasise	   sex,	   brutality	   and	   gangsterism	   over	  the	  years	  have	   left	   their	   lasting	  mark	  on	  impressionable	  youth,	  and	   the	  mounting	  wave	   of	   crime,	   involving	   a	   large	   number	   of	  teenagers	  is	  a	  clear	  indication	  of	  the	  evils	  of	  yellow	  culture.”15	  	  In	  addition	   to	   the	   clear	  association	  between	   films	  and	  crime	   rates,	   the	  PAP	  also	   mobilised	   a	   strong	   anti-­‐colonial	   argument.	   As	   a	   newly	   self-­‐governing	  state,	  censorship	  was	  a	  matter	  of	  national	  self-­‐esteem,	  and	  PAP	  saw	  it	  as	  their	  mission	  to	  bring	  to	  the	  people	  	  “a	  new	  sense	  of	  dignity	  and	  worth.”16	  PAP	  saw	  film	   as	   a	   particularly	   sinister	   medium	   that	   could	   condition	   a	   subordinate	  people	   to	   “enjoy	   (the	   depiction	   of)	   their	   degradation.”17	  As	   a	   result,	   the	  prohibition	  applied	  to	  “colonial	  films”	  as	  well:	  “films	  whose	  primary	  intent	  is	  the	  glorification	  or	  justification	  of	  colonialism…	  films	  which	  are	  calculated	  to	  bring	  Asians	  and	  so-­‐called	  coloured	  people	  generally	  into	  contempt,	  ridicule	  and	   hatred.”18	  The	   Film	   Censorship	   Board	   prohibited	   anti-­‐African	   films	   or	  Cowboy	   films	   that	   portrayed	   the	   massacre	   of	   ‘Red	   Indians’,	   indicating	   the	  broad	  extent	  of	   its	  censorship	  policies.19	  Like	  the	  previous	  wave	  of	  student-­‐led	   Anti-­‐Yellow	   Culture	   Movement,	   PAP	   presented	   ‘yellow	   culture’	   as	   a	  systemic	   effect	   of	   colonial	   degeneration,	   and	   their	   opposition	   of	   it	   was	   a	  morally	   unambiguous	   cause.	   As	   a	   way	   of	   setting	   themselves	   apart	   from	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  ST,	  14	  August	  1959.	  16	  Ibid.	  17	  ST,	  5	  July	  1959.	  18	  Ibid.	  19	  ST,	  18	  Oct	  1959;	  ST,	  14	  August	  1959.	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regimes	   associated	  with	   the	   British,	   PAP	   openly	   criticized	   Lim	   Yew	  Hock’s	  Labour	  Front	  government	  for	  allowing	  ‘yellow	  culture’	  to	  survive	  in	  various	  forms,	   and	   asserted	   that	   “the	   new	   Government	   is	   not	   inclined	   to	   take	   as	  tolerant	  a	  view	  as	  these	  (former)	  establishments.”20	  	  	  
Ong	  Pang	  Boon	  and	  his	  Regime	  of	  Social	  Discipline	  	  	  
	  Surprisingly,	  the	  main	  agent	  of	  PAP’s	  Anti-­‐Yellow	  Culture	  Movement	  was	  not	  the	  Ministry	   of	   Culture.	   Instead,	   it	  was	  Ong	   Pang	   Boon	   and	   his	  Ministry	   of	  Home	  Affairs	  that	  took	  the	  driver’s	  seat.	  There	  are	  two	  interrelated	  reasons.	  The	  first	  was	  possibly	  Ong	  Pang	  Boon’s	  background	  and	  personality.	  Ong	  was	  a	  highly	  regarded	  bilingual	  administrator	  who	  was	  considered	  the	  third	  most	  powerful	  man	  in	  the	  party	  after	  Toh	  Chin	  Chye	  and	  Lee	  Kuan	  Yew.21	  Born	  in	  Kuala	  Lumpur,	  Ong	  attended	  Chinese	   language	  primary	  and	  middle	   schools	  in	  Singapore	  until	  he	  joined	  the	  University	  of	  Malaya	  and	  became	  politicised	  through	  his	  contemporaries	  in	  the	  University	  Socialist	  Club.	  	  While	  it	  may	  be	  an	   oversimplification	   to	   relate	   Ong’s	   Chinese	   educational	   background	   as	   a	  testament	  of	  his	  Chinese	  identity,	  he	  was	  one	  of	  the	  few	  top	  PAP	  cadres	  that	  could	   communicate	   comfortably	   to	   the	   Chinese	   masses,	   and	   therefore	  projected	  a	  set	  of	  values	  that	  resonated	  with	  the	  Chinese	  masses	  –	  prudence,	  simplicity,	   and	  disdain	   for	  Western	  and	   colonial	   culture.22	  He	  was	   to	  play	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  ST,	  25	  July	  1959.	  21	  Yap,	  S.,	  Lim,	  R.,	  Leong,	  W.	  K.,	  Men	  In	  White:	  The	  Untold	  Story	  of	  Singapore’s	  Ruling	  
Political	  Party,	  (Singapore:	  Singapore	  Press	  Holdings,	  2009),	  pp.	  116-­‐117,	  169.	  22	  Hong	   and	   Huang	   gave	   a	   more	   nuanced	   background	   to	   the	   ‘Chinese	   Political	  Vanguards’	  of	  PAP,	  arguing	  that	  they	  do	  not	  fit	  into	  the	  neat	  categories	  of	  Chinese	  or	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crucial	  role	  in	  adapting	  the	  values	  of	  the	  Chinese-­‐educated	  masses	  into	  PAP,	  thereby	  cultivating	  an	  essential	  hegemony.	  Ong	  Pang	  Boon’s	  wife	  Chan	  Choy	  Siong	   (one	   of	   the	   members	   of	   the	   Board	   of	   Film	   Censors)	   also	   possibly	  influenced	  his	  personal	   interest	   in	   the	  Anti-­‐Yellow	  Culture	  Movement.	  Chan	  was	  known	  to	  be	  a	  fiery	  speaker	  at	  rallies	  and	  could	  connect	  to	  the	  Chinese	  masses	   well.	  23	  She	   attended	   Nanyang	   Girls’	   School,	   one	   of	   the	   hotbeds	   for	  student	  activism	  and	  where	  she	  got	  her	  political	  awakening.	  Upon	  graduating	  in	   1954,	   she	   joined	   the	   PAP	   in	   order	   to	   put	   her	   antagonism	   against	  colonialism	   to	   action.24	  Known	  best	   for	   ardently	   championing	   the	  Women’s	  Charter,	  she	  embodied	  much	  of	  the	  values	  of	  the	  Chinese	  left,	  including	  their	  insistence	  on	  moral	  and	  cultural	  purity.	  Her	  strong	  desire	  for	  the	  government	  to	  enforce	  moral	  righteousness	  was	  seen	  in	  her	  later	  parliamentary	  speeches	  on	   stricter	   film	   censorship	   and	   banning	   courting	   couples	   from	   publicly	  displaying	  affection	  at	  the	  Botanic	  Gardens.25	  	  When	  reminiscing	  about	  Ong	  and	  Chan,	  their	  long-­‐time	  colleague	  Lee	  Khoon	  Choy	  remarked	  with	  a	  tinge	  of	  humour,	  “Ong	  Pang	  Boon	  was	  concerned	  with	  yellow	  culture…	  perhaps	   through	  Chan	  Choy	  Siong’s	   influence.”	  He	  added	  a	  hesitant	   personal	   opinion	   that	   “they	   were	   puritanical,	   so	   puritanical	   that	  there	   were	   so	   many	   yellow	   stuff,	   you	   know…”26	  What	   was	   implied	   in	   his	  comment	   was	   that	   Ong	   and	   Chan’s	   puritanical	   standards	   were	   the	   exact	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  English	  educated	  as	  portrayed	  in	  conventional	  historiography.	  See	  Hong	  and	  Huang,	  
The	  Scripting	  of	  a	  National	  History,	  pp.	  79	  -­‐	  108.	  	  23	  ST,	  18	  October	  1959.	  24	  ST,	  13	  February	  1981.	  	  25	  Ibid.	  26	  Lee	   Khoon	   Choy,	   “Political	   History	   in	   Singapore	   1945-­‐1965”,	   Oral	   Interview,	  National	  Archives	  of	  Singapore,	  16	  June	  1981.	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reason	   for	   unearthing	   the	   large	   amount	   of	   “yellow	   stuff”	   in	   society.	   This	  suggests	  the	  large	  extent	  that	  the	  Anti-­‐Yellow	  Culture	  Movement	  was	  driven	  by	  their	  personal	  values	  and	  beliefs,	  although	  this	  was	  not	  inconsistent	  with	  what	   the	   party	   wanted.	   Lee	   Khoon	   Choy	   was	   himself	   a	   Chinese-­‐educated	  cadre	  with	  a	  background	  similar	  to	  Ong	  and	  Chan.	  To	  have	  him	  finding	  irony	  in	   their	   puritanical	   endeavour	   implies	   the	   degree	   of	   controlling	   ‘yellow	  culture’	  to	  be	  overblown	  even	  by	  the	  standards	  of	  the	  day.	  	  	  The	   second	   possible	   reason	   for	  Ministry	   of	   Home	   Affairs	   to	   take	   lead	   in	   a	  cultural	  movement	  was	  that	  Ong	  Pang	  Boon	  and	  by	  extension,	  the	  PAP,	  saw	  ‘yellow	  culture’	  as	  a	  matter	  of	   imposing	  order	  and	  control	  and	  not	  merely	  a	  cultural	   issue.	   Social	   behaviour,	   morality	   and	   crime	   were	   conflated	   into	   a	  same	  problem	  that	  could	  be	  resolved	  by	  policing,	  regulating	  and	  censorship.	  Society	   needed	   to	   be	   disciplined,	   and	   this	   attitude	   was	   evident	   in	   a	   joint	  statement	   given	   by	   Ong	   Pang	   Boon,	   Lee	   Kuan	   Yew	   and	   perhaps	  unsurprisingly	   by	   now,	   the	   Commissioner	   of	   Police.	   It	   asserted	   that	   “there	  has	  been	  a	  steady	  decline	  in	  the	  moral	  standards	  of	  society…	  Our	  young	  boys	  and	   girls	   rock	   ‘n’	   roll	   in	   the	   streets	   while	   our	   young	   people	   waste	   their	  precious	  time	  playing	  billiards	  and	  listening	  to	  sexy	  songs.	  Striptease	  shows	  are	  performed	  freely	  and	  publicly.”	  If	  this	  situation	  was	  allowed	  to	  continue,	  there	  would	  be	  a	  “total	  bankruptcy	  of	  the	  moral	  standards	  of	  our	  society”.	  As	  such,	   the	   urgent	   task	   for	   the	   government	   is	   to	   correct	   the	   “degenerate	  standard	  of	  morals…	  to	  create	  a	  new	  and	  healthy	  vigour	  in	  our	  society	  and	  to	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foster	  a	  unified	  Malayan	  culture	  so	  as	   to	  establish	  the	  essential	   foundations	  for	  a	  rational	  society.”	  27	  	  Yao	  Souchou,	   in	  discussing	  Lee	  Kuan	  Yew’s	  chosen	  metaphor	  of	  the	  body	  to	  depict	   national	   culture,	   defines	   social	   discipline	   as	   “an	   idea	   of	   personal	  regime”,	  where	  one	  “reins	  in	  human	  desires	  and	  ‘excessive’	  pleasure-­‐taking,	  fashioning	   as	   it	   does	   a	   prophylactic	   against	   the	   seduction	   of	   ‘yellow	  culture’.”28	  Indeed,	  like	  the	  earlier	  wave	  of	  the	  Anti-­‐Yellow	  Culture	  Movement,	  Ong’s	   joint	   statement	   above	   indicated	   a	   somatisation	  of	   the	  nation.	  He	   saw	  ‘yellow	  culture’	  as	  a	  debilitating	  influence	  on	  the	  national	  body.	  Indulgence	  in	  rock	   ’n’	  roll,	  billiards	  and	  striptease	  –	   ‘hedonistic’	  desires	  in	  his	  eyes	  -­‐	  drew	  away	   precious	   youthful	   energies	   from	   the	   more	   crucial	   tasks	   of	   nation	  building.	  The	  youth	  was	  once	  again	  seen	  as	  the	  bearers	  of	  morality	  within	  the	  society.	  Despite	   the	   emphasis	   on	   the	   youth’s	   responsibility	   to	   the	  nation,	   it	  was	  ultimately	  bureaucratic	   intervention	  and	  a	  state-­‐regulating	  regime	   that	  would	   reverse	   the	   course	   of	   degeneracy	   and	   instil	   “healthy	   vigour”,	  rationality	  and	  social	  discipline	  into	  the	  society.	  	  	  PAP’s	  rhetoric	  of	  social	  discipline	  extends	  into	  the	  way	  it	  governed	  sexuality	  and	   sexual	   relations.	   In	   the	   social	   construction	   of	   a	   post-­‐colonial	   Malayan	  nation	   in	  Singapore,	  PAP	  propagated	  a	  discourse	  of	  sexual	  discipline	   that	   is	  based	   on	   restraint,	   moderation,	   and	   downplaying	   displays	   of	   sexualized	  identities.	  In	  a	  strongly	  worded	  critique	  against	  the	  tabloid	  magazines	  of	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  ST,	  9	  June	  1959.	  28	  Yao	   Souchou,	   Singapore:	   The	   State	   and	   the	   Culture	   of	   Excess,	   (Oxon:	   Routledge,	  2007),	  p.	  58.	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day,	   Ong	   Pang	   Boon	   discussed	   the	   symptoms	   of	   ‘yellow	   culture’	   along	  gendered	  and	  nationalistic	  lines:	  	  	   “The	  view	  presented	   (in	   ‘yellow	  magazines’)	   is	   that	  of	   a	  world	  peopled	  by	   semi-­‐nude	  and	  promiscuous	  women,	   of	   tough	  men	  who	   glory	   in	   violence	   and	   bestiality.	   Just	   as	   harmful	   are	   the	  magazines	  which	  glamourize	  the	  promiscuous	  life	  of	  celebrities,	  dwell	  at	   length	  on	  the	  barnyard	  morals	  of	  the	  less	  reputable	  of	  film	   stars,	   and	   generally	   convey	   the	   impression	   that	   the	   only	  interesting	   people	   worth	   writing	   about	   are	   call	   girls,	   pimps,	  gangsters	  and	  men	  who	  made	  quick	  fortunes	  by	  obviously	  shady	  means.”29	  	  Historians	  of	   Indian	  nationalism	  Partha	  Chatterjee	  and	  Mriralini	  Sinha	  have	  long	   noted	   the	   relationship	   between	   anti-­‐colonialism	   and	   sexuality. 30	  Nationalist	  movements	  were	   not	   just	   launched	   at	   the	   level	   of	   statecraft	   or	  economy,	  but	  also	   in	   cultural	   and	  spiritual	   realms.	   Indian	  nationalists	  were	  concerned	   with	   purifying	   the	   body,	   the	   family	   and	   conjugal	   relations	   as	   a	  form	   of	   spiritual	   defence	   against	   the	   degeneracy	   of	   the	   colonizer.	   These	  modes	  of	  social	  purification	  were	  highly	  gendered,	  as	  womanhood	  were	  used	  to	  signify	  both	  the	  “continuity	  and	  authenticity	  of	  national	  tradition”	  and	  the	  “backwardness”	  of	  a	  past	  to	  be	  eschewed	  by	  the	  modernizing	  project	  of	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  ST,	  25	  July	  1959	  30 	  Partha	   Chatterjee,	   The	   Nation	   and	   Its	   Fragments:	   Colonial	   and	   Postcolonial	  
Histories,	   (Princeton:	   Princeton	   University	   Press,	   1993);	   Mrinalini	   Sinha,	  “Nationalism	  and	  Respectable	  Sexuality	  in	  India”,	  Genders,	  no.	  21,	  1995,	  pp.	  30-­‐57.	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nation”. 31 	  In	   this	   case,	   Ong’s	   statement	   revealed	   a	   suspicion	   towards	  exaggerated	   exhibitions	   of	   gendered	   identity.	   Despite	   championing	   for	  healthy	   vigour	   among	   youths	   in	   the	   earlier	   statement,	   demonstrating	   too	  much	   masculine	   toughness	   was	   associated	   with	   and	   would	   lead	   to	  gangsterism,	   violence,	   and	   bestiality.	   Ong	   also	   took	   issue	   with	   uninhibited	  public	   expressions	   of	   feminine	   sexuality	   in	   celebrities	   and	   film	   stars	   were	  deemed	   ‘promiscuous’	   and	   morally	   questionable.	   Taken	   together,	   ‘yellow	  culture’	  for	  Ong	  was	  the	  excessive	  display	  of	  both	  masculinity	  and	  femininity,	  where	   unrestrained	   demonstrations	   and	   explorations	   of	   sexuality	   meant	  turning	  away	  from	  the	  rational	  mind	  and	  regressing	  into	  bodily	  primitivism.	  	  	  Because	   ‘yellow	  culture’	  was	  seen	  to	  have	  a	  more	  perverse	  and	  devastating	  effect	  on	  women	  than	  it	  had	  on	  men,	  the	  protection	  of	  women	  became	  crucial	  in	  the	  task	  of	  effecting	  a	  moral	  nation.	  In	  Chan	  Choy	  Siong’s	  Chinese	  election	  rally	  speech	  in	  1959,	  she	  declared	  that	  “women	  are	  the	  direct	  victims	  of	  the	  various	  evils	  caused	  by	  yellow	  culture,”	  and	  that	   it	  had	  a	  unequivocal	  effect	  on	  the	  “physical	  and	  spiritual	  health	  of	  our	  women	  and	  culture.”32	  This	  image	  of	  women	  as	  victims	  of	  ‘yellow	  culture’	  needs	  to	  be	  juxtaposed	  with	  Ong	  Pang	  Boon’s	  earlier	  image	  of	  “semi-­‐nude	  and	  promiscuous	  women”	  that	  populated	  ‘yellow	   magazines’.	   For	   the	   PAP,	   women	   were	   altogether	   the	   victims,	   the	  perpetuators,	   and	   the	   solution	  of	   ‘yellow	  culture’.	  Women	  were	   the	  victims	  because,	   like	  Chong	  Geok	  Tin,	   their	  chastity	  was	  violated	  as	  a	  result	  of	  men	  infected	   with	   the	   ‘yellow	   disease’.	   Yet,	   they	   were	   also	   the	   perpetuators	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  Mrinalini	  Sinha,	  “Nations	  in	  an	  Imperial	  Crucible”,	  Gender	  and	  Empire,	  ed.	  Philippa	  Levine,	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2007),	  p.	  192.	  32	  Petir	  (Chinese),	  Issue	  27,	  26	  March	  1959.	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because	   their	   displaying	   of	   sexuality	   was	   the	   cause	   for	   corrupting	   men’s	  rational	   minds.	   Finally,	   women	   were	   the	   solutions	   because	   they	   were	  protectors	  of	  social	  morality	  and	  bearers	  of	  a	  healthy	  culture.	  In	  PAP’s	  early	  gender	  regime,	  reforming	  the	  women	  was	  thus	  crucial	  to	  their	  success.33	  	  	  There	   is	  an	  additional	   layer	  to	  PAP’s	  rhetoric	  to	  social	  and	  sexual	  discipline	  that	  revealed	  the	  adoption	  of	  leftist	  values.	  ‘Yellow	  culture’	  was	  often	  spoken	  in	   the	  same	  vein	  as	   the	  perils	  of	  capitalism.	  Goh	  Keng	  Swee	  blamed	   ‘yellow	  culture’	   as	   the	  effects	  of	   “worst	   forms	  of	   industrial	   civilization.”34	  Ong	  Pang	  Boon’s	   unease	   with	   public	   displays	   of	   feminine	   sexuality	   was	   frequently	  associated	  with	  the	  film	  industry	  –	  a	  place	  where	  “money	  was	  magnificently	  magnified”.35	  In	  another	  radio	  talk,	  Ong	  stated	  that	  while	  sex	  on	  its	  own	  could	  be	  a	  “legitimate	  theme	  for	  art,	  literature	  and	  painting”,	  there	  was	  a	  possibility	  for	  “commercial	  exploitation”.36	  The	  difference	  between	  sex	  in	  ‘high	  art’	  and	  for	   ‘commercial	  purposes’	  was	  that	  the	  former	  “brings	  about	  understanding	  of	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	   sexes”	   and	   the	   latter	   “aimed	   at	   literary	  lechery.”37	  The	  implication	  was	  therefore	  not	  the	  display	  of	  nudity	  itself,	  but	  its	   perceived	   intentions.	   “High	   art”	   was	   presumed	   to	   be	   above	   the	   vulgar	  demands	   of	   capitalism,	   while	   art	   forms	   produced	   for	   profit	   motives	   were	  automatically	   under	   suspect	   for	   committing	   “literary	   lechery”.	   His	  assignation	  of	  blame	  on	  commercialisation	  for	  the	  hazards	  of	  ‘yellow	  culture’	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  The	  term	  “gender	  regime”	  was	  coined	  by	  Connell	  to	  explain	  the	  power	  distribution	  on	  which	  government	  rested.	  R.	  W.	  Connell,	  Gender	  and	  Power:	  Society,	  
the	  Person	  and	  Sexual	  Politics,	  (Cambridge:	  Polity	  Press	  in	  association	  with	  Blackwell,	  1987).	  34	  Petir	  (English),	  vol	  3,	  no.	  12,	  21	  May	  1960.	  35	  ST,	  10	  Feb	  1961.	  36	  ST,	  25	  July	  1959.	  37	  Ibid.	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belies	   a	   socialist	   and	   traditional	   Chinese	   distaste	   for	   the	   mercantile	   class,	  where	   the	   profit	   motive	   cannot	   possibly	   achieve	   the	   artistic	   and	   moral	  standards	   of	   ‘high	   art’.	   In	   the	   Chinese	   version	   of	   the	   PAP	   newsletter,	  Petir	  
Weekly,	   the	   editors	   expounded	   an	   explicit	   condemnation	   of	   the	   capitalist	  class	   in	   its	   definition	   of	   ‘yellow	   culture’,	   which	   is	   “anything	   that	   does	   not	  belong	  to	  the	  masses,	  does	  not	  serve	  the	  masses…	  disregards	  the	  demands	  of	  the	   masses,	   denies	   the	   historical	   effects	   of	   the	   masses…”	   The	   rhetorical	  flourish	   was	   accompanied	   by	   a	   more	   direct	   condemnation:	   “as	   long	   as	   it	  intently	  serves	  as	  the	  instrument	  of	  the	  minority	  capitalist	  or	  the	  ruling	  elite,	  it	  can	  be	  considered	  ‘yellow’.”38	  	  	  
Criticism	  and	  Resistance	  	  Despite	  receiving	  commendations	  from	  the	  Chinese-­‐dominated	  trade	  unions	  and	  cultural	  groups,	   the	  pervasive	  and	  aggressive	  crackdown	  was	  met	  with	  some	   public	   resistance.	   39 	  In	   particular,	   the	   pintable	   parlour	   industry	  organised	   itself	   and	   sent	   a	   delegation	   to	   voice	   their	   complaints	   with	   the	  Ministry	   for	   Labour	   and	   Law.	   The	   delegation	   claimed	   that	   the	   unexpected	  and	   drastic	   ban	   on	   pintable	   machines	   and	   jukeboxes	   had	   directly	   caused	  more	  than	  3,000	  workers	  to	   lose	  their	   jobs,	  and	  another	  10,000	  more	  were	  affected.40	  Despite	  asking	  for	  a	  longer	  lead-­‐time	  to	  implement	  the	  ban	  and	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  Petir	  Weekly,	  Issue	  7,	  29	  August	  1959.	  	  39 	  Xinjiapo	   Zizhibangde	   Chengjiu	   (The	   Achievements	   of	   the	   Self-­‐Government	   of	  
Singapore新加坡自治邦的成就),	  (Singapore:	  Nanyang	  Siang	  Pau,	  1961),	  p.	  5.	  40	  ST,	  16	  June	  1959.	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ease	  their	  unemployed	  workers	  into	  new	  jobs,	  Ong	  Pang	  Boon	  was	  adamant	  that	  “progressive	  clean-­‐up	  of	  these	  saloons	  is	  a	  futile	  venture”.	  41	  As	  a	  final	  hit	  to	  the	  pintable	  owners	  that	  just	  lost	  their	  business,	  Ong	  further	  warned	  that	  the	  government	   “would	   see	   to	   it	   that	   (these	   closed	  down	  parlours)	  did	  not	  reappear	  in	  new	  disguise.”42	  	  Some	   commentators	   in	   the	   Straits	   Times	   cautioned	   against	   taking	   the	  campaign	   too	   far.	   In	   a	   particularly	   harsh	   critique	   against	   the	   government’s	  decision	   to	   fire	   eight	   teachers	   and	   four	   civil	   servants	   for	   watching	   an	  underground	   pornographic	   film	   show,	   a	   commentator	   complained	   that	   the	  “arbitrary	   dispensation	   of	   justice	   without	   warning	   and	   without	   precedent	  can	  hardly	  be	  said	  to	  be	  keeping	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  a	  “more	  just”	  Singapore.”	  The	  article	   pointed	   out	   that	   PAP	   was	   dictating	   the	   personal	   decisions	   of	   the	  people	  while	   telling	   them	  that	   they	  were	  heading	   for	  a	   freer	  society.	   “From	  being	   a	   political	   organisation	   the	   PAP	   has	   become	   the	   conscience	   of	   the	  public.	  Surely	  this	  is	  a	  contradiction.”43	  	  	  	  In	   a	   bid	   to	   appear	   impartial	   in	   the	   execution	   of	   the	   Anti-­‐Yellow	   Culture	  Movement,	   Ong	   Pang	   Boon	   stated	   “in	   defining	   what	   is	   yellow	   culture,	   we	  shall	  always	  be	  on	  guard	  not	  to	  allow	  personal	  preferences	  and	  prejudices	  to	  influence	   our	   judgment.” 44 	  He	   added	   that	   the	   Ministry	   was	   acting	   on	  standards	   of	  morality	   determined	   by	   the	   society,	   and	   reminded	   publishers	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  1959.	  42	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and	   importers	  about	  their	  duty	  to	  the	  society	  and	  urging	  parents	  to	  control	  their	   children	   in	   accordance	   to	   these	   values.	   Yet,	   the	   key	   questions	   of	  who	  decides	  the	  line	  between	  personal	  preference	  and	  society’s	  standards,	  and	  on	  what	  basis,	  remain	  elusive.	  The	  lack	  of	  any	  clear	  definition	  of	  ‘yellow	  culture’	  led	   some	   to	   cast	   doubts	   on	   how	   these	   standards	   could	   be	   determined	   and	  enforced	   even	   within	   the	   bureaucracy.	   One	   Straits	   Times	   contributor	  remarked,	   “Drawing	   the	   line	   is	   demonstrably	   difficult.	   The	   Ministers	  themselves	  may	  be	  clear	  in	  their	  minds	  as	  to	  where	  the	  points	  of	  distinction	  lie.	  Can	  the	  same	  be	  said	  of	  all	  officials	  to	  whom	  the	  actual	  job	  is	  entrusted?”45	  Despite	  Ong’s	   unwillingness	   to	   appear	  prudish,	   the	   strict	   policy	   on	   ‘yellow’	  publications	   led	   some	   publishers	   to	   practice	   self-­‐censorship.	   As	   a	   result,	   a	  teenager	   wrote	   a	   public	   complaint	   calling	   the	   Singapore	   Booksellers’	  Association	   “old-­‐fashioned”	   for	   stopping	   the	   import	   of	   the	   unexpurgated	  edition	  of	  D.H.	  Lawrence’s	  Lady	  Chatterley’s	  Lover.46	  	  	  PAP’s	   efforts	   at	   the	   Anti-­‐Yellow	   Cultural	   Movement	   were	   most	   vocally	  criticized	  by	  University	  of	  Malaya	  Professor	  D.J.	  Enright	  in	  1960	  as	  culturally	  deadening	   and	   even	   “totalitarian”.47	  He	  urged	   the	   government	   of	   Singapore	  to	  let	  the	  people	  decide	  their	  culture	  for	  themselves.	  He	  argued	  that	  “art	  does	  not	   begin	   in	   a	   test-­‐tube,	   it	   does	   not	   take	   its	   origin	   in	   good	   sentiments	   and	  clean	   shaven	   upstanding	   young	   thoughts.”	   He	   considered	   the	   creation	   of	   a	  national	   culture	   to	   be	   beyond	   the	   scope	   of	   a	   government,	   and	   that	   it	   was	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  June	  1959.	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  ST,	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  February	  1961.	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  Liao	  Bolun	  Edgar,	  “The	  Enright	  Affair	  (1960):	  Student	  Activism	  and	  the	  Politics	  of	  Culture	   in	   Singapore”,	   Academic	   Exercise,	   Department	   of	   History,	   National	  University	  of	  Singapore,	  2006.	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something	  to	  be	  grown	  organically	  –	  “who	  can	  decide	  in	  advance	  which	  seeds	  will	   fall	   on	   barren	   ground	   and	  which	  will	   grow?”48	  Enright’s	   remarks	  were	  met	   with	   the	   PAP	   government’s	   firm	   admonition	   that	   a	   foreigner	   had	   no	  business	  in	  meddling	  with	  the	  domestic	  affairs	  in	  Singapore.	  As	  Yao	  Souchou	  puts	  it,	  the	  handling	  of	  the	  kerfuffle	  –	  later	  called	  the	  Enright	  Affair	  –	  by	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Labour	  and	  Law	  had	  “a	  touch	  of	  postcolonial	  settling	  of	  scores”,	  as	  the	  Ministry	  not	  only	  threatened	  to	  send	  Enright	  away	  but	  reminded	  him	  in	  a	  sternly-­‐worded	   letter	   that	   “the	   days	   are	   gone	  when	   birds	   of	   passage	   from	  Europe	   or	   elsewhere	   used	   to	   make	   it	   a	   habit	   of	   participating	   from	   their	  superman	  heights	  of	  European	  civilization.”49	  	  Despite	  the	  earlier	  claims	  from	  PAP	  about	  being	  the	  voice	  of	  morality,	  society	  was	   not	   in	   consensus	   over	   the	   issue.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   news	   of	   the	  government’s	   treatment	   of	   the	   Enright	   Affair	   provoked	   protests	   from	   the	  students	   of	   Malayan	   University.	   The	   Student	   Union	   organised	   sit-­‐ins	   to	  condemn	  the	  Singapore	  Government’s	  attempt	  to	  “strangle	  free	  discussion	  in	  the	   University	   and	   to	   cow	   an	   individual	   into	   silence	   for	   expressing	   views	  which	  do	  not	  coincide	  with	   the	  official	  ones”.50	  Their	  protests	  surprised	   the	  PAP	   leadership,	   who	   associated	   the	   English-­‐educated	   students	   with	   their	  apparent	  “apathy,	  self-­‐centredness	  and	  lack	  of	  self-­‐confidence”.51	  In	  fairness,	  the	  Malayan	  University	  students	  did	  not	  identify	  with	  the	  Anti-­‐Yellow	  Culture	  cause	  as	  much	  as	  their	  Chinese-­‐speaking	  contemporaries.	  One	  student	  even	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declared,	  “we	  are	  not	  concerned	  with	  the	  truths	  of	  Professor	  Enright’s	  lecture	  but	  on	  the	  fundamental	  principles	  of	  a	  democratic	  society.”52	  	  Consequently,	  the	   Singapore	   People’s	   Alliance	   and	   Singapore	   Congress	   took	   this	  opportunity	   to	  politicize	   the	   issue,	  calling	  PAP’s	  heavy-­‐handed	   treatment	  of	  Professor	  Enright	  “undemocratic”	  and	  “boorish”.53	  	  	  The	   reactions	   from	   the	   English-­‐speaking	   community	   contrasted	   with	   the	  response	   from	   the	   Nanyang	   University	   Student	   Union,	   who	   issued	   a	  statement:	   “(Enright’s)	   attempts	   to	   mock	   the	   local	   culture	   from	   a	   place	   of	  cultural	   superiority	   and	   arrogance,	   his	   speech	   that	   hurt	   the	   dignity	   of	   the	  local	   people,	   are	   only	   a	   testament	   to	   his	   narrow-­‐mindedness.” 54 	  The	  statement	   then	   reiterated	   its	   support	   for	   PAP’s	   Anti-­‐Yellow	   Culture	  Movement	   and	   its	   efforts	   for	   building	   a	   Malayan	   culture.	   In	   another	  commentary	   on	  Nanyang	   Siang	   Pau,	   the	   author	   pointed	   out	   that	   Enright’s	  remarks	  were	  not	  academic	  at	  all,	   and	   thus	   it	  was	   “a	   joke”	   for	   the	  Malayan	  University	  students	  to	  be	  defending	  his	  “academic	  freedom”.55	  	  	  The	   different	   responses	   to	   the	   Enright	   controversy	   highlight	   the	   fissures	  between	   the	   English	   and	   Chinese-­‐speaking	   communities	   in	   Singapore.	   It	  showed	  how	   the	  Anti-­‐Yellow	  Culture	   rhetoric	   found	   little	   resonance	  among	  the	   English-­‐educated,	   and	   was	   instead	   aimed	   directly	   at	   garnering	   the	  support	   of	   the	   Chinese-­‐educated.	   The	   Enright	   episode	   also	   represented	   a	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differing	   understanding	   of	   ‘yellow	   culture’.	   The	   English	   professor	   had	  underestimated	   how	   serious	   the	   PAP	   government	   was	   in	   its	   endeavour	   to	  build	   a	   ‘national	   culture’.	   As	   a	   white	   man,	   Enright	   had	   also	   miscalculated	  what	  he	  himself	  symbolized	  in	  the	  pervasive	  mood	  of	  anti-­‐colonialism	  in	  the	  region.56	  At	   the	   same	   time,	   this	   incident	   also	   revealed	   the	   extent	   of	   PAP’s	  dogged	   persistence	   in	   their	   belief	   that	   a	   ‘national	   culture’	   could	   be	  engineered	  through	  policy.	  PAP’s	  Anti-­‐Yellow	  Culture	  policies	  should	  be	  seen	  in	  light	  of	  how	  the	  core	  leadership	  understood	  the	  role	  of	  culture	  in	  society,	  as	  well	  as	  how	  they	  have	  navigated	   the	  dynamics	  between	   the	  Chinese	  and	  English-­‐speaking	  bases.	  	  
	  
PAP’s	  Political	  Imperatives	  and	  Balancing	  the	  Tightrope	  	  	  The	  Anti-­‐Yellow	  Culture	  Movement	  was	  not	   just	   an	  opportunity	   for	  PAP	   to	  exert	   its	  bureaucratic	  muscles	   in	  an	  attempt	   to	  whip	  up	  national	  discipline.	  They	  were	  driven	  by	  political	  imperatives	  of	  survival	  and	  hegemony	  as	  well.	  In	  order	  to	  understand	  that,	  one	  needs	  to	  first	  recognise	  the	  political	  climate	  in	  which	  the	  PAP	  came	  into	  power.	  In	  the	  dominant	  historical	  narrative,	  the	  PAP	   came	   into	   power	   in	   1959	   riding	   on	   an	   uneasy	   alliance	   between	   the	  English-­‐educated	  moderates	  who	  dominated	  the	  top	  leadership	  of	  the	  party,	  and	   the	   Chinese-­‐educated	   leftists	   who	   commanded	   the	  mass	   base	   of	   trade	  union	  workers	  and	  politically	  active	  students.	  This	  narrative	  has	  painted	  the	  early	   years	  of	  PAP’s	  political	   career	   as	   a	   constant	  battle	  between	  Lee	  Kuan	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Yew’s	   faction	   and	   the	   pro-­‐Communists. 57 	  Terms	   like	   “riding	   the	   tiger”	  referred	  to	  the	  precarious	  strategy	  employed	  by	  Lee	  and	  his	  team	  to	  outwit	  and	   outmanoeuvre	   communism.	   This	   sets	   Lee	   and	   the	   pro-­‐Communists	   in	  distinctive	  camps.	  However,	  these	  depictions	  oversimplified	  the	  factionalism	  and	   unities	   that	   existed	   in	   PAP’s	   initial	   years.	   Among	   the	   English-­‐educated	  were	  the	  ‘moderates’	  such	  as	  Lee	  Kuan	  Yew,	  Toh	  Chin	  Chye,	  Goh	  Keng	  Swee	  and	   S.	   Rajaratnam,	   and	   the	   relatively	   more	   radical	   socialists	   such	   as	   J.	  Puthucheary	  and	  S.	  Woodhull,	  who	   identified	   themselves	   ideologically	  with	  the	   Chinese	   leftists.58	  Similarly,	   among	   the	   Chinese-­‐educated	   factions,	   there	  were	  ideologically	  more	  radical	  individuals	  whom	  Lee	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  “left-­‐wing	  adventurers”,	   and	   there	  were	   the	   ‘moderates’	  whom	  Lee	   identified	   as	  crucial	  to	  bridging	  the	  party	  with	  the	  Chinese	  masses,	  such	  as	  Ong	  Pang	  Boon,	  Chan	   Choy	   Siong,	   Jek	   Yeun	   Thong,	   Lee	   Khoon	   Choy.	   Moreover,	   the	   PAP	  leadership	  was	  also	  not	  as	  clearly	  demarcated	  into	  two	  camps	  –	  there	  were	  factions	  who	  opposed	   the	  Central	  Executive	  Committee	   (CEC)	  but	  were	  not	  clearly	  in	  one	  camp	  or	  the	  other,	  such	  as	  Ong	  Eng	  Guan,	  who	  later	  broke	  away	  from	  the	  party	  to	  contest	   the	  PAP	  as	  an	   independent	  candidate	   in	  the	  1961	  Anson	  by-­‐elections.	  The	  divisions	  from	  within	  the	  party	  from	  the	  onset	  led	  to	  	  “a	  subtle,	  but	  conscious,	  ideological	  contest.”59	  	  Despite	  –	  or	  arguably	  perhaps,	  because	  –	  of	  the	  contest,	  each	  of	  these	  camps	  were	  mutually	   influencing	  and	  reacting	  to	  one	  another,	  and	  the	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  Bloodworth,	  The	  Tiger	  and	  the	  Trojan	  Horse.	  58	  Petir	  (English),	  vol	  3,	  no.	  4,	  December	  1959.	  59	  Albert	  Lau,	  “Pragmatism:	  A	  History	  of	  the	  Ideas	  of	  Socialism	  of	  the	  People’s	  Action	  Party	  (1954-­‐1976)”,	  Academic	  Exercise,	  Department	  of	  History,	  National	  University	  of	  Singapore,	  1981,	  p.	  33.	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Culture	   Movement	   was	   a	   clear	   instance	   of	   the	   ‘moderates’	   and	   ‘radicals’	  working	   with	   each	   other	   to	   achieve	   certain	   social	   objectives	   while	  establishing	   their	   ideological	  positioning.	  Edgar	  Liao	  has	  suggested	   that	   the	  Anti-­‐Yellow	   Culture	   Movement	   was	   a	   move	   to	   compete	   with	   the	   pro-­‐Communists	   for	   Chinese	   support.60	  While	   there	   was	   some	   truth	   in	   this	  argument,	   it	   was	   not	   a	   case	   of	   competition	   but	   rather	   co-­‐optation.	   At	   its	  inauguration,	  PAP	  was	  firmly	  leftist	  in	  its	  outlook,	  and	  overtly	  championed	  its	  socialist	   democratic	   ideology.	   As	   one	   of	   the	   first	   mass-­‐based	   parties	   in	  Singapore,	   PAP	   was	   also	   influenced	   by	   the	   values	   of	   the	   Chinese	   left	   and	  motivated	  to	  absorb	  the	  puritan	  and	  moralistic	  ideals	  as	  their	  own.	  This	  has	  led	   some	   outsiders	   to	   question	   if	   PAP	   was	   already	   a	   communist	   party,	  although	   this	   query	  was	   countered	   by	   some	   radicals	  within	   the	   party	  who	  were	   also	   criticizing	   the	   moderates	   for	   being	   “not	   left	   enough”,	   “not	  ideologically	  deep	  enough”	  and	  being	  a	  “milk-­‐in-­‐water	  socialist”.61	  Lee	  Kuan	  Yew	  and	  the	  moderates	  realised	  that	  the	  key	  to	  winning	  over	  the	  hearts	  and	  minds	  of	   the	   left-­‐influenced	  masses	  was	   to	   “out-­‐left	   the	   left.”62	  	  Taking	   into	  account	  PAP’s	  agenda,	  the	  Anti-­‐Yellow	  Culture	  Movement	  should	  be	  seen	  in	  the	   light	   of	   the	   Party	   cultivating	   a	   state	   hegemony	   by	   appealing	   to	   the	  Chinese-­‐speaking	  masses.	  	  	  The	  courting	  of	  Chinese	  mass	  support	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  mass-­‐oriented,	   Chinese	   language	  party	  newsletter,	  Xingdong	  Zhoukan	   (行动
周刊,	  Petir	  Weekly),	  in	  1959.	  This	  publication	  was	  different	  from	  the	  internal	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  60	  Liao,	  “Enright	  Affair”,	  p.	  21.	  61	  Yap,	  Lim	  and	  Leong,	  Men	  in	  White,	  p.	  82.	  62	  Ibid.,	  p.	  166.	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party	  organ	  Xingdong	  Bao	  (行动报,	  Petir),	  which	  was	  first	  published	  in	  1954	  in	   four	   languages	   (English,	   Chinese,	   Malay	   and	   Tamil)	   as	   a	   means	   to	  communicate	  with	  party	  members.63	  While	  both	  Petir	  Weekly	  and	  Petir	  were	  published	  alongside	  each	  other,	   the	   former’s	  contents	  were	  decidedly	  more	  varied	  and	  had	  less	  focus	  on	  party	  happenings	  than	  the	  original	  Petir.	  Stylized	  as	  a	  literary	  and	  current	  affairs	  magazine,	  the	  format	  of	  Petir	  Weekly	  was	  not	  unlike	   the	   youth	   periodicals	   of	   the	   early	   1950s.	   While	   the	   cover	   of	   each	  edition	  often	  featured	  political	  events,	  such	  as	  LKY’s	  visits	  to	  other	  countries	  or	  the	  building	  of	  public	  housing,	  more	  than	  half	  of	  each	  issue	  were	  devoted	  to	   literary	  works	   like	  plays,	  novels	  and	  essays	  which	  debated	  on	  artistic	  or	  literary	  matters.64	  	  	  The	  Anti-­‐Yellow	  Culture	  Movement	  was	   in	   fact	  one	  of	   the	   founding	  reasons	  for	  Petir	  Weekly.	   In	   the	   foreword	  of	   the	   first	   issue,	   the	   editor	   asserted	   that	  eradication	  of	  ‘yellow	  culture’	  was	  one	  of	  PAP’s	  top	  priorities.	  ‘Yellow	  culture’	  represented	   the	   “darkness,	   corruption,	   carelessness,	   superficiality”	   of	   old	  society,	  and	  thus	  needs	  to	  be	  eradicated	  to	  make	  way	  for	  a	  new	  culture	  that	  was	   driven	   by	   the	   PAP.65	  The	   editor	   proclaimed	   that	   Petir	   Weekly	   would	  collaborate	   with	   local	   writers,	   artists,	   publishers,	   cultural	   groups	   and	   the	  government	   to	   achieve	   this	   aim.	   The	   editor	  was	   none	   other	   than	   Jek	   Yeun	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  63	  The	  editor	  for	  the	  Chinese	  edition	  of	  this	  paper	  was	  Chan	  Sun	  Wing.	  Coming	  from	  a	  Chinese	  speaking	  background,	  he	  was	  an	  associate	  with	  the	  Chinese	  leftists	  and	  his	  administrative	  capabilities	  earned	  him	  Lee’s	   trust.	  However,	  he	  was	  soon	  revealed	  to	  be	  a	  MCP	  member	  and	  defected	  to	  Barisan	  Socialis	  after	  the	  1961	  Split.	  See	  Yap,	  Lim	  and	  Leong,	  Men	  in	  White,	  p.	  4.	  	  64	  See	  Appendix:	  Figure	  8	  and	  Figure	  9.	  65	  Petir	  Weekly,	  Issue	  7,	  20	  August	  1959.	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Thong,	  who	  was	  concurrently	  the	  Chairman	  of	  the	  Board	  of	  Film	  Censors	  in	  1959.	  	  	  Yet,	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  Anti-­‐Yellow	  Culture	  Movement	  was	  not	  merely	  to	  appeal	   to	   the	   idealisms	   of	   the	   Chinese-­‐speaking	   masses.	   Its	   imperative	  resided	   in	   convincing	   them	   of	   PAP’s	   willingness	   to	   disregard	   ‘unhealthy’	  elements	   of	   Western	   culture	   while	   treading	   the	   path	   of	   parliamentary	  democracy	   that	   also	   has	   its	   roots	   in	   Western	   civilization.	   For	   both	   the	  moderates	  and	  the	  leftists,	  ‘yellow	  culture’	  was	  not	  merely	  an	  issue	  of	  youth	  delinquency	   or	   national	   dignity,	   but	  was	   a	  matter	   of	   consolidating	   political	  capital	   and	   ensuring	   the	   survival	   of	   PAP.	   Chan	   Sun	   Wing,	   the	   Chinese-­‐educated	  parliamentary	  secretary	  who	   later	  broke	  away	  to	   join	   the	  Barisan	  Sosialis,	  argued	  in	  1959	  that	  	  	  	   “If	  western	  democracy	  is	  represented	  by	  people	  like	  Chew	  Swee	  Kee	  who	  pocketed	  American	  money,	   if	  rock	  n	  roll	  becomes	  the	  symbol	  of	  western	  democracy,	  if	  the	  western	  democratic	  way	  of	  life	   consists	   of	   cars,	   European	   architecture	   and	   women,	   if	  western	  democracy	  ultimately	   boils	   down	   to	   allowing	   a	   few	  Assemblymen…	  to	  put	  up	  their	  farcical	  acts	  here	  every	  now	  and	  then,	   instead	   of	   being	   instrumental	   in	   raising	   the	   standard	   of	  
	   109	  
life	   of	   the	   people,	   let	   me	   ask	   you	   then	   what	   attraction	  Western	  democracy	  has	  had	  for	  the	  Chinese	  youths.”66	  	  PAP’s	   incorporation	   of	   the	   values	   and	   ethics	   of	   the	   Chinese	   left	   was	   not	  without	  discomfort.	  As	  early	  as	  1957,	   the	  branches	  of	  PAP	  were	  dominated	  by	   Chinese-­‐speaking	   members,	   who	   organized	   mass	   picnics	   overtly	   for	  bonding	  and	  mobilising	  against	  “sexy	  and	  yellow	  cultures	  and	  the	  madness	  of	  entertainment	   centres”. 67 	  However,	   the	   format	   of	   these	   picnics,	   which	  included	   Chinese	   folk	   dancing,	   group	   singing,	   and	   chanting	   of	   slogans	  reminiscent	   of	   Communist	   China,	   alarmed	   the	   moderates	   and	   the	   non-­‐Chinese	   speaking	   members	   of	   PAP.	   Toh	   Chin	   Chye	   recalled	   how	  “flabbergasted”	  he	  was	  when	  he	  attended	  the	  first	  of	  these	  picnics	  organized	  by	   the	   Tanjong	   Pagar	   Branch	   in	   1955,	   and	   how	   K.M.	   Bryne,	   one	   of	   the	  founding	  members	  of	  PAP,	  was	  red-­‐faced	  doing	   the	   “yang-­‐ko”	   (Chinese	   folk	  dance).68	  The	  dominance	  of	  the	  Chinese-­‐speaking	  leftists	  led	  to	  the	  alienation	  of	   non-­‐Chinese	   and	   English-­‐educated	  members,	   which	   further	   perpetuated	  the	   image	   that	   the	   PAP	   was	   becoming	   a	   Chinese	   party.69	  The	   disconnect	  between	   the	   leadership	  core	  and	   the	  branches	  were	  so	  acute	   that	   “only	   the	  views	  of	  the	  leftist	  union	  leaders	  filtered	  through	  to	  the	  branches;	  the	  views	  of	  Lee	  and	  Toh	  were	  blocked.”70	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  66	  Chew	   Swee	   Kee	   was	   the	   former	   Minister	   of	   Education	   in	   the	   Labour	   Front	  Government,	  whom	  PAP	  accused	  of	  corruption	  through	  receiving	  political	  donation	  from	  America.	  Singapore	  Parliamentary	  Report	  (Hansard),	  20	  July	  1959.	  	  67	  Thomas	  Bellows,	  The	  People’s	  Action	  Party	  of	  Singapore:	  Emergence	  of	  a	  Dominant	  
Party	  System,	  (New	  Haven:	  Yale	  University	  Southeast	  Asia	  Studies,	  1970),	  p.	  25.	  68	  Ong	  Pang	  Boon,	   “Problems	  of	  Party	  Organization:	  The	  pro-­‐communist	  Challenge	  from	  within	  1954-­‐57”,	  Petir:	  PAP	  25th	  Anniversary	  Issue,	  1979,	  p.	  48.	  69	  Yap,	  Lim	  and	  Leong,	  Men	  in	  White,	  p.	  119.	  70	  Ibid.,	  p.	  122.	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  71	  “The	   Fixed	   Political	   Objectives	   of	   Our	   Party:	   A	   Policy	   Statement	   by	   the	   Central	  Executive	   Committee	   of	   the	   PAP”,	  People’s	  Action	  Party	  6th	  Anniversary	  Celebration	  
Souvenir,	  31	  December	  	  1960,	  p.	  3.	  72	  Our	  First	  Ten	  Years	  –	  PAP	  10th	  Anniversary	  Souvenir,	  21	  Nov	  1964,	  p.	  268.	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Conclusion	  	  PAP’s	  Anti-­‐Yellow	  Culture	  Movement	  in	  1959	  to	  1961	  signifies	  a	  time	  when	  being	   the	   moral	   crusader	   still	   had	   much	   traction	   among	   the	   Chinese-­‐dominated	  and	   leftist-­‐influenced	   constituency.	   Its	   reorientation	  of	   the	  Anti-­‐Yellow	  Culture	  Movement	  represented	  an	  amalgamation	  of	  values	  and	  policy	  goals	  for	  the	  various	  factions	  within	  the	  party,	  and	  it	  was	  also	  an	  important	  cause	  that	  gathered	  political	  capital	  for	  the	  PAP.	  The	  movement	  signified	  the	  origins	   of	   an	   insistence	   on	   social	   and	   sexual	   discipline	   –	   a	   governing	  rationality	  which	   extended	   far	  beyond	   the	  1960s	   and	  across	   various	  policy	  sectors.	  The	  implementation	  of	  this	  movement	  set	  many	  precedents	  for	  state	  intervention	   into	   the	   cultural	   realm,	   and	   defined	   the	   tone	   for	   national	  disciplining	   through	   the	   control	   of	   information	   and	   the	   arts.	   This	   was	   a	  necessary	  move	  to	  acquire	  the	  much	  needed	  political	  capital	  from	  their	  most	  immediate	   competitors	   of	   the	   Chinese-­‐educated	   leftists.	   However	   by	   mid-­‐1961,	   PAP	   was	   beset	   with	   a	   series	   of	   internal	   crises	   as	   they	   lost	   two	  important	  by-­‐elections	  and	  had	  13	  key	  members	  split	  away	  to	  form	  the	  new	  party	   of	   Barisan	   Sosialis.	   PAP’s	   initial	   attention	   on	   the	   ‘anti-­‐yellow	   culture’	  cause	  soon	  gave	  way	  to	  other	  pressing	  matters	  as	  they	  battle	  challenges	  from	  within	  the	  party,	  as	  well	  as	  to	  prepare	  the	  ground	  for	  a	  controversial	  merger	  with	  Malaya.	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EPILOGUE:	  
The	  Drama	  Ensues	  
	  Indeed,	   the	   Anti-­‐Yellow	   Culture	   Movement	   can	   be	   viewed	   as	   not	   having	  ended	   in	   1961.	   For	   many	   critics	   of	   the	   state’s	   cultural	   policy,	   the	   Enright	  affair	   in	   1960	   represented	   the	   beginning	   of	   an	   epoch	   of	   PAP	   cultural	  authoritarianism.1	  In	   the	   1970s,	   the	   PAP	   further	   implemented	   a	   series	   of	  disciplinary	   policies	   in	   the	   name	   of	   controlling	   ‘yellow	   culture’.	   Long	   hair	  came	  to	  represent	   the	   loose,	  hedonistic	  and	  decadent	  Western	   lifestyle	   that	  Singaporeans	   could	   ill-­‐afford	   in	   the	   march	   towards	   economic	   progress.	  2	  Across	  government	  agencies,	  men	  with	  long	  hair	  were	  to	  be	  served	  last	  and	  male	  foreigners	  were	  ordered	  to	  trim	  their	  tresses	  upon	  entering	  Singapore	  or	   be	   turned	   away.3	  Several	   renowned	   rock	   musicians	   (clearly	   those	   with	  long	   hair)	   cancelled	   their	   shows	   in	   protest	   and	   this	   gave	   rise	   to	   criticisms	  that	  Singapore	  was	  becoming	  a	  “cultural	  desert”.4	  In	  response	  to	  these	  drastic	  measures,	   one	   former	  American	   information	  officer	   remarked	   sarcastically:	  “brash,	  rich,	  little	  Singapore	  is	  beginning	  to	  exhibit	  much	  concern	  about	  ‘life	  quality’…	  the	  government	  leaders	  now	  act	  and	  sound	  as	  if	  they	  are	  convinced	  that	  they	  can	  keep	  the	  heads	  both	  square	  and	  clear,	  the	  bodies	  fit	  and	  clean,	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  and	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  Counter	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  and	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  in	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  (Hong	  Kong:	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  Kong	  University	  Press,	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  p.	  43.	  	  2	  Willard,	  Culture,	  Yellow	  Culture,	  Counter	  Culture	  and	  Polyculture,	  p.	  8.	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  1972;	  ST,	  23	  June	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the	   sexes	   discreetly	   differentiated,	   and	   the	   society	   sound	   and	   stable.”5	  The	  state’s	  paranoia	  to	  the	  perils	  of	  negative	  Western	  influences	  came	  to	  a	  head	  in	  the	  1990s	  during	  the	  Asian	  Values	  debate.	  Concerned	  about	  the	  perceived	  erosion	  of	  values	  brought	  about	  by	  an	  increasingly	  globalized	  economy,	  PAP	  resorted	   to	  explaining	   the	  basis	  of	  Singapore’s	  economic	  success	   in	  cultural	  terms.	  They	  emphasized	  ‘traditional’	  values	  such	  as	  Confucianism,	  respect	  for	  authority	  and	  order,	  and	  family	  centricity	  to	  quell	  criticisms	  in	  the	  Western	  media	  about	  its	  control	  of	  media	  and	  lack	  of	  human	  rights.6	  	  	  Although	   the	   term	   ‘yellow	   culture’	   was	   not	   explicitly	   used	   again	   after	   the	  1970s,	   the	   pathology	   of	   cultural	   contagion	   and	   the	   ensuing	   sense	   of	   crisis	  continue	   to	   be	   invoked.	   A	   recent	   development	   was	   the	   controversy	  surrounding	   local	   director	   Tan	   Pin	   Pin’s	   2014	   documentary,	   ‘To	   Singapore	  With	   Love”	   which	   featured	   the	   current	   lives	   of	   several	   political	   exiles,	  including	   a	   few	   former	   Chinese	   leftists	   in	   the	   1950s	   and	   1960s.	   Despite	  having	   received	   critical	   acclaim	   from	   international	   film	   festivals,	   the	   state	  issued	   a	   ban	   on	   its	   screening	   on	   grounds	   that	   the	   film	   “obfuscates	   and	  whitewashes	   an	   armed	   insurrection	   by	   an	   illegal	   organisation,	   and	   violent	  and	  subversive	  acts	  directed	  at	  Singaporeans.”	  To	  allow	  the	  film	  to	  be	  shown	  “would	   effectively	   mean	   condoning	   the	   use	   of	   violence	   and	   subversion	   in	  Singapore,	   and	   thus	   harm	   our	   national	   security.”7	  It	  would	   appear	   that	   the	  stern	  and	  morally	  simplistic	  rhetoric	  of	  cultural	  products	  posing	  a	  threat	  on	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Willard,	  Culture,	  Yellow	  Culture,	  p.	  8.	  6	  Yao,	  State	  and	  Culture	  of	  Excess,	  p.	  69.	  7	  “To	   Singapore,	  With	   Love	   'contains	   untruths	   about	   history':	  Dr	   Yaacob”,	   Channel	  News	  Asia,	  7	  October	  2014,	  	  	  [http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/singapore/to-­‐singapore-­‐with-­‐love/1402042.html],	  (Accessed:	  1	  December	  2014).	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the	  nation	  was	  still	  salient	  sixty	  years	  on.	  Airing	  a	  film	  with	  “subversive”	  and	  “violent”	   content	   was	   tantamount	   to	   spreading	   actual	   subversion	   and	  violence,	   and	   therefore	   it	   ought	   to	   be	   contained.	  Whereas	   in	   the	  1950s	   the	  leftist	  activists	  had	  championed	  most	  vigorously	  against	  ‘yellow	  culture’	  and	  set	   in	  motion	  a	  national	  rhetoric	  for	  cultural	  containment,	   it	  was	  ironic	  that	  these	  very	  protagonists	  would	  later	  be	  cast	  in	  the	  category	  of	  the	  un-­‐seeable	  and	   thus	   the	  obscene.	  As	  a	  corollary,	   critiques	  of	  PAP’s	  cultural	  policy	  have	  often	  focused	  on	  its	  authoritarianism,	  media	  censorship,	  lack	  of	  freedom,	  and	  the	  official	  “scripting	  of	  history”.8	  Yet	  in	  a	  not	  too	  distant	  past,	  these	  Chinese	  leftist	   students	   themselves	   advocated	   for	   heavier	   censorship	   and	   were	   in	  favour	  of	  stringent	  measures	  to	  guard	  against	  morally	  contaminating	  cultural	  products.	  PAP’s	  institutionalization	  of	  the	  Anti-­‐Yellow	  Culture	  Movement	  was	  born	   out	   of	   a	   historical	   contingency	   to	   appeal	   to	   this	  mass	   base,	   and	   their	  cultural	   strategy,	   among	   other	   things,	   have	   brought	   them	   success	   at	   the	  ballot	  boxes	  for	  the	  past	  five	  decades.	  	  	  Today,	   it	   is	   no	   longer	   groundbreaking	   to	   stress	   that	   moral	   labels	   have	   no	  inherent	  stable	  meaning,	  yet	  they	  continue	  to	  have	  traction	  and	  they	  deserve	  scrutiny.	   The	   contemporaneous	   controversial	   discourses	   of	   terrorism,	  censorship,	  immigration,	  gay	  rights	  and	  so	  on	  were	  still	  persistently	  couched	  in	   moral	   terms.	   As	   various	   interest	   groups	   asserted	   their	   values	   more	  forcefully,	  society	   is	  segmented	  into	  an	  array	  of	  positions	  and	  beliefs.	  Going	  back	  to	  Foucault	  and	  his	  archaeological	  method	  of	  excavating	  the	  discursive	  space	  around	  these	  objects,	  we	  should	  be	  empowered	  to	  peel	  apart	  the	  layers	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Hong	  and	  Huang,	  The	  Scripting	  of	  A	  National	  History.	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of	  discourses	  to	  uncover	  its	  perpetuators,	  their	  interests,	  and	  to	  deconstruct	  the	  array	  of	  inherent	  contradictions	  and	  ironies.	  	  	  This	  study	  has	  contextualised	  the	  development	  of	  cultural	  discourses	  that	  are	  framed	  in	  moral	  terms.	  It	  has	  argued	  that	  the	  Anti-­‐Yellow	  Culture	  Movement,	  as	   a	   unique	   case	   study	   in	   Singapore’s	   history,	   was	   a	   discursive	   space	   that	  emerged	  when	  an	  array	  of	  postcolonial	  imaginings	  was	  in	  competition.	  It	  was	  amidst	   these	  competing	  visions	   that	   issues	  of	  morality,	   identity	  and	  culture	  became	   hugely	   contested.	   The	   ‘anti-­‐yellow	   culture’	   rhetoric	   became	   an	  effective	   platform	   for	   the	   various	   parties	   to	   achieve	   their	   respective	   aims.	  The	   shifting	   and	   uncertain	   backdrop	   of	   decolonisation,	   onset	   of	   the	   global	  Cold	  War,	  post-­‐war	  cosmopolitanism	  and	  the	  budding	  nationalist	  movements	  provided	   fertile	   ground	   for	   stabilizing	   moral	   arguments	   to	   take	   root.	   The	  term	   ‘yellow	   culture’	   was	   a	   potent	   weapon	   for	   the	   various	   groups	   to	   use	  against	   their	  detractors.	   Its	   inherent	   contradictory	   and	   contested	  meanings	  were	  often	  overshadowed	  by	   the	   forceful	  ways	   that	   it	  was	  used	   to	  assert	   a	  sense	  of	  moral	  righteousness.	  Regrettably,	  there	  were	  several	  directions	  that	  this	   thesis	   was	   unable	   to	   fully	   pursue,	   such	   as	   the	   construction	   of	   gender	  regimes,	   or	   a	   more	   in-­‐depth	   treatment	   of	   inter-­‐racial	   representations	   and	  relations	  among	  the	  1950s	  Chinese	  community.	  Like	  the	  Anti-­‐Yellow	  Culture	  Movement,	  itself	  a	  divergent	  drama	  with	  multiple	  protagonists	  and	  stages,	  it	  is	  my	  modest	  hope	   that	   the	  culmination	  of	   this	  narrative	  would	   lead	   to	   the	  opening	  of	  another.	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APPENDIX:	  
	  
Newspaper	  Reports	  and	  Periodical	  Illustrations	  	  	  	  	  
	  
Figure	  1:	  News	  report	  of	  Chong	  Geok	  Tin's	  rape	  and	  murder	  	  (Source:	  NYSP,	  13	  October	  1953)	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Figure	  2:	  Selected	  covers	  of	  major	  youth	  periodicals:	  	  (from	  top	  left,	  clockwise)	  Gengyun,	  Huangdi,	  Shidaibao,	  Wenyibao,	  Renjian	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Figure	  3:	  Cover	  of	  Huangdi,	  Issue	  6	  "Special	  Edition	  on	  Suppressing	  Yellow	  Culture"	  (Source:	  Huangdi,	  Issue	  6,	  15	  November	  1953)	  
Figure	  4:	  Poem	  and	  cartoon	  calling	  for	  the	  purging	  of	  'yellow	  culture'.	  The	  words	  on	  the	  black	  book	  are	  'pornographic	  culture'.	  	  (Source:	  Huangdi,	  Issue	  6,	  11	  February	  1954)	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Figure	  5:	  Back	  cover	  of	  Huangdi,	  showing	  advertisements	  and	  suscription	  information	  (Source:	  Huangdi,	  Issue	  9,	  1	  January	  1954)	  
Figure	  6:	  Illustrations	  for	  Yao	  Zi's	  short	  story	  'Orang	  Ali',	  which	  sparked	  controversy	  about	  its	  'yellow-­‐ness'.	  	  (Source:	  Wenyibao,	  Issue	  1,	  15	  February	  1954)	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Figure	  7:	  News	  report	  of	  PAP’s	  initiation	  of	  the	  Anti	  Yellow	  Culture	  Movement	  mere	  8	  days	  after	  swearing	  in	  (Source:	  ST,	  9	  June	  1959)	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Figure	  9:	  Cartoon	  depicting	  PAP’s	  efforts	  in	  the	  Anti-­‐Yellow	  Culture	  Movement.	  The	  two	  banners	  behind	  the	  trio	  read	  “Persistently	  anti-­‐yellow”	  and	  ”promote	  healthy	  culture”.	  The	  torn	  banner	  on	  the	  floor	  reads	  “yellow”.	  	  (Source:	  Petir	  Weekly,	  Issue	  5,	  15	  August	  1959)	  
Figure	  8:	  Cover	  of	  Inaugural	  Issue	  of	  Petir	  Weekly,	  PAP’s	  Chinese	  newsletter	  	  (Source:	  Petir	  Weekly,	  Issue	  1,	  18	  July	  1959)	  
